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During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies an develop into learning economies which are based on intra-regional production linkages, interactive technological learning processes, flexibility and proximity (Storper, 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Gregersen and Johnson, 1997). In the next section of this paper, I will discuss some of the theoretical issues regarding localized learning processes, learning economies and learning regions (see, also, Bathelt, 1999). I will then describe the methodology used. What follows is a brief overview of how Boston s economy has specialized in high technology production. The main part of the paper will then focus on recent trends in Boston s high technology industries. It will be shown that the high technology economy consists of different subsectors which are not tied to a single technological development path. The various subsectors are, at least partially, dependent on different forces and unrelated processes. There is, however, tentative evidence which suggests that cooperative behavior and collective learning in supplierproducer- user relations have become important factors in securing reproductivity in the regional structure. The importance of these trends will be discussed in the conclusions.
Die Ergebnisse jüngerer Untersuchungen legen die Hypothese nahe, dass vernetzte Strukturen und eingebettetes Handeln von Unternehmen positive Auswirkungen auf deren Wettbewerbsfähigkeit hat. Die Unternehmensbefragungen der Zulieferer und Dienstleister des IPH liefern Hinweise dafür, dass dies auch für die in der chemischen Produktion tätigen Unternehmen und Betriebe gilt. Im einzelnen lassen sich aus der durchgeführten Studie folgende Ergebnisse und Tendenzen erkennen: 1. Der Zuliefer- und Dienstleistungssektor des IPH besteht aus einer großen Bandbreite von verarbeitenden Betrieben sowie Handels- und Dienstleistungsbetrieben, von denen eine Vielzahl (972 von 2435 Betrieben) in der Region ansässig sind. 2. Bei 90% der Zulieferer und Dienstleister handelt es sich um Kleinst- und Kleinbetriebe (unter 10 bzw. unter 100 Beschäftigte), die zumeist einen relativ geringen Anteil ihres Umsatzes im IPH erzielen). Lediglich 15% der befragten Betriebe sind zu mehr als der Hälfte ihrer Umsätze von den Abnehmern im IPH abhängig. 3. Die erfassten Betriebe sind vor allem über ihre Absatzbeziehungen eng in die regionale Wirtschaft eingebunden. Mehr als 50% erzielen über drei Viertel ihres Umsatzes in der Rhein-Main-Region. 4. Etwa die Hälfte der Zulieferer und Dienstleister haben durch individuelle Leistungserstellung und kundenspezifische Beratung enge Abnehmerbeziehungen zum IPH aufgebaut. Allerdings spielen besonders kommunikationsintensive Arten der Zusammenarbeit (z.B. gemeinsame Entwicklungsarbeiten und Schulungen vor Ort) offenbar nur eine geringe Rolle. 5. Die Zuliefer- und Dienstleistungsbeziehungen sind oftmals durch eine große Kontinuität und Häufigkeit gekennzeichnet. Zwar haben viele Betriebe nur jährliche oder sporadische Kontakte, die Hälfte der Betriebe stehen aber wöchentlich oder sogar täglich in Kontakt mit ihrem bedeutendsten Abnehmer im IPH. 6. Hinsichtlich der Abstimmungsinhalte zwischen den IPH-Abnehmern und ihren Zulieferern und Dienstleistern zeigt sich, dass einfache, standardisierte Kontakte (z.B. Absprache von Liefertermin und -menge) überwiegen, während komplexe Inhalte (wie gegenseitiges Feedback und gemeinsame Fehlerbeseitigung) eher selten auftreten. 7. Tendenziell haben Betriebe mit besonders regelmäßiger, individuell abgestimmter und komplexer Zusammenarbeit ihre Rolle als Zulieferer und Dienstleister des IPH in den 1990er Jahren stärken können. Bei ihnen hat sich der Anteil des IPH am Umsatz zumeist erhöht. Demgegenüber scheinen Betriebe mit seltenen, einfachen und eher standardisierten Abstimmungen im Hinblick auf ihre Umsatzentwicklung im IPH weniger erfolgreich gewesen zu sein. 37 8. Intensive Über-Kreuz-Abstimmungen zwischen den Zulieferern und Dienstleistern des IPH sind eher eine Ausnahmeerscheinung. Die meisten Betriebe haben keine Kontakte zu anderen Zulieferern und Dienstleistern. In einer anschließenden Studie soll im Rahmen einer Diplomarbeit (Bearbeiterin: Katrin Griebel) untersucht werden, ob diese Befragungsergebnisse tatsächlich die Schlussfolgerung zulassen, dass Betriebe die Möglichkeiten zu einer intensiven, komplexen Zusammenarbeit mit ihren Abnehmern im IPH nicht voll ausschöpfen und dass deshalb Potenziale für Lernprozesse und Innovationen ungenutzt bleiben. Hierzu werden im März und April 2001 Interviews mit ausgewählten Zulieferern und Dienstleistern geführt.
