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93
The great financial crisis and the euro area crisis led to a substantial reform of financial safety nets across Europe and – critically – to the introduction of supranational elements. Specifically, a supranational supervisor was established for the euro area, with discrete arrangements for supervisory competences and tasks depending on the systemic relevance of supervised credit institutions. A resolution mechanism was created to allow the frictionless resolution of large financial institutions. This resolution mechanism has been now complemented with a funding instrument.
While much more progress has been achieved than most observers could imagine 12 years ago, the banking union remains unfinished with important gaps and deficiencies. The experience over the past years, especially in the area of crisis management and resolution, has provided impetus for reform discussions, as reflected most lately in the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022.
This Policy Insight looks primarily at the current and the desired state of the banking union project. The key underlying question, and the focus here, is the level of ambition and how it is matched with effective legal and regulatory tools. Specifically, two questions will structure the discussions:
What would be a reasonable definition and rationale for a ‘complete’ banking union? And what legal reforms would be required to achieve it?
Banking union is a case of a new remit of EU-level policy that so far has been established on the basis of long pre-existing treaty stipulations, namely, Article 127(6) TFEU (for banking supervision) and Article 114 TFEU (for crisis management and deposit insurance). Could its completion be similarly carried out through secondary law? Or would a more comprehensive overhaul of the legal architecture be required to ensure legal certainty and legitimacy?
92
To ensure the credibility of market discipline induced by bail-in, neither retail investors nor peer banks should appear prominently among the investor base of banks’ loss absorbing capital. Empirical evidence on bank-level data provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority raises a few red flags. Our list of policy recommendations encompasses disclosure policy, data sharing among supervisors, information transparency on holdings of bail-inable debt for all stakeholders, threshold values, and a well-defined upper limit for any bail-in activity. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
91
European banks have substantial investments in assets that are
measured without directly observable market prices (mark-to-
model). Financial disclosures of these value estimates lack
standardization and are hard to compare across banks. These
comparability concerns are concentrated in large European
banks that extensively rely on level 3 estimates with the most
unobservable inputs. Although the relevant balance sheet
positions only represent a small fraction of these large banks’
total assets (2.9%), their value equals a significant fraction of core
equity tier 1 (48.9%). Incorrect valuations thus have a potential to
impact financial stability. 85% of these bank assets are under
direct ECB supervision. Prudential regulation requires value
adjustments that are apt to shield capital against valuation risk.
Yet, stringent enforcement is critical for achieving this objective.
This document was provided by the Economic Governance
Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
90
Der Koalitionsvertrag 2021 sieht eine generationengerechte Absicherung des Rentenniveaus durch eine teilweise aus Haushaltsmitteln finanzierte Kapitaldeckung vor. Um dieses Ziel zu verwirklichen, wird hier die Einführung einer Generationenrente ab Geburt vorgeschlagen. Dabei wird aus Haushaltsmitteln ein Betrag von € 5.000 für jedes Neugeborene nach Grundsätzen des professionellen Anlagemanagements am globalen Kapitalmarkt angelegt. Konzeptionell soll sich diese Generationenrente am Modell der Basisrente(§10 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 b EStG) orientieren, d.h. die akkumulierten Gelder sind weder beleihbar, vererbbar noch übertragbar und können frühestens ab Alter 63 zugunsten einer lebenslangen Monatsrente verwendet werden. Unsere Berechnungen zeigen, dass durch die hier vorgeschlagene Generationenrente unabhängig vom Verlauf der individuellen Erwerbsbiographie, Altersarmut für die vom demographischen Wandel besonders betroffenen zukünftigen Generationen vermieden wird.
89
The sixth sanction package of the European Union in the context of the aggression against Ukraine excludes Sberbank, the largest Russian bank, from the SWIFT network. The increasing use of SWIFT as a tool for sanctions stimulates the rollout of alternative payment information systems by the governments of Russia and China. This policy white paper informs about the alternatives at hand, as well as their advantages and disadvantages. Careful reflection about these issues is particularly important, given the call for an “Economic Article 5” tabled for the next NATO meeting. Finally, the white paper highlights the need for institutional reforms, if policymakers decide to return SWIFT to the status of a global public good after the war.
88
This briefing paper describes and evaluates the law and economics of institution(al) protection schemes. Throughout our analysis, we use Europe’s largest such scheme, that of German savings banks, as paradigm. We find strengths and weaknesses: Strong network-internal monitoring and early warning seems to be an important contributor to IPS network success. Similarly, the geographical quasi-cartel encourages banks to build a strong client base, including SME, in all regions. Third, the growth of the IPS member institutions may have benefitted from the strictly unlimited protection offered, in terms of euro amounts per account holder. The counterweighing weaknesses encompass the conditionality of the protection pledge and the underinvestment risk it entails, sometimes referred to as blackmailing the government, as well as the limited diversification potential of the deposit insurance within the network, and the near-incompatibility of the IPS model with the provisions of the BRRD, particularly relating to bail-in and resolution. Consequently, we suggest, as policy guidance, to treat large IPS networks similar to large banking groups, and put them as such under the direct supervision of the ECB within the SSM. Moreover, we suggest strengthening the seriousness of a deposit insurance that offers unlimited protection. Finally, to improve financial stability, we suggest embedding the IPS model into a multi-tier deposit re-insurance scheme, with a national and a European layer. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
87
We raise some critical points against a naïve interpretation of “green finance” products and strategies. These critical insights are the background against which we take a closer look at instruments and policies that might allow green finance to become more impactful. In particular, we focus on the role of a taxonomy and investor activism. We also describe the interaction of government policies with green finance practice – an aspect, which has been mostly neglected in policy debates but needs to be taken into account. Finally, the special case of green government bonds is discussed.
86 [Oktober 2021]
We raise some critical points against a naïve interpretation of “green finance” products and strategies. These critical insights are the background against which we take a closer look at instruments and policies that might allow green finance to become more impactful. In particular, we focus on the role of a taxonomy and investor activism. We also describe the interaction of government policies with green finance practice – an aspect, which has been mostly neglected in policy debates but needs to be taken into account. Finally, the special case of green government bonds is discussed.
86 [Juli 2021]
This in-depth analysis provides evidence on differences in the practice of supervising large banks in the UK and in the euro area. It identifies the diverging institutional architecture (partially supranationalised vs. national oversight) as a pivotal determinant for a higher effectiveness of supervisory decision making in the UK. The ECB is likely to take a more stringent stance in prudential supervision than UK authorities. The setting of risk weights and the design of macroprudential stress test scenarios document this hypothesis. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. It was originally published on the European Parliament’s webpage: www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2021/689443/IPOL_IDA(2021)689443_EN.pdf
85
The crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework in the euro area requires a reset. Although its policy objectives remain valid, the means of achieving them do not. As the euro area comes the end of the long transition period taken to implement the BRRD/SRMR, it should take the opportunity to reset expectations about resolution.
Above all, resolution should be for the many, not just the few. There should be a single presumptive path for dealing with failed banks: the use of bail-in to facilitate orderly liquidation under a solvent-wind down strategy. This will protect deposits and set the stage – together with the backstop that the European Stability Mechanism provides to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) -- for the transformation of the SRF into the Single Deposit Guarantee Scheme (SDGS). To avoid forbearance, responsibility for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) should rest, not with national central banks, but with the ECB as a single lender of last resort. Finally, national deposit guarantee schemes should function as institutional protection schemes and become investors of last resort in their member banks. Together, these measures would complete Banking Union, promote market discipline, avoid imposing additional burdens on taxpayers, help untie the doom loop between weak banks and weak governments, strengthen the euro and enhance financial stability.