Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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This paper uses laboratory experiments to provide a systematic analysis of how di↵erent presentation formats a↵ect individuals’ investment decisions. The results indicate that the type of presentation as well as personal characteristics influence both, the consistency of decisions and the riskiness of investment choices. However, while personal characteristics have a larger impact on consistency, the chosen risk level is determined more by framing e↵ects. On the level of personal characteristics, participants’ decisions show that better financial literacy and a better understanding of the presentation format enhance consistency and thus decision quality. Moreover, female participants on average make less consistent decisions and tend to prefer less risky alternatives. On the level of framing dimensions, subjects choose riskier investments when possible outcomes are shown in absolute values rather than rates of return and when the loss potential is less obvious. In particular, reducing the emphasis on downside risk and upside potential simultaneously leads to a substantial increase in risk taking.
The Solvency II standard formula employs an approximate Value-at-Risk approach to define risk-based capital requirements. This paper investigates how the standard formula’s stock risk calibration influences the equity position and investment strategy of a shareholder-value-maximizing insurer with limited liability. The capital requirement for stock risks is determined by multiplying a regulation-defined stock risk parameter by the value of the insurer’s stock portfolio. Intuitively, a higher stock risk parameter should reduce risky investments as well as insolvency risk. However, we find that the default probability does not necessarily decrease when reducing the investment risk (by increasing the stock investment risk parameter). We also find that depending on the precise interaction between assets and liabilities, some insurers will invest conservatively, whereas others will prefer a very risky investment strategy, and a slight change of the stock risk parameter may lead from a conservative to a high risk asset allocation.
A greater firm-level transparency through enhanced disclosure provides more information regarding the risk situation of an insurer to its outside stakeholders such as stock investors and policyholders. The disclosure of the insurer's risktaking can result in negative influences on, for example, its stock performance and insurance demand when stock investors and policyholders are risk-averse. Insurers, which are concerned about the potential ex post adverse effects of risk-taking under greater transparency, are thus inclined to limit their risks ex ante. In other words, improved firm-level transparency can induce less risktaking incentive of insurers. This article investigates empirically the relationship between firm-level transparency and insurers' strategies on capitalization and risky investments. By exploring the disclosure levels and the risk behavior of 52 European stock insurance companies from 2005 to 2012, the results show that insurers tend to hold more equity capital under the anticipation of greater transparency, and this strategy on capital-holding is consistent for different types of insurance businesses. When considering the influence of improved transparency on the investment policy of insurers, the results are mixed for different types of insurers.
This article explores life insurance consumption in 31 European countries from 2003 to 2012 and aims to investigate the extent to which market transparency can affect life insurance demand. The cross-country evidence for the entire sample period shows that greater market transparency, which resolves asymmetric information, can generate a higher demand for life insurance. However, when considering the financial crisis period (2008-2012) separately, the results suggest a negative impact of enhanced market transparency on life insurance consumption. The mixed findings imply a trade-off between the reduction in adverse selection under greater market transparency and the possible negative effects on life insurance consumption during the crisis period due to more effective market discipline. Furthermore, this article studies the extent to which transparency can influence the reaction of life insurance demand to bad market outcomes: i.e., low solvency ratios or low profitability. The results indicate that the markets with bad outcomes generate higher life insurance demand under greater transparency compared to the markets that also experience bad outcomes but are less transparent.
Europe's debt crisis casts doubt on the effectiveness of fiscal austerity in highly-integrated economies. Closed-economy models overestimate its effectiveness, because they underestimate tax-base elasticities and ignore cross-country tax externalities. In contrast, we study tax responses to debt shocks in a two-country model with endogenous utilization that captures those externalities and matches the capital-tax-base elasticity. Quantitative results show that unilateral capital tax hikes cannot restore fiscal solvency in Europe, and have large negative (positive) effects at "home" ("abroad"). Restoring solvency via either Nash competition or Cooperation reduces (increases) capital (labor) taxes significantly, and leaves countries with larger debt shocks preferring autarky.
After the Global Financial Crisis a controversial rush to fiscal austerity followed in many countries. Yet research on the effects of austerity on macroeconomic aggregates was and still is unsettled, mired by the difficulty of identifying multipliers from observational data. This paper reconciles seemingly disparate estimates of multipliers within a unified and state-contingent framework. We achieve identification of causal effects with new propensity-score based methods for time series data. Using this novel approach, we show that austerity is always a drag on growth, and especially so in depressed economies: a one percent of GDP fiscal consolidation translates into 4 percent lower real GDP after five years when implemented in the slump rather than the boom. We illustrate our findings with a counterfactual evaluation of the impact of the U.K. government’s shift to austerity policies in 2010 on subsequent growth.
