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Over the past decade, a variety of studies have shown that other sectors in addition to high technology industries can provide a basis for regional growth and income and employment opportunities. In addition, design-intensive, craft-based, creative industries which operate in frequently changing, fashion-oriented markets have established regional concentrations. Such industries focus on the production of products and services with a particular cultural and social content and frequently integrate new information technologies into their operations and outputs. Among these industries, the media and, more recently, multimedia industries have received particular atte ntion (Brail/ Gertler 1999; Egan/ Saxenian 1999). Especially, the film (motion picture) and TV industries have been the focus of a number of studies (e.g. Storper/ Christopherson 1987; Scott 1996). For the purpose of this paper, cultural products industries are defined as those industries which are involved in the commodification of culture, especially those operations that depend for their success on the commercialization of objects and services that transmit social and cultural messages (Scott 1996, p. 306). Empirical studies on the size, structure and organizational attributes of the firms in media-related industry clusters have revealed a number of common characteristics (Scott 1996; Brail/ Gertler 1999; Egan/ Saxenian 1999). Most firms in these industries are fairly young, often existing for only a few years. They also tend to be small in terms of employment. Often, regional clusters of specialized industries are the product of a local growth process which has been driven by innovative local start-ups. In their early stages, many firms have been established by teams of persons rather than by individual entrepreneurs and have heavily relied on owner capital. Another important feature which distinguishes these industries from others is that they concentrate in inner-city instead of suburban locations (Storper/ Christopherson 1987; Eberts/ Norcliffe 1998; Brail/ Gertler 1999). In this study, I provide evidence that the Leipzig media industry shows similar tendencies and characteristics as those displayed by the multimedia and cultural products industry clusters in Los Angeles, San Francisco and Toronto, albeit at a much smaller scale. Cultural products industries are characterized by a strong tendency towards the formation of regional clusters despite the fact that in some sectors, such as the multimedia industry, technological opportunities (i.e. internet technologies) have seemingly reduced the necessity of proximity in operations between interlinked firms. In fact, it seems that regional concentration tendencies are even more dominant in cultural products industries than in many industries of the old economy . Cultural products industries have formed particular regional clusters of suppliers, producers and customers which are interlinked within the same commodity chains (Scott 1996; Les- 2 lie/ Reimer 1999). These clusters are characterized by a deep social division of labor between vertically-linked firms and patterns of interaction and cooperation in production and innovation. Within close networks of social relations and reflexive collective action, they have developed a strong tendency towards product- and process-related specialization (Storper 1997; Maskell/ Malmberg 1999; Porter 2000). In the context of the rise of a new media industry cluster in Leipzig, Germany, I discuss those approaches in the next section of this paper which provide an understanding of complex industrial clustering processes. Therein socio-institutional settings, inter-firm communication and interactive learning play a decisive role in generating regional innovation and growth. However, I will also emphasize that interfirm networks can have a negative impact on competitiveness if social relations and linkages are too close, too exclusive and too rigid. Leipzig's historical role as a location of media-related businesses will be presented in section 3. As part of this, I will argue the need to view the present cluster of media firms as an independent phenomenon which is not a mere continuation of tradition. In section 4 the start-up and location processes are analyzed which have contributed to the rise of a new media industry cluster in Leipzig during the 1990's. Related to this, section 5 will discuss the role and variety of institutions which have developed in Leipzig and how they support specialization processes. This will be interpreted as a process of reembedding into a local context. In section 6, I will discuss how media firms have become over-embedded due to their strong orientation towards regional markets. This will be followed by some brief conclusions regarding the growth potential of the Leipzig media industry.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies an develop into learning economies which are based on intra-regional production linkages, interactive technological learning processes, flexibility and proximity (Storper, 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Gregersen and Johnson, 1997). In the next section of this paper, I will discuss some of the theoretical issues regarding localized learning processes, learning economies and learning regions (see, also, Bathelt, 1999). I will then describe the methodology used. What follows is a brief overview of how Boston s economy has specialized in high technology production. The main part of the paper will then focus on recent trends in Boston s high technology industries. It will be shown that the high technology economy consists of different subsectors which are not tied to a single technological development path. The various subsectors are, at least partially, dependent on different forces and unrelated processes. There is, however, tentative evidence which suggests that cooperative behavior and collective learning in supplierproducer- user relations have become important factors in securing reproductivity in the regional structure. The importance of these trends will be discussed in the conclusions.
