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“Institutional Overburdening” to a large extent was a consequence of the “Great Moderation”. This term indicates that it was a period in which inflation had come down from rather high levels. Growth and employment were at least satisfying and variability of output had substantially declined. It was almost unavoidable that as a consequence expectations on future actions of central banks and their ability to control the economy reached an unprecedented peak which was hardly sustainable. Institutional overburdening has two dimensions. One is coming from exaggerated expectations on what central banks can achieve (“expectational overburdening”). The other dimension is “operational overburdening” i.e. overloading the central bank with more and more responsibilities and competences.
Deutschland und Europa
(2018)
Otmar Issing erörtert die Reaktionen in Deutschland auf die Pläne des französischen Präsidenten Macron aus dessen viel beachteter Rede zur Zukunft Europas an der Pariser Sorbonne. Issing wertet das Ergebnis der Sondierungsgespräche zwischen CDU/CSU und SPD als Abschied von der Vorstellung einer auf Stabilität gerichteten europäischen Gemeinschaft und mahnt an, den einheitlichen Markt und die damit verbundenen Freiheiten nicht durch überzogene Ambitionen zu gefährden und damit zunehmendes Misstrauen gegenüber Europa zu fördern.
Insbesondere in der geplanten Weiterentwicklung des ESM zu einem im Unionsrecht verankerten Europäischen Währungsfonds sieht Issing die Auslieferung der durch den Fonds zur Verfügung gestellten Mittel an eine politische Mehrheit. Zudem führe die Bestellung eines europäischen Finanzministers zur Schaffung einer die Währungsunion ergänzenden Fiskalunion und damit zur Verlagerung finanzpolitischer Kompetenz von der nationalen auf die europäische Ebene. In letzter Konsequenz bedeute dies eine Aufgabe des grundlegenden Prinzips der demokratischen Legitimierung und Kontrolle finanzpolitischer Entscheidungen.
Das Ergebnis der Sondierungsgespräche muss man als Abschied von der Vorstellung einer auf Stabilität gerichteten europäischen Gemeinschaft verstehen. Damit werden die Versprechen gebrochen, die man den Bürgern in Deutschland vor der Einführung des Euros gegeben hat.
Opting out of the great inflation: German monetary policy after the break down of Bretton Woods
(2009)
During the turbulent 1970s and 1980s the Bundesbank established an outstanding reputation in the world of central banking. Germany achieved a high degree of domestic stability and provided safe haven for investors in times of turmoil in the international financial system. Eventually the Bundesbank provided the role model for the European Central Bank. Hence, we examine an episode of lasting importance in European monetary history. The purpose of this paper is to highlight how the Bundesbank monetary policy strategy contributed to this success. We analyze the strategy as it was conceived, communicated and refined by the Bundesbank itself. We propose a theoretical framework (following Söderström, 2005) where monetary targeting is interpreted, first and foremost, as a commitment device. In our setting, a monetary target helps anchoring inflation and inflation expectations. We derive an interest rate rule and show empirically that it approximates the way the Bundesbank conducted monetary policy over the period 1975-1998. We compare the Bundesbank´s monetary policy rule with those of the FED and of the Bank of England. We find that the Bundesbank´s policy reaction function was characterized by strong persistence of policy rates as well as a strong response to deviations of inflation from target and to the activity growth gap. In contrast, the response to the level of the output gap was not significant. In our empirical analysis we use real-time data, as available to policy-makers at the time. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E41, E52, E58
Content A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, INCLUDING MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS B. COMPLETE REPORT 1. INTRODUCTION 2. RISK MAP 2.1 Why a Risk Map is needed, and for what purpose 2.1.1 Creating a unified data base 2.1.2 Assessing systemic risk 2.1.3 Allowing for coordinated policy action 2.2 Recommendations 3. GLOBAL REGISTER FOR LOANS (CREDIT REGISTER) AND BONDS (SECURITIES REGISTER) 3.1 Objectives of a credit register 3.2 Credit registers in Europe (and beyond) 3.3 Suggestions for a supra-national Credit Register 3.4 Integrating a supra-national Securities Register 3.5 Recommendations 4. HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 4.1 What are hedge funds (activities, location, size, regulation)? 4.2 What are the risks posed by hedge funds (systematic risks, interaction with prime brokers)? 4.3 Routes to better regulation (direct, indirect) 4.4 Recommendations 5. RATING AGENCIES: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 5.1 The role of ratings in bond and structured finance markets, past and present 5.2 Elements of rating integrity (independence, compensation and incentives, transparency) 5.3 Recommendations (registration, transparency, annual report on rating performance) 6. PROCYCLICALITY: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 6.1 What is meant by “procyclicality” and why is it a problem? 6.2 The roots of procyclicality and the lessons it suggests for policymakers 6.2.1 Underpinnings of the phenomenon 6.2.2 Lessons to be learned 6.3 Characteristics of a macrofinancial stability framework 6.4 Recommendations 7. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND FORA, IN PARTICULAR THE IMF, BIS AND FSF 7.1 Legitimacy 7.2 Re-focusing the work 7.3 Recommendations
Content New Financial Architecture (Short Version) 1. Purpose of the paper – causes of the crisis 2. Recommendations 2.1. Incentives 2.2. Transparency 2.3. Regulation and Supervision 2.4. International Institutions 3. Concluding remarks Appendix (Full text) A 1. Causes of the crisis A 2. Improving the Framework A 2.1. Incentives A 2.2. Transparency A 2.3. Regulation and Supervision A 2.4. International Institutions A 3. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we provide some reflections on the development of monetary theory and monetary policy over the last 150 years. Rather than presenting an encompassing overview, which would be overambitious, we simply concentrate on a few selected aspects that we view as milestones in the development of this subject. We also try to illustrate some of the interactions with the political and financial system, academic discussion and the views and actions of central banks.
In this paper, we provide some reflections on the development of monetary theory and monetary policy over the last 150 years. Rather than presenting an encompassing overview, which would be overambitious, we simply concentrate on a few selected aspects that we view as milestones in the development of this subject. We also try to illustrate some of the interactions with the political and financial system, academic discussion and the views and actions of central banks.
Wie in der Medizin muss der Therapie die Diagnose vorausgehen. Allzu viele Vorschläge zur Lösung der Krise gehen nicht zuletzt deshalb in die falsche Richtung, weil sie eine adäquate Ursachenanalyse vermissen lassen. Wird der Fiskalpakt Europa aus der Krise führen? Die Europäische Währungsordnung ist ein Produkt politischer Entscheidungen, gegossen in europäisches und nationales Recht. Wie glaubwürdig ist das Versprechen, durch neues Recht, härtere vertragliche Bestimmungen, Fehlverhalten in Zukunft zu verhindern, wenn das geltende Recht so gering geachtet wird?