Austerity
(2014)
We shed light on the function, properties and optimal size of austerity using the standard sovereign model augmented to include incomplete information about credit risk. Austerity is defined as the shortfall of consumption from the level desired by a country and supported by its repayment capacity. We find that austerity serves as a tool for securing a more favorable loan package; that it is associated with over-investment even when investment does not create collateral; and that low risk borrowers may favor more to less severe austerity. These findings imply that the amount of fresh funds obtained by a sovereign is not a reliable measure of austerity suffered; and that austerity may actually be associated with higher growth. Our analysis accommodates costly signalling for gaining credibility and also assigns a novel role to spending multipliers in the determination of optimal austerity.
Does austerity pay off?
(2014)
Policy makers often implement austerity measures when the sustainability of public finances is in doubt and, hence, sovereign yield spreads are high. Is austerity successful in bringing about a reduction in yield spreads? We employ a new panel data set which contains sovereign yield spreads for 31 emerging and advanced economies and estimate the effects of cuts of government consumption on yield spreads and economic activity. The conditions under which austerity takes place are crucial. During times of fiscal stress, spreads rise in response to the spending cuts, at least in the short-run. In contrast, austerity pays off, if conditions are more benign.
In this paper, we investigate how the introduction of complex, model-based capital regulation affected credit risk of financial institutions. Model-based regulation was meant to enhance the stability of the financial sector by making capital charges more sensitive to risk. Exploiting the staggered introduction of the model-based approach in Germany and the richness of our loan-level data set, we show that (1) internal risk estimates employed for regulatory purposes systematically underpredict actual default rates by 0.5 to 1 percentage points; (2) both default rates and loss rates are higher for loans that were originated under the model-based approach, while corresponding risk-weights are significantly lower; and (3) interest rates are higher for loans originated under the model-based approach, suggesting that banks were aware of the higher risk associated with these loans and priced them accordingly. Further, we document that large banks benefited from the reform as they experienced a reduction in capital charges and consequently expanded their lending at the expense of smaller banks that did not introduce the model-based approach. Counter to the stated objectives, the introduction of complex regulation adversely affected the credit risk of financial institutions. Overall, our results highlight the pitfalls of complex regulation and suggest that simpler rules may increase the efficacy of financial regulation.
We show that the correct experiment to evaluate the effects of a fiscal adjustment is the simulation of a multi year fiscal plan rather than of individual fiscal shocks. Simulation of fiscal plans adopted by 16 OECD countries over a 30-year period supports the hypothesis that the effects of consolidations depend on their design. Fiscal adjustments based upon spending cuts are much less costly, in terms of output losses, than tax-based ones and have especially low output costs when they consist of permanent rather than stop and go changes in taxes and spending. The difference between tax-based and spending-based adjustments appears not to be explained by accompanying policies, including monetary policy. It is mainly due to the different response of business confidence and private investment.
On 23 July 2014, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed the “Money Market Reform: Amendments to Form PF ,” designed to prevent investor runs on money market mutual funds such as those experienced in institutional prime funds following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The present article evaluates the reform choices in the U.S. and draws conclusions for the proposed EU regulation of money market funds.
Can a tightening of the bank resolution regime lead to more prudent bank behavior? This policy paper reviews arguments for why this could be the case and presents evidence linking changes in bank resolution regimes with bank risk-taking. The authors find that the tightening of bank resolution in the U.S. (i.e., the introduction of the Orderly Liquidation Authority) significantly decreased overall risk-taking of the most affected banks. This effect, however, does not hold for the largest and most systemically important banks – too-big-to-fail seems to be unresolved. Building on the insights from the U.S. experience, the authors derive principles for effective resolution regimes and evaluate the emerging resolution regime for Europe.
A recent proposal by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) suggests a new risk capital buffer for globally operating systemically important financial institutions. The suggested metric, “Total Loss Absorbing Capacity“ (TLAC), is composed of Tier-1 capital and loss absorbing debt. In a crisis situation, “bail-in-able” debt is to be written down or converted into equity. Jan Krahnen argues that the credibility of bail-in, in the case of systemically important financial institutions, hinges crucially on the design of TLAC and the requirements that will be placed on loss absorbing “bail-in-able” debt.The fear of direct systemic consequences through bail-in could be overcome, if a holding ban were placed on the “bail-in-bonds” of financial institutions. The holding ban would stipulate that these bonds cannot be held by other institutions within the banking sector.
