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Following Pain’s (2021) critical assessment of the prospects of minimal capacity inferences within cognitive archeology based on ‘classical’ cognitive science, I elaborate on the chances of these inferences within so-called embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted (4E) frameworks. Cognitive archeologists infer the cognitive abilities of past hominins from the remains found in the archeological record. Here they face the problem of choosing a theory from the cognitive sciences. Results vary considerably, depending on one’s cognitive theory, so choice matters. Where classical views conceive cognition as mainly involving representations and computing, more recent 4E approaches focus on interactions between environment, body, and brain: hence the same trace, like a stone tool, might require capacities like a mental ‘blueprint’ according to the former, but only environmentally guided perception according to the latter. Given this crucial choice of theory, what are the prospects of 4E then? I present a model of cognitive hominin evolution based on 4E and niche construction theory. Based on this model, I argue that we should be guardedly optimistic: contrary to first impressions, minimal capacity inferences work well within the 4E framework, and adopting 4E might give us a methodological advantage, too.
Rational agency is of central interest to philosophy, with evolutionary accounts of the cognitive underpinnings of rational agency being much debated. Yet one building block—our ability to argue—is less studied, except Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory (Mercier and Sperber in Behav Brain Sci 34(02):57–74, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10000968 [Titel anhand dieser DOI in Citavi-Projekt übernehmen] , 2011, in The enigma of reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2017). I discuss their account and argue that it faces a lacuna: It cannot explain the origin of argumentation as a series of small steps that reveal how hominins with baseline abilities of the trait in question could turn into full-blown owners of it. This paper then provides a first sketch of the desired evolutionary trajectory. I argue that reasoning coevolves with the ability to coordinate behavior. After that, I establish a model based on niche construction theory. This model yields a story with following claims. First, argumentation came into being during the Oldowan period as a tool for justifying information ‘out of sight’. Second, argumentation enabled hominins to solve collective action problems with collaborators out of sight, which stabilized argumentative practices eventually. Archeological findings are discussed to substantiate both claims. I conclude with outlining changes resultant from my model for the concept of rational agency.
Explaining humans as rational creatures—capable of deductive reasoning—remains challenging for evolutionary naturalism. Schechter (Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1)437–464, 2011, 2013) proposes to link the evolution of this kind of reasoning with the ability to plan. His proposal, however, does neither include any elaborated theory on how logical abilities came into being within the hominin lineage nor is it sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. I present such a theory in broad outline and substantiate it with archeological findings. It is argued that the cognitive makeup of any animal is constituted by being embedded in a certain way of life. Changing ways of life thus foster appearances of new cognitive abilities. Finally, a new way of life of coordinated group behavior emerged within the hominins: anticipatory group planning involved in activities like making sophisticated spears for hunting. This gave rise to human logical cognition. It turned hominins into domain-general reasoner and adherents of intersubjective norms for reasoning. However, as I argue, it did not—and most likely could not—give rise to reason by deductive logic. More likely, deductive reasoning entered our world only a few thousand years ago: exclusively as a cultural artifact.
Introduction: Esophageal atresia with or without tracheoesophageal fistula (EA/TEF) occurs approximately 1 in 3.500 live births representing the most common malformation of the upper digestive tract. Only half a century ago, EA/TEF was fatal among affected newborns suggesting that the steady birth prevalence might in parts be due to mutational de novo events in genes involved in foregut development.
Methods: To identify mutational de novo events in EA/TEF patients, we surveyed the exome of 30 case-parent trios. Identified and confirmed de novo variants were prioritized using in silico prediction tools. To investigate the embryonic role of genes harboring prioritized de novo variants we performed targeted analysis of mouse transcriptome data of esophageal tissue obtained at the embryonic day (E) E8.5, E12.5, and postnatal.
Results: In total we prioritized 14 novel de novo variants in 14 different genes (APOL2, EEF1D, CHD7, FANCB, GGT6, KIAA0556, NFX1, NPR2, PIGC, SLC5A2, TANC2, TRPS1, UBA3, and ZFHX3) and eight rare de novo variants in eight additional genes (CELSR1, CLP1, GPR133, HPS3, MTA3, PLEC, STAB1, and PPIP5K2). Through personal communication during the project, we identified an additional EA/TEF case-parent trio with a rare de novo variant in ZFHX3. In silico prediction analysis of the identified variants and comparative analysis of mouse transcriptome data of esophageal tissue obtained at E8.5, E12.5, and postnatal prioritized CHD7, TRPS1, and ZFHX3 as EA/TEF candidate genes. Re-sequencing of ZFHX3 in additional 192 EA/TEF patients did not identify further putative EA/TEF-associated variants.
Conclusion: Our study suggests that rare mutational de novo events in genes involved in foregut development contribute to the development of EA/TEF.