Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (12)
- Part of Periodical (2)
- Report (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (15)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (15)
Keywords
- Solvency II (15) (remove)
The capital requirements of Solvency II allow insurers to make discretionary choices. Besides extensive possibilities regarding the choice of a risk model (ranging between a regulatory prescribed standard formula to a full self-developed internal model), insurers can make use of transitional measures and adjustments, which can have a substantial impact on their reported solvency level. The aim of this article is to study the effect of these long-term guarantee measures and to identify drivers of the discretionary decisions. For this purpose, we first assess the risk profile of 49 European insurers by estimating the sensitivities of their stock returns to movements in market risk drivers, such as interest rates and credit spreads. In a second step, we analyze to what extent insurers’ risk profiles influence their discretionary decisions in the capital requirement calculation. We gather information on discretionary decisions based on hand-collected Solvency II data for the years 2016 to 2020. We find that insurers optimize their reported solvency situation by making discretionary decisions in such a way that capital requirements for material risk drivers are clearly reduced. For instance, we find that the usage of the volatility adjustment is positively related to the interest rate risk as perceived by financial markets, even when controlling for the portion of life insurance in technical provisions. Similarly, the matching adjustment is linked to significantly higher credit risk sensitivities. Our results point out that due to discretionary decisions Solvency II figures can substantially deviate from a market-oriented, risk-based view on insurance companies’ risk situation.
European insurers are allowed to make discretionary decisions in the calculation of Solvency II capital requirements. These choices include the design of risk models (ranging from a standard formula to a full internal model) and the use of long-term guarantees measures. This article examines the impact and the drivers of discretionary decisions with respect to capital requirements for market risks. In a first step of our analysis, we assess the risk profiles of 49 stock insurers using daily market data. In a second step, we exploit hand-collected Solvency II data for the years 2016 to 2020. We find that long-term guarantees measures substantially influence the reported solvency ratios. The measures are chosen particularly by less solvent insurers and firms with high interest rate and credit spread sensitivities. Internal models are used more frequently by large insurers and especially for risks for which the firms have already found adequate immunization strategies.
Most insurers in the European Union determine their regulatory capital requirements based on the standard formula of Solvency II. However, there is evidence that the standard formula inaccurately reflects insurers’ risk situation and may provide misleading steering incentives. In the second pillar, Solvency II requires insurers to perform a so-called “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment” (ORSA). In their ORSA, insurers must establish their own risk measurement approaches, including those based on scenarios, in order to derive suitable risk assessments and address shortcomings of the standard formula. The idea of this paper is to identify scenarios in such a way that the standard formula in connection with the ORSA provides a reliable basis for risk management decisions. Using an innovative method for scenario identification, our approach allows for a simple but relatively precise assessment of marginal and even non-marginal portfolio changes. We numerically evaluate the proposed approach in the context of market risk employing an internal model from the academic literature and the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) calculation under Solvency II.
In this paper I assess the effect of interest rate risk and longevity risk on the solvency position of a life insurer selling policies with minimum guaranteed rate of return, profit participation and annuitization option at maturity. The life insurer is assumed to be based in Germany and therefore subject to German regulation as well as to Solvency II regulation. The model features an existing back book of policies and an existing asset allocation calibrated on observed data, which are then projected forward under stochastic financial markets and stochastic mortality developments. Different scenarios are proposed, with particular focus on a prolonged period of low interest rates and strong reduction in mortality rates. Results suggest that interest rate risk is by far the greatest threat for life insurers, whereas longevity risk can be more easily mitigated and thereby is less detrimental. Introducing a dynamic demand for new policies, i.e. assuming that lower offered guarantees are less attractive to savers, show that a decreasing demand may even be beneficial for the insurer in a protracted period of low interest rates. Introducing stochastic annuitization rates, i.e. allowing for deviations from the expected annuitization rate, the solvency position of the life insurer worsen substantially. Also profitability strongly declines over time, casting doubts on the sustainability of traditional life business going forward with the low interest rate environment. In general, in the proposed framework it is possible to study the evolution over time of an existing book of policies when underlying financial market conditions and mortality developments drastically change. This feature could be of particular interest for regulatory and supervisory authorities within their financial stability mandate, who could better evaluate micro- and macro-prudential policy interventions in light of the persistent low interest rate environment.
This article discusses the effects of the countercyclical premium discussed in insurance supervision in the context of Solvency II. While the basic principle of introducing countercyclical elements into Solvency II is endorsed, the authors argue for a system based on market scenarios which would enforce stricter capital requirements in boom times and less strict requirements in times of crisis.
I assess how Basel III, Solvency II and the low interest rate environment will affect the financial connection between the bank and insurance sector by changing the funding patterns of banks as well as the investment strategies of life insurance companies. Especially for life insurance companies, the current low interest rate environment poses a key risk since declining returns on investments jeopardize the guaranteed return on life insurance contracts, a core component of traditional life insurance contracts in several European countries. I consider a contingent claim framework with a direct financial connection between banks and life insurers via bank bonds. The results indicate that life insurers' demand for bank bonds increases over the mid-term but ultimately declines in the long-run. Since life insurers are the largest purchasers of bank bonds in Europe, banks could lose one of their main funding sources. In addition, I show that shareholder value driven life insurers' appetite for risk increases when the gap between asset return and liability growth diminishes. To check the robustness of the findings, I calibrate a prolonged low interest rate scenario. The results show that the insurer's risk appetite is even higher when interest rates remain persistently low. A sensitivity analysis regarding industry-specific regulatory safety levels reveals that contagion between bank and life insurer is driven by the insurers' demand for bank bonds which itself depends on the regulatory safety level of banks.
Pursuant to art. 45 of the Solvency II Framework Directive, all insurance undertakings will be obliged to conduct an “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment” (ORSA). ORSA’s relevance is not limited only to the second pillar of Solvency II, where mainly qualitative requirements are to be found. ORSA rather exhibits strong interlinks with the first pillar and its quantitative requirements and may also serve as a trigger for transparency duties which form Solvency II’s third pillar. ORSA may thus be described in some respects as the glue that binds together all three pillars of Solvency II. ORSA is one of the most obvious examples of the supervisory shift from a rules-based to a principles-based approach. As such, ORSA has hitherto been only very roughly defined. Since it is for the undertaking to determine its own specific risk profile and to evaluate whether this risk profile deviates significantly from the assumptions underlying the standard formula, it seems only natural that the supervisor must specify in greater detail what these underlying assumptions are. The most practicable way to do so would be for EIOPA to establish a “standard insurer”, which implies a translation of the assumptions concerning the underlying probability distributions into directly observable characteristics. The creation of the standard insurer would be an important step towards relaxing the insurers’ fear of what ORSA might bring about.
Der Entwurf eines Lebensversicherungsreformgesetz der Bundesregierung vom 04.06.2014 adressiert die Folgen der derzeitigen Niedrigzinsphase für Lebensversicherungunternehmen und Lebensversicherte. Helmut Gründl kommentiert die vorgeschlagene Regelung zu den Bewertungsreserven, die Regelung zur Ausschüttungssperre sowie die Regelung zum Höchstzillmersatz. Der Beitrag konzentriert sich auf die Auswirkungen der Vorschläge auf die Renditeerwartungen des Kollektivs der Versicherungsnehmer sowie auf die Anreize potentieller Eigenkapitalgeber, sich an Versicherungsunternehmen zu beteiligen.