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The objective of this paper is to test the hypothesis that in particular financially constrained firms lease a higher share of their assets to mitigate problems of asymmetric information. The assumptions are tested under a GMM framework which simultaneously controls for endogeneity problems and firms’ fixed effects. We find that the share of total annual lease expenses attributable to either finance or operating leases is considerably higher for financially strained as well as for small and fast-growing firms – those likely to face higher agency-cost premiums on marginal financing. Furthermore, our results confirm the substitution of leasing and debt financing for lessee firms. However, we find no evidence that firms use leasing as an instrument to reduce their tax burdens. Keywords: Leasing; financial constraints; capital structure; asymmetric information.
Departing from the principle of absolute priority, CoCo bonds are particularly exposed to bank losses despite not having ownership rights. This paper shows the link between adverse CoCo design and their yields, confirming the existence of market monitoring in designated bail-in debt. Specifically, focusing on the write-down feature as loss absorption mechanism in CoCo debt, I do find a yield premium on this feature relative to equity-conversion CoCo bonds as predicted by theoretical models. Moreover, and consistent with theories on moral hazard, I find this premium to be largest when existing incentives for opportunistic behavior are largest, while this premium is non-existent if moral hazard is perceived to be small. The findings show that write-down CoCo bonds introduce a moral hazard problem in the banks. At the same time, they support the idea of CoCo investors acting as monitors, which is a prerequisite for a meaningful role of CoCo debt in banks' regulatory capital mix.
We study the dispersion of debt maturities across time, which we call "granularity of corporate debt,'' using a model in which a firm's inability to roll over expiring debt causes inefficiencies, such as costly asset sales or underinvestment. Since multiple small asset sales are less costly than a single large one, firms diversify debt rollovers across maturity dates. We construct granularity measures using data on corporate bond issuers for the 1991-2012 period and establish a number of novel findings. First, there is substantial variation in granularity in that we observe both very concentrated and highly dispersed maturity structures. Second, observed variation in granularity supports the model's predictions, i.e. maturities are more dispersed for larger and more mature firms, for firms with better investment oppo
We study to what extent firms spread out their debt maturity dates across time, which we call "granularity of corporate debt." We consider the role of debt granularity using a simple model in which a firm's inability to roll over expiring debt causes inefficiencies, such as costly asset sales or underinvestment. Since multiple small asset sales are less costly than a single large one, firms may diversify debt rollovers across maturity dates. We construct granularity measures using data on corporate bond issuers for the 1991-2011 period and establish a number of novel findings. First, there is substantial variation in granularity in that many firms have either very concentrated or highly dispersed maturity structures. Second, our model's predictions are consistent with observed variation in granularity. Corporate debt maturities are more dispersed for larger and more mature firms, for firms with better investment opportunities, with higher leverage ratios, and with lower levels of current cash flows. We also show that during the recent financial crisis especially firms with valuable investment opportunities implemented more dispersed maturity structures. Finally, granularity plays an important role for bond issuances, because we document that newly issued corporate bond maturities complement pre-existing bond maturity profiles.
In this paper we provide new evidence that corporate financing decisions are associated with managerial incentives to report high equity earnings. Managers rely most heavily on debt to finance their asset growth when their future earnings prospects are poor, when they are under pressure due to past declines in earnings, negative past stock returns, and excessively optimistic analyst earnings forecasts, and when the earnings yield is high relative to bond yields so that from an accounting perspective equity is ‘expensive’. Managers of high debt issuing firms are more likely to be newly appointed and also more likely to be replaced in subsequent years. Abnormal returns on portfolios formed on the basis of asset growth and debt issuance are strongly positively associated with the contemporaneous changes in returns on assets and on equity as well as with earnings surprises. This may account for the finding that debt issuance forecasts negative abnormal returns, since debt issuance also forecasts negative changes in returns on assets and on equity and negative earnings surprises. Different mechanisms appear to be at work for firms that retire debt.
Financing asset growth
(2012)
We document the existence of a debt anomaly that is in addition to the asset growth anomaly: for a given asset growth rate, firms that issue more debt, as well as firms that retire more debt, have lower stock returns in the 12 months starting 6 months after the calendar year of asset growth. Exploring the reasons for debt issuance, we find that managers of firms for which analyst expectations are more over-optimistic, which suffer from declining investment profitability, and whose earnings-price ratios are relatively high are inclined to rely more heavily on debt financing. On the other hand, firms that retire more debt for a given asset growth rate tend to have improving profitability but to be over-priced. We also find that the financing decision is influenced by the prior debt ratio, the asset growth rate, profitability, and CEO pay sensitivity. We interpret our results in terms of managerial incentives, signaling, and market timing.
We offer evidence of a new stylized feature of corporate financing decisions: the tendency of managers to rely more on debt financing when earnings prospects are poor. We term this 'leaning against the wind' and consider three possible explanations: market timing, precautionary financing, and 'making the numbers'. We find no evidence in favor of the first two hypotheses, and provisionally accept the 'making the numbers' hypothesis that managers who are under pressure because of unrealistically optimistic earnings expectations by analysts and deteriorating real opportunities, will rely more heavily on debt financing to boost earnings per share and return on equity.