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Life insurers use accounting and actuarial techniques to smooth reporting of firm assets and liabilities, seeking to transfer surpluses in good years to cover benefit payouts in bad years. Yet these techniques have been criticized as they make it difficult to assess insurers’ true financial status. We develop stylized and realistically-calibrated models of a participating life annuity, an insurance product that pays retirees guaranteed lifelong benefits along with variable non-guaranteed surplus. Our goal is to illustrate how accounting and actuarial techniques for this type of financial contract shape policyholder wellbeing, along with insurer profitability and stability. Smoothing adds value to both the annuitant and the insurer, so curtailing smoothing could undermine the market for long-term retirement payout products.
Dynamics of life course family transitions in Germany: exploring patterns, process and relationships
(2023)
This paper explores dynamics of family life events in Germany using discrete time event history analysis based on SOEP data. We find that higher educational attainment, better income level, and marriage emerge as salient protective factors mitigating the risk of mortality; better education also reduces the likelihood of first marriage whereas, lower educational attainment, protracted period, and presence of children act as protective factors against divorce. Our key finding shows that disparity in mean life expectancies between individuals from low- and high-income brackets is observed to be 9 years among males and 6 years among females, thereby illustrating the mortality inequality attributed to income disparities. Our estimates show that West Germans have low risk of death, less likelihood of first marriage, and they have a high risk of divorce and remarriage compared to East Germans.
Many nations incentivize retirement saving by letting workers defer taxes on pension contributions, imposing them when retirees withdraw their funds. Using a dynamic life cycle model, we show how ‘Rothification’ – that is, taxing 401(k) contributions rather than payouts – alters saving, investment, consumption, and Social Security claiming patterns. We find that taxing pension contributions instead of withdrawals leads to delayed retirement, somewhat lower lifetime tax payments, and relatively small reductions in consumption. Indeed, the two tax regimes generate quite similar relative inequality metrics: the relative consumption inequality ratio under TEE is only four percent higher than in the EET case. Moreover, results indicate that the Gini measures are also strikingly similar under the EET and the TEE regimes for lifetime consumption, cash on hand, and 401(k) assets, differing by only 1-4 percent. While tax payments are higher early in life under the TEE regime, they are slightly lower in the long run. Moreover, higher EET tax payments are also accompanied by higher volatility. We therefore find few reasons for policymakers to favor either tax approach on egalitarian or revenue-enhancing grounds.
Der Koalitionsvertrag 2021 sieht eine generationengerechte Absicherung des Rentenniveaus durch eine teilweise aus Haushaltsmitteln finanzierte Kapitaldeckung vor. Um dieses Ziel zu verwirklichen, wird hier die Einführung einer Generationenrente ab Geburt vorgeschlagen. Dabei wird aus Haushaltsmitteln ein Betrag von € 5.000 für jedes Neugeborene nach Grundsätzen des professionellen Anlagemanagements am globalen Kapitalmarkt angelegt. Konzeptionell soll sich diese Generationenrente am Modell der Basisrente(§10 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 b EStG) orientieren, d.h. die akkumulierten Gelder sind weder beleihbar, vererbbar noch übertragbar und können frühestens ab Alter 63 zugunsten einer lebenslangen Monatsrente verwendet werden. Unsere Berechnungen zeigen, dass durch die hier vorgeschlagene Generationenrente unabhängig vom Verlauf der individuellen Erwerbsbiographie, Altersarmut für die vom demographischen Wandel besonders betroffenen zukünftigen Generationen vermieden wird.
Do required minimum distribution 401(k) rules matter, and for whom? Insights from a lifecylce model
(2021)
Tax-qualified vehicles helped U.S. private-sector workers accumulate $25Tr in retirement assets. An often-overlooked important institutional feature shaping decumulations from these retirement plans is the “Required Minimum Distribution” (RMD) regulation, requiring retirees to withdraw a minimum fraction from their retirement accounts or pay excise taxes on withdrawal shortfalls. Our calibrated lifecycle model measures the impact of RMD rules on financial behavior of heterogeneous households during their worklives and retirement. We show that proposed reforms to delay or eliminate the RMD rules should have little effects on consumption profiles but more impact on withdrawals and tax payments for households with bequest motives.
