Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (10)
- Doctoral Thesis (3)
- Report (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (14)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (14)
Keywords
- Kapitalmarkt (14) (remove)
Institute
Market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side, as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt, but also from the asset side. This will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply, so that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus creating an asset market-based incentive for banks to hold capital. Borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the loans, which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid o.. Since borrowers do not fully internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks, the level of capital demanded by market participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator, even when capital is a relatively costly source of funds. This implies that capital requirements may not be binding, as recent evidence seems to indicate. JEL Classification: G21, G38
Im Rahmen der Arbeit wird empirisch untersucht, welche Reaktionen die Veröffentlichung von Periodenergebnissen als Teil der Unternehmenspublizität am deutschen Kapitalmarkt auslöst, welches die Bestimmungsfaktoren für das Ausmaß der Kapitalmarktreaktionen sind und ob Unternehmen in der Lage sind, durch ihre Publizitätsentscheidungen die Kapitalmarktreaktionen auf die Veröffentlichung von Periodenergebnissen zu beeinflussen. Kapitalmarktreaktionen auf die Veröffentlichung von Periodenergebnissen werden im Rahmen dieser Arbeit anhand von Aktienkursen und Handelsvolumen (Informationsgehalt) sowie anhand von Geld-Brief-Spannen (Informationsasymmetrie) gemessen. Als Ergebnis kann ein erhöhtes Ausmaß an abnormalen Renditen und Handelsvolumen am Tag der Ergebnisankündigung festgestellt werden, was darauf hinweist, dass Ergebnisankündigungen Informationsgehalt besitzen. Weiterhin kann festgestellt werden, dass durch Ergebnisankündigungen anhand von Geld-Brief-Spannen gemessene Informationsasymmetrien sinken. Weiterhin zeigt sich, dass die Kapitalmarktreaktion umso stärker ist, je mehr zusätzliche Informationen zusammen mit dem Periodenergebnis veröffentlicht werden. In diesem Zusammenhang kann auch gezeigt werden, dass sowohl Aktienkurs- und Handelsvolumenreaktionen als auch Geld-Brief-Spannen bei Anwendung international anerkannter Rechnungslegungsgrundsätze größer sind als bei Anwendung handelsrechtlicher Grundsätze. Dabei zeigt sich, dass Aktienkursreaktionen und Geld-Brief-Spannen über den Untersuchungszeitraum, der als Gewöhnungsphase an international anerkannte Rechnungslegungsgrundsätze angesehen werden kann, sinken und das Handelsvolumen steigt. Darüber hinaus kann gezeigt werden, dass die Kapitalmarktreaktion umso geringer ausfällt, je mehr oder je qualitativ hochwertiger die Unternehmenspublizität vor der Ergebnisankündigung ausfällt.
This paper examines empirically the question whether the presence of foreign banks and a liberal trade regime with regard to financial services can contribute to a stabilization of capital flows to emerging markets. Since foreign banks, so the argument goes, provide better information to foreign investors and increase transparency, the danger of herding is reduced. Previous findings by Kono and Schuknecht (1998) confirmed empirically that such an effect does exist. This study expands their data set with respect to the length of the time period and the number of countries. Contrary to Kono and Schuknecht, it is found that foreign bank penetration tends to rather increase the volatility of capital flows. The trade regime variables are not significant in explaining cross-country variations in the volatility of capital flows. This result does not change significantly when alternative measures of volatility are considered. This paper was presented at the conference ''Financial crisis in transition countries: recent lessons and problems yet to solve'' on 13-14 July 2000 at the Institute for Economic Research (IWH) in Halle, Germany.
