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Institute
The Dodd Frank Act of 2010 (DFA) was the legislative response by the US Government to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007. DFA’s rescission of Rule 436 (g) of the Securities Act of 1933 - the exemption from liability clause - was the response to the post-crisis perception that credit rating agencies were insufficiently constrained by reputational risk considerations and consistently failed to provide high quality and accurate credit ratings as a consequence of the immunity they enjoyed and the regulatory reliance placed on ratings, as well as the conflicts of interest that they faced. This paper investigates whether the market failure event that occurred in the Asset Backed Securities market immediately after DFA was signed into law on July 21, 2010 was due to real economic concerns held by rating agencies about operating under a liability regime or whether it was merely an act of brinkmanship on the part of the rating agencies. The paper also predominantly examines US case law to identify the dilution of the freedom of speech defence in state courts, the conflict of interest issues and the legal challenges faced by plaintiffs when bringing a lawsuit against credit rating agencies, and proposes a novel co-pay and capped liability model to address the concerns of both credit rating agencies and investors.
The dissertation explores to what extent the post-financial crisis EU resolution regime, based on equity/debt write-down and conversion powers and bail-in tools will be effective in maintaining the stability of bank groups. To arrive at its unique angle, it first asks why bank groups are considered complex, thereby explaining the reasons for their proliferation and instability, and how this may inform the view regarding a desired regulatory framework. The main observation the dissertation makes is that, notwithstanding of other factors already pointed out in the literature, bank groups adopt complex structures with multiple entities, as it allows them, inter alia, to use double-leverage financing structures and internal capital markets.
Double-leverage financing structures allow bank groups to optimise the combination of their debt/equity funding from external parent entity investors with a combination of debt/equity funding downstreamed internally to subsidiaries and other entities in the bank group. An important component within this structure is also that the allocation of the bank group’s resources takes place through the internal capital market (ICM). The allocation of resources via the ICM allows bank groups to manage their liquidity constraint either to undertake activities that are more profitable, or to stabilise the financial position of the group as a whole.
While both double leverage and ICMs can optimise the funding and allocation of resources of the bank group, respectively, they can also generate perils to the stability of the bank group. In particular, this is because double-leverage can result in excessive risk taking and regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, the allocation of the intra-group resources in the ICM may not maintain the financial health of all subsidiaries in the bank group, which can prove to be incompatible with the financial stability goals of the regulators in the countries where those subsidiaries conduct their business.
Within this context, the dissertation argues that the current EU resolution regime does not clearly address issues of double leverage when setting out capital and other liability requirements, i.e. the ‘Total Loss Absorbing Capacity’ (TLAC) and ‘Minimum Requirement for Eligible Liabilities’ (MREL) requirements. Moreover, the dissertation emphasis that it is equally relevant to clarify the way in which the bank group resources are available ahead of, and in financial distress. It is argued that to this end, bank groups need to be allowed to make use of the ICM as it is often uncertain what may be the cause of the financial distress and how the resources of the bank group could be used to stabilise it. To this end, the dissertation highlights that there is lack of clarity in both the ex-ante provisions on intra-group support framework and in the ex-post provisions governing the allocation of any surplus TLAC/MREL resources.
Besides the ‘intra-group’ issues within the bank group, the third point the dissertation makes relation to the bank group’s presence in multiple jurisdictions. This transnational element adds to the complexity of the intra-group issues resulting from sub-optimal cooperation between home and host authorities. In this regard, the dissertation underlines that the current framework could adopt a more balanced way in which the regulatory fora will take into account the interest of the authorities of all parts of the bank group.
Private equity has grown remarkably in the last 30 years. Given its rise to prominence, exceptional profitability and a more prolific and publicly visible buyout activity, regulation in the private equity space seemed inevitable. The 2007 global financial crisis furnished an opportunity to doubt the industry’s role and magnify the key concerns, providing momentum for calls to regulate the industry more aggressively. Ultimately, the regulatory change came from the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), which has been described as one of the most rigorously debated and controversial pieces of financial regulation to ever emerge from the European Union (EU).
The AIFMD is unique and unprecedented, yet there has been very little written about it in the context of private equity. Therefore, this thesis makes a contribution to this area of research by examining the implications of AIFMD for private equity and arguing that this EU Directive has a re-shaping effect on the industry that inevitably marks the end of the light-touch regulation in this area. Whilst the desire of policymakers to act and intervene decisively during market
downturns is understandable, there is a risk that the response may not be appropriate and result in a crisis-induced over-reaction.
This thesis demonstrates, amongst other things, that the AIFMD has created a particularly
complex regulatory regime which for the hitherto unregulated or lightly regulated fund managers has had a significant effect in the EU and beyond. Examples of the most impactful
provisions relate to authorisation, marketing, depositaries, acquisition of control, remuneration, and transparency and disclosure. The implication are wide-ranging, and there is a clear conflict between the opportunities (e.g. EU passport, AIFMD as a global brand) and threats (e.g. excessive compliance costs, exodus of fund managers from the EU), which depend on a firm’s size, domicile and the gap needed to be aligned between the pre- and post-AIFMD regime.
Although there will be no stark triumph of one position over another in the assessment of the AIFMD until all of its elements are fully implemented, overall the impact of the Directive has been material, requiring substantial work to comply with (or adapt to) the requirements, which in some cases are not only particularly onerous and costly, but also a bit misguided, discouraging, or fairly irrelevant.