Dieser Artikel behandelt das Zusammenspiel von staatlich organisierten sozialen Sicherungssystemen und der privaten Eigenvorsorge durch Vermögensbildung als Grundpfeiler der sozialen Marktwirtschaft in Deutschland. Die jährlichen Ausgaben der verschiedenen staatlichen Sicherungssysteme belaufen sich auf rund ein Drittel des erwirtschafteten Bruttosozialprodukts, wobei die umlagefinanzierten Alterssicherungssysteme für die Arbeitsnehmer den größten Anteil ausmachen. Sachvermögen in Form von selbst genutzten Wohnungen sowie Finanzvermögen in Form von Bankeinlagen und Ansprüche gegen private Versicherungen machen den größten Anteil der Eigenversorge aus. Aufgrund des niedrigen Zinsniveaus sowie des demografischen Wandels der Gesellschaft wird die Eigenvorsorge durch Anlagen an den internationalen Wertpapiermärkten sowohl für Selbständige als auch Arbeitsnehmer immer bedeutender.
In diesem Beitrag wird ein Vorschlag vorgestellt, wie es trotz langfristiger Niedrigzinsen möglich ist, die vor 18 Jahren eingeführte Riester-Rente so umzugestalten, dass alle Beteiligten davon profitieren. Wird die Mindestauszahlung am Ende der Vertragslaufzeit nur für die Eigenbeiträge, nicht aber für die staatlichen Zulagen garantiert, können deutlich höhere Renditen erzielt werden. Unter dem Strich haben dann nicht nur Privatleute mehr Geld aus ihrer Altersvorsorge, sondern der Staat wird mehr Steuern einnehmen und die Anbieter haben mehr Spielraum für bedarfsgerechte Produktgestaltung.
Implications of money-back guarantees for individual retirement accounts: protection then and now
(2019)
In the wake of the financial crisis and continued volatility in international capital markets, there is growing interest in mechanisms that can protect people against retirement account volatility. This paper explores the consequences for savers’ wellbeing of implementing market-based retirement account guarantees, using a life cycle consumption and portfolio choice model where investors have access to stocks, bonds, and tax-qualified retirement accounts. We evaluate the case of German Riester plans adopted in 2002, an individual retirement account produce that includes embedded mandatory money-back guarantees. These guarantees influenced participant consumption, saving, and investment behavior in the higher interest rate environment of that era, and they have even larger impacts in a low-return world such as the present. Importantly, we conclude that abandoning these guarantees could enhance old-age consumption for over 80% of retirees, particularly lower earners, without harming consumption during the accumulation phase. Our results are of general interest for other countries implementing default investment options in individual retirement accounts, such as the U.S. 401(k) defined contribution plans and the Pan European Pension Product (PEPP) recently launched by the European Parliament.
This Chapter explores how an environment of persistent low returns influences saving, investing, and retirement behaviors, as compared to what in the past had been thought of as more “normal” financial conditions. Our calibrated lifecycle dynamic model with realistic tax, minimum distribution, and Social Security benefit rules produces results that agree with observed saving, work, and claiming age behavior of U.S. households. In particular, our model generates a large peak at the earliest claiming age at 62, as in the data. Also in line with the evidence, our baseline results show a smaller second peak at the (system-defined) Full Retirement Age of 66. In the context of a zero-return environment, we show that workers will optimally devote more of their savings to non-retirement accounts and less to 401(k) accounts, since the relative appeal of investing in taxable versus tax-qualified retirement accounts is lower in a low return setting. Finally, we show that people claim Social Security benefits later in a low interest rate environment.
Given rising life expectations around the world, it seems that old-age pension benefits will need to be cut and pension contributions boosted in many nations. Yet our research on old-age system reforms does not require raising mandatory retirement ages or contributions. Instead, we offer ways to enhance incentives for people to work longer and delay retirement. There are good reasons to incentivize older people to work longer and delay retirement. These include rising longevity, the shrinking workforce, and emerging evidence indicating that working longer can be associated with better mental and physical health for many people. Nevertheless, old age Social Security systems in many nations find that people tend to claim benefits early, usually leading to reduced benefits.In the United States, for instance, a majority of Americans claim their Social Security benefits at the earlier feasible age, namely 62, even though their monthly benefits would be 75% higher if they waited until age 70. To test whether this is the result of people underweighting the economic value of higher lifetime benefit streams, we examine whether people would claim later and work longer if they were rewarded with a lump sum instead of a higher lifetime benefit stream for deferring. Two arguments have been offered to explain early claiming. One is that workers claim early to avoid potentially “forfeiting” their deferred benefits should they die too soon (Brown et al., 2016). A second explanation is that many people underweight the economic value of lifetime benefit streams (Brown et al., 2017). This latter rationale motivates the present study.