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Agamben has claimed to work inside the tradition inaugurated by the archaeological method of Michel Foucault but not to fully coincide with it. “My method is archaeological and paradigmatic in a sense which is very close to that of Foucault, but not completely coincident with it. The question is, facing the dichotomies that structuralize our culture, to go beyond the exceptions that have been producing the former, however, not to find a chronologically originary state, but to be able to understand the situation in which we are. Archaeology is, in this sense, the only way to access present” (interview to Flavia Costa, trad. Susana Scramim, in Revista do Departamento de Psicologia – Universidade Federal Fluminense, Niterói, v. 18 - n. 1, 131-136, Jan./Jun. 2006, 132, translated by the author). However, the aspects in which Agamben follows Foucault's method and the ones he does not were never very clear. This situation seems to change with the edition of Agamben's most extensive and explicit texts on method, Signatura Rerum. Sul Metodo (2008, italian edition). The goal of this article is to identify the points of intersection between their methods and some points in which they differ.
Are Kantian philosophy and its principle of respect for persons inadequate to the protection of environmental values? This paper answers this question by elucidating how Kantian ethics can take environmental values seriously. In the period that starts with the Critique of Judgment in 1790 and ends with the Metaphysics of Morals in 1797, the subject would have been approached by Kant in a different manner; although the respect that we may owe to non-human nature is still grounded in our duties to mankind, the basis for such respect stems from nature’s aesthetic properties, and the duty to preserve nature lies in our duties to ourselves. Compared to the “market paradigm”, as it is called by Gillroy (the reference is to a conception of a public policy based on a criterion of economic efficiency or utility), Kantian philosophy can offer a better explanation of the relationship between environmental policy and the theory of justice. Kantian justice defines the “just state” as the one that protects the moral capacities of its “active” citizens, as presented in the first Part of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the Kantian paradigm, the environmental risk becomes a “public” concern. That means it is not subsumed under an individual decision, based on a calculus.
Frente al positivismo racionalista, que sólo cree en el poder de la razón filosófica y que considera que el mundo es esencialmente racional y justo, y frente al tragicismo, que sostiene que la realidad carece de sentido y orden, y que por tanto sólo la poesía puede comprenderla, la actitud postrágica de Ortega, Heidegger y Adorno, afirma que sólo en la tensión entre filosofía y poesía puede salvarse el ser humano, porque sólo esa colaboración y diálogo le permite acceder al ser.
Klaus Heinrich im Gespräch mit Wolfram Ette und Volkmar Billig zur Frage, in welcher Weise gerade die Städte eine gattungsgeschichtliche Utopie zu formulieren in der Lage sein könnten, die alle Konflikte, Brüche und Unvereinbarkeiten, die das Leben der Menschen bestimmen, ausstellen? Sind Ruinen, Brachflächen und die in die Stadt einwachsende Natur ein Indiz für ökonomischen Niedergang und stadtplanerisches Versagen oder drückt sich daran, wenn auch vielleicht ungewollt, eine realistische Korrektur eines falschen stadtplanerischen Rationalismus aus? - Religionswissenschaft thematisiert, Klaus Heinrich zufolge, "das Verdrängte der Philosophie". Neben den Religionen hat sie daher auch die Künste zu Bundesgenossen - und eben die Psychoanalyse, die selbst einen Gegenentwurf zum Rationalismus der europäischen Aufklärung praktiziert.
Self Study is a genre-bending work of autophilosophy. It opens a rare, rear window into the schizoid position of self-sufficient withdrawal and impassive indifference. This inability to be enriched by outer experiences feeds the relentless suspicion that hell is other people. Laying bare his life and work, Kishik engages with psychoanalysis, philosophy, and cultural inquiry to trace loneliness across the history of thought, leading to today's shut-in society and the autonomous subject of liberal capitalism.
Adorno e Kierkegaard
(2013)
Falar da relação entre dois pensadores, um dos quais produziu uma interpretação do outro, significa fazer duas coisas. Por um lado, o expositor precisa examinar essa interpretação, desvendando os pressupostos do intérprete, seus a prioris culturais, seus condicionamentos ideológicos. Por outro, ele precisa investigar em que medida o próprio intérprete foi influenciado em sua obra posterior pelas ideias que ele descobriu no interpretado. É o caso exemplar de Adorno e Kierkegaard. Adorno interpretou Kierkegaard segundo uma óptica marxista muito particular. A tarefa, no caso, é examinar a validade dessa análise. E depois impõe-se fazer o movimento inverso, procurando na obra de Adorno os ecos do pensamento de Kierkegaard. No primeiro caso, Kierkegaard é objeto de interpretação, e no segundo, é fonte para a interpretação da teoria crítica em geral. O autor tentou examinar as duas vertentes dessa dialética.
Ao tratar de diferentes aspectos do conceito de mimese na estética de Theodor Adorno, o artigo busca evidenciar a permanência do que Adorno designou como mimese primitiva ou originária na sociedade contemporânea. A análise do conceito de idiossincrasia servirá para mostrar esta permanência e, ao mesmo tempo, o seu reforço pela indústria cultural. Como contraponto a essa faceta do conceito de mimese, trataremos da mimese nos âmbitos científico, filosófico e no que Adorno considera obra de arte autêntica.
The papers here collected are divided in an English and an Italian section, to facilitate the reader who is confident, or prefers, only one of these languages. In both sections, Critical Theory is addressed in a twofold way: as regards its origins in the so-called School of Frankfurt and as concerns its further and contemporary developments, from an interdisciplinary perspective.
This essay restages Arendt's 'Auseinandersetzung' with Heidegger regarding 'political beginnings'. Sketching Heidegger's exceptionalist account of 'new beginnings' and Arendt's dispute with him in relation to the tension between the spheres of 'philosophy' and 'politics', I trace her position about 'political founding'. I claim that Arendt invites us to recognize the 'principle of an-archy' innate to 'political beginnings', which cannot be absorbed by exceptionalist invocations of the 'history of Being'.