Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (6)
- Article (3)
- Report (1)
Language
- English (10)
Has Fulltext
- yes (10)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (10)
Keywords
- Generaldirektor (3)
- Geschäftsführer (3)
- Topmanager (3)
- Vorstandsvorsitzender (3)
- Capital Butgeting (2)
- Corporate Governance (2)
- Influence Activities (2)
- Information Acquisition (2)
- Investitionsplanung (2)
- Investitionsrechnung (2)
Institute
When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devote too many resources (too much effort) to acquiring information. Doing so can be costly to the principal because the agent can use information to game the performance measure to the detriment of the principal. We analyze the impact of endogenous information acquisition on the optimal incentive strength and the quality of the performance measure used.
We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compensation scheme that is relatively insensitive to performance in order to reduce the burden of subsequent monitoring. When the functions are separated through the formation of committees, the compensation committee is willing to choose a higher pay-performance sensitivity as the increased cost of oversight is borne by the audit committee. Our model generates predictions relating the board committee structure to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, the quality of board oversight, and the level of earnings management.
We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compensation scheme that is relatively insensitive to performance in order to reduce the burden of subsequent monitoring. When the functions are separated through the formation of committees, the compensation committee is willing to choose a higher pay-performance sensitivity as the increased cost of oversight is borne by the audit committee. Our model generates predictions relating the board committee structure to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, the quality of board oversight, and the level of earnings management.
This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivated to work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2) manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent´s action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide a sufficient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of the second task is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. This shows that information content is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valuable.
This paper shows that a capital budgeting process in which the division manager is required to engage in personally costly influence activities prior to a project approval has beneficial incentive effects: It provides the manager with incentives to acquire costly information about project prospects and helps to elicit the revelation of the acquired information. As a consequence, imposing influence costs on the manager can lead to improved capital allocations. The optimal level of influence costs, chosen by the firm, trades off ex ante incentives for information acquisition against efficient use of the acquired information ex post.
It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a substitute for commitment. Boards that are dependent on the incumbent CEO adopt a less aggressive CEO replacement rule than independent boards. While this behavior is inefficient ex post, it has positive ex ante incentive effects. The model suggests that independent boards (dependent boards) are most valuable to shareholders if the problem of providing appropriate incentives to the CEO is weak (severe).
Acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) is a major cause of patient mortality in intensive care units (ICUs) worldwide. Considering that no causative treatment but only symptomatic care is available, it is obvious that there is a high unmet medical need for a new therapeutic concept. One reason for a missing etiologic therapy strategy is the multifactorial origin of ARDS, which leads to a large heterogeneity of patients. This review summarizes the various kinds of ARDS onset with a special focus on the role of reactive oxygen species (ROS), which are generally linked to ARDS development and progression. Taking a closer look at the data which already have been established in mouse models, this review finally proposes the translation of these results on successful antioxidant use in a personalized approach to the ICU patient as a potential adjuvant to standard ARDS treatment.
The transcription factor NF-E2 p45-related factor 2 (Nrf2) is an established master regulator of the anti-oxidative and detoxifying cellular response. Thus, a role in inflammatory diseases associated with the generation of large amounts of reactive oxygen species (ROS) seems obvious. In line with this, data obtained in cell culture experiments and preclinical settings have shown that Nrf2 is important in regulating target genes that are necessary to ensure cellular redox balance. Additionally, Nrf2 is involved in the induction of phase II drug metabolizing enzymes, which are important both in degrading and converting drugs into active forms, and into putative carcinogens. Therefore, Nrf2 has also been implicated in tumorigenesis. This must be kept in mind when new therapy approaches are planned for the treatment of sepsis. Therefore, this review highlights the function of Nrf2 in sepsis with a special focus on the translation of rodent-based results into sepsis patients in the intensive care unit (ICU).
Blood-pressure-lowering drugs are proposed to foster SARS-CoV-2 infection by pharmacological upregulation of angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2), the binding partner of the virus spike (S) protein, located on the surface of the host cells. Conversely, it is postulated that angiotensin–renin system antagonists may prevent lung damage caused by SARS-CoV-2 infection, by reducing angiotensin II levels, which can induce permeability of lung endothelial barrier via its interaction with the AT1 receptor (AT1R). Methods: We have investigated the influence of the ACE inhibitors (lisinopril, captopril) and the AT1 antagonists (telmisartan, olmesartan) on the level of ACE2 mRNA and protein expression as well as their influence on the cytopathic effect of SARS-CoV-2 and on the cell barrier integrity in a Caco-2 cell model. Results: The drugs revealed no effect on ACE2 mRNA and protein expression. ACE inhibitors and AT1R antagonist olmesartan did not influence the infection rate of SARS-CoV-2 and were unable to prevent the SARS-CoV-2-induced cell barrier disturbance. A concentration of 25 µg/mL telmisartan significantly reduced the virus replication rate. Conclusion: ACE inhibitors and AT1R antagonist showed neither beneficial nor detrimental effects on SARS-CoV-2-infection and cell barrier integrity in vitro at pharmacologically relevant concentrations.