Die Ergebnisse jüngerer Untersuchungen legen die Hypothese nahe, dass vernetzte Strukturen und eingebettetes Handeln von Unternehmen positive Auswirkungen auf deren Wettbewerbsfähigkeit hat. Die Unternehmensbefragungen der Zulieferer und Dienstleister des IPH liefern Hinweise dafür, dass dies auch für die in der chemischen Produktion tätigen Unternehmen und Betriebe gilt. Im einzelnen lassen sich aus der durchgeführten Studie folgende Ergebnisse und Tendenzen erkennen: 1. Der Zuliefer- und Dienstleistungssektor des IPH besteht aus einer großen Bandbreite von verarbeitenden Betrieben sowie Handels- und Dienstleistungsbetrieben, von denen eine Vielzahl (972 von 2435 Betrieben) in der Region ansässig sind. 2. Bei 90% der Zulieferer und Dienstleister handelt es sich um Kleinst- und Kleinbetriebe (unter 10 bzw. unter 100 Beschäftigte), die zumeist einen relativ geringen Anteil ihres Umsatzes im IPH erzielen). Lediglich 15% der befragten Betriebe sind zu mehr als der Hälfte ihrer Umsätze von den Abnehmern im IPH abhängig. 3. Die erfassten Betriebe sind vor allem über ihre Absatzbeziehungen eng in die regionale Wirtschaft eingebunden. Mehr als 50% erzielen über drei Viertel ihres Umsatzes in der Rhein-Main-Region. 4. Etwa die Hälfte der Zulieferer und Dienstleister haben durch individuelle Leistungserstellung und kundenspezifische Beratung enge Abnehmerbeziehungen zum IPH aufgebaut. Allerdings spielen besonders kommunikationsintensive Arten der Zusammenarbeit (z.B. gemeinsame Entwicklungsarbeiten und Schulungen vor Ort) offenbar nur eine geringe Rolle. 5. Die Zuliefer- und Dienstleistungsbeziehungen sind oftmals durch eine große Kontinuität und Häufigkeit gekennzeichnet. Zwar haben viele Betriebe nur jährliche oder sporadische Kontakte, die Hälfte der Betriebe stehen aber wöchentlich oder sogar täglich in Kontakt mit ihrem bedeutendsten Abnehmer im IPH. 6. Hinsichtlich der Abstimmungsinhalte zwischen den IPH-Abnehmern und ihren Zulieferern und Dienstleistern zeigt sich, dass einfache, standardisierte Kontakte (z.B. Absprache von Liefertermin und -menge) überwiegen, während komplexe Inhalte (wie gegenseitiges Feedback und gemeinsame Fehlerbeseitigung) eher selten auftreten. 7. Tendenziell haben Betriebe mit besonders regelmäßiger, individuell abgestimmter und komplexer Zusammenarbeit ihre Rolle als Zulieferer und Dienstleister des IPH in den 1990er Jahren stärken können. Bei ihnen hat sich der Anteil des IPH am Umsatz zumeist erhöht. Demgegenüber scheinen Betriebe mit seltenen, einfachen und eher standardisierten Abstimmungen im Hinblick auf ihre Umsatzentwicklung im IPH weniger erfolgreich gewesen zu sein. 37 8. Intensive Über-Kreuz-Abstimmungen zwischen den Zulieferern und Dienstleistern des IPH sind eher eine Ausnahmeerscheinung. Die meisten Betriebe haben keine Kontakte zu anderen Zulieferern und Dienstleistern. In einer anschließenden Studie soll im Rahmen einer Diplomarbeit (Bearbeiterin: Katrin Griebel) untersucht werden, ob diese Befragungsergebnisse tatsächlich die Schlussfolgerung zulassen, dass Betriebe die Möglichkeiten zu einer intensiven, komplexen Zusammenarbeit mit ihren Abnehmern im IPH nicht voll ausschöpfen und dass deshalb Potenziale für Lernprozesse und Innovationen ungenutzt bleiben. Hierzu werden im März und April 2001 Interviews mit ausgewählten Zulieferern und Dienstleistern geführt.
