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Long-range angular correlations on the near and away side in p–Pb collisions at √sNN=5.02 TeV
(2013)
Angular correlations between charged trigger and associated particles are measured by the ALICE detector in p–Pb collisions at a nucleon–nucleon centre-of-mass energy of 5.02 TeV for transverse momentum ranges within 0.5<pT,assoc<pT,trig<4 GeV/c. The correlations are measured over two units of pseudorapidity and full azimuthal angle in different intervals of event multiplicity, and expressed as associated yield per trigger particle. Two long-range ridge-like structures, one on the near side and one on the away side, are observed when the per-trigger yield obtained in low-multiplicity events is subtracted from the one in high-multiplicity events. The excess on the near-side is qualitatively similar to that recently reported by the CMS Collaboration, while the excess on the away-side is reported for the first time. The two-ridge structure projected onto azimuthal angle is quantified with the second and third Fourier coefficients as well as by near-side and away-side yields and widths. The yields on the near side and on the away side are equal within the uncertainties for all studied event multiplicity and pT bins, and the widths show no significant evolution with event multiplicity or pT. These findings suggest that the near-side ridge is accompanied by an essentially identical away-side ridge.
The Basel Committee plans to differentiate risk-adjusted capital requirements between banks regulated under the internal ratings based (IRB) approach and banks under the standard approach. We investigate the consequences for the lending capacity and the failure risk of banks in a model with endogenous interest rates. The optimal regulatory response depends on the banks' inclination to increase their portfolio risk. If IRB-banks are well-capitalized or gain little from taking risks, then they will increase their market share and hold safe portfolios. As risk-taking incentives become more important, the optimal portfolio size of banks adopting intern rating systems will be increasingly constrained, and ultimately they may lose market share relative to banks using the standard approach. The regulator has only limited options to avoid the excessive adoption of internal rating systems. JEL Klassifikation: K13, H41.