Im Jahr 2019 wurde ein etwa 500 m langer Abschnitt der Trattnach in Schlüßlberg (Bundesland Oberösterreich) restrukturiert. Ziel der libellenkundlichen Untersuchungen in den Jahren 2016 und 2021 war die Bewertung dieser ökologischen Aufwertung durch ein Prae- und ein Post-Monitoring. Die Verbesserungsmaßnahmen führten zu einer Verdopplung der Artengesamtzahl (von fünf auf zehn) und der Zahl der sicher, wahrscheinlich und möglicherweise bodenständigen Arten (von vier auf acht). Es konnten im Jahr 2021 vier der fünf gewässertyp-spezifischen Leitarten nachgewiesen werden: Calopteryx splendens, Calopteryx virgo, Gomphus vulgatissimus und Onychogomphus forcipatus. Das bodenständige Vorkommen dieser Arten bestätigt den hyporhithral/epipotamalen Übergangscharakter der Trattnach in diesem Bereich und indiziert die Ausprägung von geeigneten Strömungs- und Substratverhältnissen sowie von entsprechenden Vegetationsverhältnissen im Uferbereich. Durch die wasserbaulichen Eingriffe wurden insbesondere die rheophilen Spezies gefördert, limnophile Begleitarten waren nur vereinzelt nachzuweisen. Grund dafür ist der weiterhin in überwiegendem Maß gestreckte Verlauf des Flusses und das damit verbundene weitgehende Fehlen lenitischer Bereiche.
Die Funde von Exuvien und Sichtungen frisch emergierter Individuen von G. vulgatissimus und O. forcipatus belegen, dass das Gewässer unmittelbar nach Fertigstellung der Bauarbeiten von diesen Arten mit zweijähriger Entwicklungszeit besiedelt wurde. Die Bewertung des libellen-ökologischen Zustandes basierte auf der Berechnung des Odonata-Fließgewässer-Zonations-Index, in dem allfällige Abweichungen des aktuellen Odonatafauna von einem gewässertyp-spezifischen Referenzzustand (Klasse 1, „sehr guter libellen-ökologischer Zustand“) verrechnet werden. Das Ergebnis ist die Grundlage für die Einstufung in eine der fünf Klassen des ökologischen Zustandes gemäß EU Wasserrahmenrichtlinie. Die Restrukturierungen führten zu einer Verbesserung der libellen-ökologischen Zustandes: der betroffene Abschnitt (vormals Klasse 3, „mäßig“) wurde genauso wie die drei darin liegenden Einzelstrecken (vormals Klassen 4, „unbefriedigend“, und 3, „mäßig“) mit „gut“ (Klasse 2) bewertet. Auch der libellen-ökologische Zustand einer von den Aufwertungsmaßnahmen nicht betroffenen regulierten und in beiden Jahren kartierten oberstromig liegenden Kontrollstrecke veränderte sich von „unbefriedigend“ auf „mäßig“. Aus dem Restrukturierungsbereich wirkende Strahleffekte dürften für diese Verbesserung verantwortlich sein.
