Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
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This paper uses laboratory experiments to provide a systematic analysis of how di↵erent presentation formats a↵ect individuals’ investment decisions. The results indicate that the type of presentation as well as personal characteristics influence both, the consistency of decisions and the riskiness of investment choices. However, while personal characteristics have a larger impact on consistency, the chosen risk level is determined more by framing e↵ects. On the level of personal characteristics, participants’ decisions show that better financial literacy and a better understanding of the presentation format enhance consistency and thus decision quality. Moreover, female participants on average make less consistent decisions and tend to prefer less risky alternatives. On the level of framing dimensions, subjects choose riskier investments when possible outcomes are shown in absolute values rather than rates of return and when the loss potential is less obvious. In particular, reducing the emphasis on downside risk and upside potential simultaneously leads to a substantial increase in risk taking.
On average, "young" people underestimate whereas "old" people overestimate their chances to survive into the future. We adopt a Bayesian learning model of ambiguous survival beliefs which replicates these patterns. The model is embedded within a non-expected utility model of life-cycle consumption and saving. Our analysis shows that agents with ambiguous survival beliefs (i) save less than originally planned, (ii) exhibit undersaving at younger ages, and (iii) hold larger amounts of assets in old age than their rational expectations counterparts who correctly assess their survival probabilities. Our ambiguity-driven model therefore simultaneously accounts for three important empirical findings on household saving behavior.
This paper analyzes how on-the-job search (OJS) by an agent impacts the moral hazard problem in a repeated principal-agent relationship. OJS is found to constitute a source of agency costs because efficient search incentives require that the agent receives all gains from trade. Further, the optimal incentive contract with OJS matches the design of empirically observed compensation contracts more accurately than models that ignore OJS. In particular, the optimal contract entails excessive performance pay plus efficiency wages. Efficiency wages reduce the opportunity costs of work effort and hence serve as a complement to bonuses. Thus, the model offers a novel explanation for the use of efficiency wages. When allowing for renegotiation, the model generates wage and turnover dynamics that are consistent with empirical evidence. I argue that the model contributes to explaining the concomitant rise in the use of performance pay and in competition for high-skill workers during the last three decades.
This paper explores consequences of consumer education on prices and welfare in retail financial markets when some consumers are naive about shrouded add-on prices and firms try to exploit it. Allowing for different information and pricing strategies we show that education is unlikely to push firms to disclose prices towards all consumers, which would be socially efficient. Instead, price discrimination emerges as a new equilibrium. Further, due to a feedback on prices, education that is good for consumers who become sophisticated may be bad for consumers who stay naive and even for the group of all consumers as a whole
We study the behavioral underpinnings of adopting cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. A novel theoretical and experimental framework is developed to primarily assess the impact of sellers’ service fees and buyers’ rewards from using electronic payments. Buyers and sellers face a coordination problem, independently choosing a payment method before trading. In the experiment, sellers readily adopt electronic payments but buyers do not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards significantly boosts the adoption of electronic payments. Hence, buyers’ incentives play a pivotal role in the diffusion of electronic payments but monetary incentives cannot fully explain their adoption choices. Findings from this experiment complement empirical findings based on surveys and field data.
We outline a procedure for consistent estimation of marginal and joint default risk in the euro area financial system. We interpret the latter risk as the intrinsic financial system fragility and derive several systemic fragility indicators for euro area banks and sovereigns, based on CDS prices. Our analysis documents that although the fragility of the euro area banking system had started to deteriorate before Lehman Brothers' file for bankruptcy, investors did not expect the crisis to affect euro area sovereigns' solvency until September 2008. Since then, and especially after November 2009, joint sovereign default risk has outpaced the rise of systemic risk within the banking system.
In this paper, we study the effect of proportional transaction costs on consumption-portfolio decisions and asset prices in a dynamic general equilibrium economy with a financial market that has a single-period bond and two risky stocks, one of which incurs the transaction cost. Our model has multiple investors with stochastic labor income, heterogeneous beliefs, and heterogeneous Epstein-Zin-Weil utility functions. The transaction cost gives rise to endogenous variations in liquidity. We show how equilibrium in this incomplete-markets economy can be characterized and solved for in a recursive fashion. We have three main findings. One, costs for trading a stock lead to a substantial reduction in the trading volume of that stock, but have only a small effect on the trading volume of the other stock and the bond. Two, even in the presence of stochastic labor income and heterogeneous beliefs, transaction costs have only a small effect on the consumption decisions of investors, and hence, on equity risk premia and the liquidity premium. Three, the effects of transaction costs on quantities such as the liquidity premium are overestimated in partial equilibrium relative to general equilibrium.
