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Combining market data with a publicly available monthly snapshot of Deutsche Börse’s index ranking list, I create a model that predicts index changes in the DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX from 2010 to 2019 before they are officially announced. Even though I empirically show that index changes are predictable, they still earn sizeable post-announcement 1-day abnormal returns up to 1.42% and − 1.54% for promotions and demotions, respectively. While abnormal returns are larger in smaller stocks, I find no evidence that they are related to funding constraints or additional risk for trading on wrong predictions. A trading strategy that trades according to my model yields an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.83 while being invested for just 4 days a year.
This paper analyses disclosure duties in insurance contract law in Germany on the basis of questions developed in preparation of the World Congress of the International Insurance Law Association (AIDA) 2018. As risk factors are within the policyholder’s sphere of knowledge, the insurer naturally depends on gaining such knowledge from its policyholder in order to calculate and evaluate premium and risk. Legal approaches as to how the insurer may obtain relevant information and the legal consequences differ in national insurance contract laws around the globe. Taking part in this legal comparison, the paper describes the key elements of such a mechanism from a German perspective and comprises both duties of the policyholder and duties of the insurer.
As for the policyholder, these issues are differences between a duty to (spontaneously) disclose and a duty not to misrepresent as a reaction to questions of the insurer, the prerequisites and remedies of such duty, the subjective standard of the disclosure duty and a duty to notify material changes during the contract term. On the other hand, the paper also addresses an insurer’s duty to investigate, a duty to ascertain the policyholder’s understanding of the policy and a duty to inform during the contract term or after the occurrence of an insured event. In doing so, the paper offers a comprehensive and critical overview on the transfer of knowledge in the insurance (pre-)contractual relationship.
This article investigates the roles of psychological biases for deviations between subjective survival beliefs (SSBs) and objective survival probabilities. We model these deviations through age-dependent inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions. Our estimates suggest that implied measures for cognitive weakness increase and relative optimism decrease with age. Direct measures of cognitive weakness and optimism share these trends. Our regression analyses confirm that these factors play strong quantitative roles in the formation of SSBs. Our main finding is that cognitive weakness instead of optimism becomes with age an increasingly important contributor to the well-documented overestimation of survival chances in old age.
We present evidence on the way personal and institutional factors could together guide public company directors in decision-making concerning shareholders and stakeholders. In a sample comprising more than nine hundred directors originating from over fifty countries and serving in firms from twenty three countries, we confirm that directors around the world hold a principled, quasi-ideological stance towards shareholders and stakeholders, called shareholderism, on which they vary in line with their personal values. We theorize and find that in addition to personal values, directors’ shareholderism level associates with cultural norms that are conducive to entrepreneurship. Among legal factors, only creditor protection exhibits a negative correlation with shareholderism, while general legal origin and proxies for shareholder and employee protection are unrelated to it.
We show strong overall and heterogeneous economic incidence effects, as well as distortionary effects, of only shifting statutory incidence (i.e., the agent on which taxes are levied), without any tax rate change. For identification, we exploit a tax change and administrative data from the credit market: (i) a policy change in 2018 in Spain shifting an existing mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks; (ii) some areas, for historical reasons, were exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) an exhaustive matched credit register. We find the following robust results: First, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a strong – but not complete – tax pass-through. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in such pass-through: larger for borrowers with lower income, a smaller number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing less banks in their zip-code, thereby suggesting a bargaining power mechanism at work. Third, despite no variation in the tax rate, and consistent with the non-full tax pass-through, the tax shift increases banks’ risk-taking. More affected banks reduce costly mortgage insurance in case of loan default (especially so if banks have weaker ex-ante balance sheets) and expand into non-affected but (much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, experiencing even higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans.
This paper shows that judicial enforcement has substantial effects on firms’ decisions with regard to their employment policies. To establish causality, I exploit a reorganization of the court districts in Italy involving judicial district mergers as a shock to court productivity. I find that an improvement in enforcement, as measured by a reduction in average trial length, has a large, positive effect on firm employment. These effects are stronger in firms with high leverage, or that belong to industries more dependent on external finance and characterized by higher complementarity between labor and capital, consistent with a financing channel driving the results. Moreover, in presence of stronger enforcement, firms can raise more debt to dampen the impact of negative shocks and, in this way, reduce employment fluctuations.
We present novel evidence on the value of cross-border political access. We analyze data on meetings of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) with European Commission (EC) policymakers. Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns. We study channels of value creation through political access in the areas of regulation and taxation. US enterprises with EC meetings are more likely to receive favorable outcomes in their European merger decisions and have lower effective tax rates on foreign income than their peers without meetings. Our results suggest that access to foreign policymakers is of substantial value for MNEs.
We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and a major enforcement reform in Germany, we find that forcing firms to publicly disclose their financial statements discourages innovative activities. Our evidence suggests that reporting regulation has significant real effects by imposing proprietary costs on innovative firms, which in turn diminish their incentives to innovate. At the industry level, positive information spillovers (e.g., to competitors, suppliers, and customers) appear insufficient to compensate the negative direct effect on the prevalence of innovative activity. The spillovers instead appear to concentrate innovation among a few large firms in a given industry. Thus, financial reporting regulation has important aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation.