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BANK INSTABILITY SEEMINGLY COULD PUSH BORROWERS TO USE CROWDFUNDING AS A SOURCE OF EXTERNAL FINANCE. WE CONSTRUCT A NOVEL, HAND-COLLECTED DATA SET OF VENTURES' USES OF EQUITY CROWDFUNDING IN GERMANY, THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH BANKS, AND VARIOUS VENTURE TRAITS SINCE 2011. BY OBSERVING VENTUREBANK RELATIONSHIPS, WE CAN IDENTIFY IF VENTURES CONNECTED TO SHOCKED BANKS ARE MORE LIKELY TO USE CROWDFUNDING IN AN ATTEMPT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR CONTRACTING BANK CREDIT SUPPLY. OUR RESULTS SHOW THAT CROWDFUNDING IS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE LIKELY FOR NEW VENTURES THAT INTERACT WITH STRESSED BANKS. INNOVATIVE FUNDING SOURCES ARE THUS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN TIMES OF STRESS AMONG CONVENTIONAL FINANCIERS. BUT CROWDFUNDED VENTURES ARE GENERALLY ALSO MORE OPAQUE AND RISKY THAN NEW VENTURES THAT DO NOT USE CROWDFUNDING.
UNDER LAISSEZ-FAIRE REGULATION, REGULATORS CHOOSE NOT TO INTERFERE BECAUSE THEY SEEK TO STIMULATE INNOVATION AND PROTECT ENTERPRISES FROM THE COSTS IMPOSED BY REGULATORY COMPLIANCE. YET, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ABILITY OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE REGULATION TO ENSURE CONSUMER PROTECTION IS LACKING. THIS ARTICLE TESTS EMPIRICALLY WHETHER THE CURRENT LAISSEZ-FAIRE REGULATION OF PRICE ADVERTISING CLAIMS ON THE MOST POPULAR REWARD-BASED CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM, KICKSTARTER, IS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT CONSUMERS.
ENTREPRENEURS OFTEN OVERESTIMATE THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS WHEN PLANNING THEIR OWN ACTIVITIES, WHICH USUALLY RESULTS IN EXCESS MARKET ENTRY. SINCE ENTREPRENEURS CONSIDER THEIR PROJECT AS UNIQUE, THE FORECASTS OF THE FUTURE OUTCOME ARE OFTEN ANCHORED ON THE CASE AT HAND RATHER THAN ON PAST RESULTS OF COMPARABLE PROJECTS – A PHENOMENON KNOWN AS THE PLANNING FALLACY. WE INVESTIGATE WHETHER ENTREPRENEURS SUFFER FROM A PLANNING FALLACY BIAS WHEN PROVIDED WITH HISTORICAL OUTCOMES OF COMPARABLE PROJECTS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.