Vorgestellt wird eine empirische Studie, welche den Zusammenhang zwischen Rendite und Risiko für ein Sample deutscher Versicherungsaktien im Zeitraum 1975-1998 untersucht. Als Methode wurde ein Multifaktorenmodell mit makroökonomischen Faktoren verwendet. Je nach Untersuchungszeitraum beläuft sich der Anteil der erklärten Varianz auf 9,29% bis 13,62%. Es konnte eine signifikanter negativer Einfluß zwischen der Veränderung des allgemeinen Zinsniveaus und den Risikoprämien von Versicherungsaktien identifiziert werden. Weiterhin ist Wechselkurses der DM zum US-Dollar signifikant.
An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond/ Dybvig style and an asset market coexist is modelled. Firstly, within this framework we characterize distinct financial systems depending on the fraction of households with direct investment opportunities that are less efficient than those available to banks. With this fraction comparatively low, the evolving financial system can be interpreted as market-oriented. In this system, banks only provide efficient investment opportunities to households with inferior investment alternatives. Banks are not active in the secondary financial market nor do they provide any liquidity insurance to their depositors. Households participate to a large extent in the primary as well as in the secondary financial markets. In the other case of a relatively high fraction of households with inefficient direct investment opportunities, a bank-dominated financial system arises, in which banks provide liquidity transformation, are active in secondary financial markets and are the only player in primary markets, while households only participate in secondary financial markets. Secondly, we analyze the effect a run on a single bank has on the entire financial system. Interestingly, we can show that a bank run on a single bank causes contagion via the financial market neither in market-oriented nor in extremely bank-dominated financial systems. But in only moderately bank-dominated (or hybrid) financial systems fire sales of long-term financial claims by a distressed bank cause a sudden drop in asset prices that precipitates other banks into crisis.
This paper reviews the factors that will determine the shape of financial markets under EMU. It argues that financial markets will not be unified by the introduction of the euro. National central banks have a vested interest in preserving local idiosyncracies (e.g. the Wechsels in Germany) and they might be allowed to do so by promoting the use of so-called tier two assets under the common monetary policy. Moreover, a host of national regulations (prudential and fiscal) will make assets expressed in euro imperfect substitutes across borders. Prudential control will also continue to be handled differently from country to country. In the long run these national idiosyncracies cannot survive competitive pressures in the euro area. The year 1999 will thus see the beginning of a process of unification of financial markets that will be irresistible in the long run, but might still take some time to complete.
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
This dissertation analyzes tax policy, corporations, and capital market effects. First, the Savings Directive, which has left a loophole by providing grandfathering for some securities, is examined. It can be shown that investors are not willing to pay a premium for bonds that are exempt from the withholding rate, so it may be concluded that the supply of existing loopholes is large enough to allow tax evaders to continue evasion at no additional cost. Second, tax neutrality towards alternative financing instruments for corporate investment is a ubiquitous demand in the political debate. However, the magnitude of possible efficiency costs of a departure from tax neutrality is hardly discussed. Against this background, this dissertation discusses the theory of capital structure and provides back-ofthe-envelope calculations of the possible efficiency cost of a tax distortion of the debt-equity decision. Third, the ex-dividend-day effect in relation to the Gennan tax reform of 2000/2001 is discussed. The abolishment of the imputation system allows reinvestigating the size of the exdividend- day effect. I find no structural break in the size of the German ex-dividend-day effect and no evidence of an ex-dividend-day price drop that exceeds the dividend paid. Fourth, an account of the quantitative development of tax legislation in post-war Germany is presented. It can be shown that the legislative output did not increase over the decades and is not affected by a split majority in the upper and lower houses. Finally, it turns out that an increasing fraction of this legislation is passed in December.
This paper makes an attempt to present the economics of credit securitization in a non-technical way, starting from the description and the analysis of a typical securitization transaction. The paper sketches a theoretical explanation for why tranching, or nonproportional risk sharing, which is at the heart of securitization transactions, may allow commercial banks to maximize their shareholder value. However, the analysis makes also clear that the conditions under which credit securitization enhances welfare, are fairly restrictive, and require not only an active role of the banking supervisiory authorities, but also a price tag on the implicit insurance currently provided by the lender of last resort. Klassifikation: D82, G21, D74. February 16, 2005.