We study consumption-portfolio and asset pricing frameworks with recursive preferences and unspanned risk. We show that in both cases, portfolio choice and asset pricing, the value function of the investor/representative agent can be characterized by a specific semilinear partial differential equation. To date, the solution to this equation has mostly been approximated by Campbell-Shiller techniques, without addressing general issues of existence and uniqueness. We develop a novel approach that rigorously constructs the solution by a fixed point argument. We prove that under regularity conditions a solution exists and establish a fast and accurate numerical method to solve consumption-portfolio and asset pricing problems with recursive preferences and unspanned risk. Our setting is not restricted to affine asset price dynamics. Numerical examples illustrate our approach.
Austerity
(2014)
We shed light on the function, properties and optimal size of austerity using the standard sovereign model augmented to include incomplete information about credit risk. Austerity is defined as the shortfall of consumption from the level desired by a country and supported by its repayment capacity. We find that austerity serves as a tool for securing a more favorable loan package; that it is associated with over-investment even when investment does not create collateral; and that low risk borrowers may favor more to less severe austerity. These findings imply that the amount of fresh funds obtained by a sovereign is not a reliable measure of austerity suffered; and that austerity may actually be associated with higher growth. Our analysis accommodates costly signalling for gaining credibility and also assigns a novel role to spending multipliers in the determination of optimal austerity.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between austerity measures and economic growth. We propose a general equilibrium model where (i) agents have recursive preferences; (ii) economic growth is endogenously driven by investments in R&D; (iii) the government is committed to a zero-deficit policy and finances public expenditures by means of a combination of labor taxes and R&D taxes. We find that austerity measures that rely on reducing resources available to the R&D sector depress economic growth both in the short- and long-run. High debt EU members are currently implementing austerity measures based on higher taxes and/or lower investments in the R&D sector. This casts some doubts on the real ability of these countries to grow over the next years.
Banks' financial distress, lending supply and consumption expenditure : [version december 2013]
(2014)
The paper employs a unique identification strategy that links survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank level data in order to estimate the effects of bank financial distress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. Specifically, we show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report significantly lower levels of non-mortgage liabilities compared to a matched sample of households. The reduced access to credit, however, does not result in lower levels of consumption. Instead, we show that households compensate by drawing down liquid assets. Only households without the ability to draw on liquid assets reduce consumption. The results are consistent with consumption smoothing in the face of a temporary adverse lending supply shock. The results contrast with recent evidence on the real effects of finance on firms' investment, where even temporary adverse credit supply shocks are associated with significant real effects.
he observed hump-shaped life-cycle pattern in individuals' consumption cannot be explained by the classical consumption-savings model. We explicitly solve a model with utility of both consumption and leisure and with educational decisions affecting future wages. We show optimal consumption is hump shaped and determine the peak age. The hump results from consumption and leisure being substitutes and from the implicit price of leisure being decreasing over time; more leisure means less education, which lowers future wages, and the present value of foregone wages decreases with age. Consumption is hump shaped whether the wage is hump shaped or increasing over life.
I numerically solve realistically calibrated life cycle consumption-investment problems in continuous time featuring stochastic mortality risk driven by jumps, unspanned labor income as well as short-sale and liquidity constraints and a simple insurance. I compare models with deterministic and stochastic hazard rate of death to a model without mortality risk. Mortality risk has only minor effects on the optimal controls early in the life cycle but it becomes crucial in later years. A diffusive component in the hazard rate of death has no significant impact, whereas a jump component is desired by the agent and influences optimal controls and wealth evolution. The insurance is used to ensure optimal bequest such that there is no accidental bequest. In the absence of the insurance, the biggest part of bequest is accidental.
We examine the relationship between household wealth and self-control. Although self-control has been linked to consumption and financial behavior, its measurement remains an open issue. We employ a definition of self-control failure that follows literature in psychology, suggesting that three factors can render self-control defective: lack of planning, lack of monitoring, and lack of commitment to pre-set plans. Our measure combines those three ingredients and can be computed using a standard representative survey. We find that self-control failure is strongly associated with different household net wealth measures and with self-assessed financial distress.
This paper contrasts the recent European initiatives on regulating corporate groups with alternative approaches to the phenomenon. In doing so it pays particular regard to the German codified law on corporate groups as the polar opposite to the piecemeal approach favored by E.U. legislation.
