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Institute
We analyze the impact of decreases in available lending resources on quantitative and qualita- tive dimensions of firms’ patenting activities. We thereby make use of the European Banking Authority?s capital exercise to carve out the causal effect of bank lending on firm innovation. In order to do so we combine various datasets to derive information on firms’ financials, their patenting behaviors, as well as their relationships with their lenders. Building on this self- generated dataset, we provide support for the “less finance, less innovation” view. At the same time, we show that lower available financial resources for firms lead to improvement in the qualitative dimensions of their patents. Hence, we carve out a “less finance, less but better innovation” pattern.
This paper aims to analyze the impact of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after the IPO. We thereby investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives and track record of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis by using a data set embracing all IPOs which occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after the IPO compared to all other IPOs and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. Obviously, independent VCs, which concentrated mainly on growth stocks (low book-to-market ratio) and large firms (high market value), were able to add value by leading to less post-IPO idiosyncratic risk and more return (after controlling for all other effects). On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs (being small and having a high book-to-market ratio) showed relative underperformance. Klassifikation: G10, G14, G24 . 29th January 2004 .
This paper sets out to analyze the influence of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO. We investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives, and track records of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis using a data set embracing all IPOs that have occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after IPO as compared to all other IPOs, and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs show relative underperformance. The fact that this could occur implies that market participants did not correctly assess the role played by different types of VCs.
Broad, long-term financial and economic datasets are a scarce resource, in particular in the European context. In this paper, we present an approach for an extensible, i.e. adaptable to future changes in technologies and sources, data model that may constitute a basis for digitized and structured long- term, historical datasets. The data model covers specific peculiarities of historical financial and economic data and is flexible enough to reach out for data of different types (quantitative as well as qualitative) from different historical sources, hence achieving extensibility. Furthermore, based on historical German company and stock market data, we discuss a relational implementation of this approach.
We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of entry on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.