Als geladener Sachverständiger argumentierte Martin Götz bei der öffentlichen Anhörung des Finanzausschusses des Deutschen Bundestags und in seiner vorliegenden Stellungnahme, dass durch die zügige Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2014/59/EU die Selbstregulierung von Kreditinstituten und Wertpapierfirmen weiter gestärkt wird und das aufsichtsrechtliche Instrumentarium um marktorientierte Mechanismen ausgebaut wird. Er erwartet, dass das Umsetzungsgesetz die Finanzstabilität in Deutschland fördert. Positiv sei insbesondere die Ausgestaltung der Möglichkeit einer verpflichtenden Gläubigerbeteiligung („Bail-in“) im Rahmen der Abwicklung, da der Bail-in nicht nur Fragen der Privathaftung im Abwicklungsfall klärt, sondern auch gute Anreize zur Selbstregulierung von Kreditinstituten setzt. Den Verzicht auf die Umsetzung der in der Abwicklungsrichtlinie enthaltenen staatlichen Stabilisierungsmöglichkeiten bewertet er als positiv und sieht darin einen wichtigen Baustein zur Förderung der Selbstregulierung von Finanzinstituten. Die Verlängerung der Laufzeit des Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfonds sei problematisch, da die explizite Möglichkeit einer staatlichen Hilfe dem Anreiz zur Selbstregulierung von Finanzinstituten entgegensteht.
SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS 1. One of the major lessons from the current financial crisis refers to the systemic dimension of financial risk which had been almost completely neglected by bankers and supervisors in the pre-2007 years. 2. Accordingly, the most needed change in financial regulation, in order to avoid a repetition of such a crisis in the future, consists of influencing individual bank behaviour such that systemic risk is decreased. This objective is new and distinct from what Basle II was intended to achieve. 3. It is important, therefore, to evaluate proposed new regulatory instruments on the ground of whether or not they contribute to a reduction, or containment of systemic risk. We see two new regulatory measures of paramount importance: the introduction of a Systemic Risk Charge (SRC), and the implementation of a transparent bank resolution regime. Both measures complement each other, thus both have to be realized to be effective. 4. We propose a Systemic Risk Charge (SRC), a levy capturing the contribution of any individual bank to the overall systemic risk which is distinct from the institution’s own default risk. The SRC is set up such that the more systemic risk a bank contributes, the higher is the cost it has to bear. Therefore, the SRC serves to internalize the cost of systemic risk which, up to now, was borne by the taxpayer. 5. Major details of our SRC refer to the use of debt that may be converted into equity when systemic risk threatens the stability of the banking system. Also, the SRC raises some revenues for government. 6. The SRC has to be compared to several bank levies currently debated. The Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) does not directly address systemic risk and is therefore inferior to a SRC. Nevertheless, a FTT may offer the opportunity to subsidize on-exchange trading at the expense of off-exchange (over-the-counter, OTC) transactions, thereby enhancing financial market stability. The Financial Activity Tax (FAT) is similar to a VAT on financial services. It is the least adequate instrument among all instruments discussed above to limit systemic risk. 7. Bank resolution regime: No instrument to contain systemic risk can be effective unless the restructuring of bank debt, and the ensuing loss given default to creditors, is a real possibility. As the crisis has taught, bank restructuring is very difficult in light of contagion risk between major banks. We therefore need a regulatory procedure that allows winding down banks, even large banks, on short notice. Among other things, the procedure will require to distinguish systemically relevant exposures from those that are irrelevant. Only the former will be saved with government money, and it will then be the task of the supervisor to ensure a sufficient amount of nonsystemically relevant debt on the balance sheet of all banks. 8. Further issues discussed in this policy paper and its appendices refer to the necessity of a global level playing field, or the lack thereof, for these new regulatory measures; the convergence of our SRC proposal with what is expected to be long-term outcome of Basle III discussions; as well as the role of global imbalances.
Der Gegenstand der vorliegenden Arbeit ist eine theoretische und empirische Analyse der Wachstumseffekte der arbeitsorganisatorischen Veränderungen in den Unternehmen, die seit Mitte der achtziger Jahre weltweit beobachtbar sind.
Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen
Bankensektor : Zukunft der Universalbanken
(2013)
In der zweiten Veranstaltung der „Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen Bankensektor“ diskutierten Professor Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen und Dr. Michael Kemmer die Zukunft der Universalbanken. Anlass war der Vorschlag der Liikanen-Kommission, dass Finanzinstitute einen Teil ihres Investmentbankings, den Eigenhandel und das Market-Making, ab einer bestimmten Größenordnung ausgliedern sollen.