It finds that the European Commission’s proposal to submit (significant) related party transactions to enhanced transparency, outside fairness review, and ex ante shareholder approval is both flawed in its design and based on contestable assumptions on informed voting of institutional investors. In particular, the contemplated exemption for transactions with wholly owned subsidiaries allows controlling shareholders to circumvent the rule extensively. Moreover, vesting voting rights with (institutional) investors will not lead to the informed assessment that is hoped for, because these investors will rationally abstain from active monitoring and rely on proxy advisory firms instead whose competency to analyze non-routine significant related party transactions is questionable.
The paper further delineates that the proposed recognition of an overriding interest of the group requires strong counterbalances to adequately protect minority shareholders and creditors. Hence, if the Commission choses to go down this route it might end up with a comprehensive regulation that is akin to the unpopular Ninth Company Law Directive in spirit, though not in content. The latter prediction is corroborated by the pertinent parts of the proposal for a European Model Company Act.
I analyze a critical illness insurance in a consumption-investment model over the life cycle. I solve a model with stochastic mortality risk and health shock risk numerically. These shocks are interpreted as critical illness and can negatively affect the expected remaining lifetime, the health expenses, and the income. In order to hedge the health expense effect of a shock, the agent has the possibility to contract a critical illness insurance. My results highlight that the critical illness insurance is strongly desired by the agents. With an insurance profit of 20%, nearly all agents contract the insurance in the working stage of the life cycle and more than 50% of the agents contract the insurance during retirement. With an insurance profit of 200%, still nearly all working agents contract the insurance, whereas there is little demand in the retirement stage.
One of the motivations for establishing a European banking union was the desire to break the ties with between national regulators and domestic financial institutions in order to prevent regulatory capture. However, supervisory authority over the financial sector at the national level can also have valuable public benefits. The aim of this policy letter is to detail these public benefits in order to counter discussions that focus only on conflicts of interest. It is informed by an analysis of how financial institutions interacted with policy-makers in the design of national bank rescue schemes in response to the banking crisis of 2008. Using this information, it discusses the possible benefits of close cooperation between financial institutions and regulators and analyzes these in the wake of a European banking union.
We explore the sources of household balance sheet adjustment following the collapse of the housing market in 2006. First, we use microdata from the Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey to document that banks cumulatively tightened consumer lending standards more in counties that experienced a house price boom in the mid-2000s than in non-boom counties. We then use the idea that renters, unlike homeowners, did not experience an adverse wealth shock when the housing market collapsed to examine the relative importance of two explanations for the observed deleveraging and the sluggish pickup in consumption after 2008. First, households may have optimally adjusted to lower wealth by reducing their demand for debt and implicitly, their demand for consumption. Alternatively, banks may have been more reluctant to lend in areas with pronounced real estate declines. Our evidence is consistent with the second explanation. Renters with low risk scores, compared to homeowners in the same markets, reduced their levels of nonmortgage debt and credit card debt more in counties where house prices fell more. The contrast suggests that the observed reductions in aggregate borrowing were more driven by cutbacks in the provision of credit than by a demand-based response to lower housing wealth.
We document and study international differences in both ownership and holdings of stocks, private businesses, homes, and mortgages among households aged fifty or more in thirteen countries, using new and comparable survey data. We employ counterfactual techniques to decompose observed differences across the Atlantic, within the US, and within Europe into those arising from differences in population characteristics and differences in economic environments. We then correlate the latter differences to country-level indicators. Ownership across the range of the assets considered tends to be more widespread among US households. We document that shortly prior to the current crisis, US households tended to invest larger amounts in stocks and smaller ones in homes, and to have larger mortgages in older age, even controlling for characteristics. This is consistent with the high prevalence of negative equity associated with the current crisis. More generally, we find that differences in household characteristics often play a small role, while differences in economic environments tend to explain most of the observed differences in ownership rates and in amounts held. The latter differences are much more pronounced among European countries than among US regions, suggesting further potential for harmonization of policies and institutions.
Does austerity pay off?
(2014)
Policy makers often implement austerity measures when the sustainability of public finances is in doubt and, hence, sovereign yield spreads are high. Is austerity successful in bringing about a reduction in yield spreads? We employ a new panel data set which contains sovereign yield spreads for 31 emerging and advanced economies and estimate the effects of cuts of government consumption on yield spreads and economic activity. The conditions under which austerity takes place are crucial. During times of fiscal stress, spreads rise in response to the spending cuts, at least in the short-run. In contrast, austerity pays off, if conditions are more benign.