There has been a considerable debate about whether disaster models can rationalize the equity premium puzzle. This is because empirically disasters are not single extreme events, but long-lasting periods in which moderate negative consumption growth realizations cluster. Our paper proposes a novel way to explain this stylized fact. By allowing for consumption drops that can spark an economic crisis, we introduce a new economic channel that combines long-run and short-run risk. First, we document that our model can match consumption data of several countries. Second, it generates a large equity risk premium even if consumption drops are of moderate size.
We analyze the implications of the structure of a network for asset prices in a general equilibrium model. Networks are represented via self- and mutually exciting jump processes, and the representative agent has Epstein-Zin preferences. Our approach provides a exible and tractable unifying foundation for asset pricing in networks. The model endogenously generates results in accordance with, e.g., the robust-yetfragile feature of financial networks shown in Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2014) and the positive centrality premium documented in Ahern (2013). We also show that models with simpler preference assumptions cannot generate all these findings simultaneously.
The European Central Bank (ECB) has finalized its comprehensive assessment of the solvency of the largest banks in the euro area and on October 26 disclosed the results of this assessment. In the present paper, Acharya and Steffen compare the outcomes of the ECB's assessment to their own benchmark stress tests conducted for 39 publically listed financial institutions that are also included in the ECB's regulatory review. The authors identify a negative correlation between their benchmark estimates for capital shortfalls and the regulatory capital shortfall, but a positive correlation between their benchmark estimates for losses under stress both in the banking book and in the trading book. They conclude that the regulatory stress test outcomes are potentially heavily affected by discretion of national regulators in measuring what is capital, and especially the use of risk-weighted assets in calculating the prudential capital requirement.
Robustness, validity, and significance of the ECB's asset quality review and stress test exercise
(2014)
As we are moving toward a eurozone banking union, the European Central Bank (ECB) is going to take over the regulatory oversight of 128 banks in November 2014. To that end, the ECB conducted a comprehensive assessment of these banks, which included an asset quality review (AQR) and a stress test. The fundamental question is how accurately will the financial condition of these banks have been assessed by the ECB when it commences its regulatory oversight? And, can the comprehensive assessment lead to a full repair of banks’ balance sheets so that the ECB takes over financially sound banks and is the necessary regulation in place to facilitate this? Overall, the evidence presented in this paper based on the design of the comprehensive assessment as well as own stress test exercises suggest that the ECB’s assessment might not comprehensively deal with the problems in the financial sector and risks may remain that will pose substantial threats to financial stability in the eurozone.
On average, "young" people underestimate whereas "old" people overestimate their chances to survive into the future. We adopt a Bayesian learning model of ambiguous survival beliefs which replicates these patterns. The model is embedded within a non-expected utility model of life-cycle consumption and saving. Our analysis shows that agents with ambiguous survival beliefs (i) save less than originally planned, (ii) exhibit undersaving at younger ages, and (iii) hold larger amounts of assets in old age than their rational expectations counterparts who correctly assess their survival probabilities. Our ambiguity-driven model therefore simultaneously accounts for three important empirical findings on household saving behavior.
This paper investigates extensions of the method of endogenous gridpoints (ENDGM) introduced by Carroll (2006) to higher dimensions with more than one continuous endogenous state variable. We compare three different categories of algorithms: (i) the conventional method with exogenous grids (EXOGM), (ii) the pure method of endogenous gridpoints (ENDGM) and (iii) a hybrid method (HYBGM). ENDGM comes along with Delaunay interpolation on irregular grids. Comparison of methods is done by evaluating speed and accuracy. We find that HYBGM and ENDGM both dominate EXOGM. In an infinite horizon model, ENDGM also always dominates HYBGM. In a finite horizon model, the choice between HYBGM and ENDGM depends on the number of gridpoints in each dimension. With less than 150 gridpoints in each dimension ENDGM is faster than HYBGM, and vice versa. For a standard choice of 25 to 50 gridpoints in each dimension, ENDGM is 1.4 to 1.7 times faster than HYBGM in the finite horizon version and 2.4 to 2.5 times faster in the infinite horizon version of the model.
When markets are incomplete, social security can partially insure against idiosyncratic and aggregate risks. We incorporate both risks into an analytically tractable model with two overlapping generations and demonstrate that they interact over the life-cycle. The interactions appear even though the two risks are orthogonal and they amplify the welfare consequences of introducing social security. On the one hand, the interactions increase the welfare benefits from insurance. On the other hand, they can in- or decrease the welfare costs from crowding out of capital formation. This ambiguous effect on crowding out means that the net effect of these two channels is positive, hence the interactions of risks increase the total welfare benefits of social security.