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We make three points. First, the decade before the financial crisis in 2007 was characterized by a collapse in the yield on TIPS. Second, estimated VARs for the federal funds rate and the TIPS yield show that while monetary policy shocks had negligible effects on the TIPS yield, shocks to the latter had one-to-one effects on the federal funds rate. Third, these findings can be rationalized in a New Keynesian model.
We test the menu cost model of Ball and Mankiw (1994, 1995), which implies that the impact of price dispersion on inflation should differ between inflation and deflation episodes, using data for Japan and Hong Kong. We use a random cross-section sample split when calculating the moments of the distribution of price changes to mitigate the small-cross-sectionsample bias noted by Cecchetti and Bryan (1999). The parameter on the third moment is positive and significant in both countries during both the inflation and deflation periods, and the parameter on the second moment changes sign in the deflation period, as the theory predicts. Keywords: inflation, deflation, menu costs, Hong Kong, Japan JEL Numbers: E31
The risk of deflation
(2009)
This paper was prepared for the meeting on Financial Regulation and Macroeconomic Stability: Key issues for the G20, organised by the CEPR and the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee, London, 31 January 2009. Introduction: The onset of financial instability in August 2007, which quickly spread across the world, raises a number of questions for policy makers. First, what are the roots of the crisis? Many factors have been emphasized in the debate, including the opacity of complex financial products; the excessive confidence in ratings; weak risk management by financial institutions; massive reliance on wholesale funding; and the presumption that markets would always be liquid. Furthermore, poorly understood incentive effects – arising from the originate-to-distribute-model, remuneration policies and the period of low interest rates – are also widely seen as having played a role. Second, how can a repetition of the crisis can be avoided? Much attention is being focused on regulation and supervision of financial intermediaries. The G-20, at its summit in November 2008, noted that measures need to be taken in five areas: (i) financial market transparency and disclosure by firms need to be strengthened; (ii) regulation needs to be enhanced to ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate; (iii) the integrity of financial markets should be improved by bolstering investor and consumer protection, avoiding conflicts of interest, and by promoting information sharing; (iv) international cooperation among regulators must be enhanced; and (v) international financial institutions must be reformed to reflect changing economic weights in the world economy better in order to increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of these institutions. Third, how can the consequences for economic activity be minimized? Many of the adverse developments in financial markets – in particular the collapse of term interbank markets – reflect deeply entrenched perceptions of counterparty risk. Prompt and far-reaching action to support the financial system, in particular the infusion of equity capital in financial institutions to reduce counter-party risk and get credit to flow again, is essential in order to restore market functioning. A particular risk at present is that the rapid decline in inflation in many countries in recent months will turn into deflation with highly adverse real economic developments. This background paper considers how large the risk of deflation may be and discusses what policy can do to reduce it. It is organized as follows. Section 2 defines deflation and discusses downward nominal wage rigidities and the zero lower bound on interest rates. While these factors are frequently seen as two reasons why deflation can be associated with very poor economic outcomes, they should not be overemphasized. Section 3 looks at the current situation. Inflation expectations and forecasts in the subset of economies we look at (the euro area, the UK and the US) are positive, indicating that deflation is not expected. This does not imply that the current concerns of deflation are unwarranted, only that the public expects the central bank to be successful in avoiding deflation. The section also looks at the evolution of headline and “core” inflation, focusing on data from the US and the euro area. Section 4 reviews how monetary and fiscal policy can be conducted to ensure that deflation is avoided. Section 5 briefly discusses special issues arising in emerging market economies. Finally, Section 6 offers some conclusions. An Appendix discusses deflation episodes in the period 1882-1939.
At the upcoming G20 meetings the issue what can be done to avoid a repetition of the current deep financial crisis will again be debated. Much attention and criticism will be directed to central banks. That is unavoidable: central banks must never again permit the development of financial imbalances that are large enough to lead to the collapse of major parts of the financial system when they unwind. In the future, policy makers must “lean against the wind” and tighten financial conditions if they perceive that imbalances are forming, even if there is little hard data to rely on. And they must be mindful that the costs of acting too late can dwarf those of acting too early.
In this paper we assemble an annual data set on broad and narrow money, prices, real economic activity and interest rates in Ireland from a variety of sources for the period 1933-2012. We discuss in detail how the data set is constructed and what assumptions we have made to do so. Furthermore, we estimate a simple SVAR model to provide some empirical evidence on the behaviour of these time series. Money supply shocks appear to be the most important drivers of both money and prices. Interest rate shocks, which capture monetary policy, play an important role driving output and, of course, interest rates. The GDP shocks, which raise prices, seem of less importance.
Since the 1970s, the overarching view in the literature has been that a Phillips curve relationship did not exist in Ireland prior to the 1979 exchange rate break with Sterling. It was argued that, as a small open economy, prices were determined externally. To test this relationship, we study the determination of inflation between 1926 and 2012, a longer sample period than any previously used. We find that the difference between unemployment and the NAIRU is a significant determinant of inflation both in the full sample and in the subsamples spanning the periods before and after the Sterling parity link.
Expectations of Sterling returning to Gold have been disregarded in empirical work on the US dollar – Sterling exchange rate in the early 1920s. We incorporate such considerations in a PPP model of the exchange rate, letting the probability of a return to gold follow a logistic function. We draw several conclusions: (i) the PPP model works well from spring 1919 to spring 1925; (ii) wholesale prices outperform consumer prices; (iii) allowing for a return to gold leads to a higher speed of adjustment of the exchange rate to PPP; (iv) interest rate differentials and the relative monetary base are crucial determinants of the expected return to gold; (v) the probability of a return to Gold peaked at about 72% in late 1924 and but fell to about 60% in early 1925; and (vi) our preferred model does not support the Keynes’ view that Sterling was overvalued after the return to gold.
This European Policy Analysis discusses the need to strengthen the institutions underpinning the euro and makes several policy recommendations. The Stability and Growth Pact must be reinforced, have greater automaticity and entail graduated sanctions. Fiscal surveillance must be improved through the establishment of a European Fiscal Stability Agency. Finally, the European Financial Stability Facility must be made permanent.
Background: To perform a comprehensive study on the relationship between vitamin D metabolism and the response to interferon-α-based therapy of chronic hepatitis C.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Associations between a functionally relevant polymorphism in the gene encoding the vitamin D 1α-hydroxylase (CYP27B1-1260 rs10877012) and the response to treatment with pegylated interferon-α (PEG-IFN-α) and ribavirin were determined in 701 patients with chronic hepatitis C. In addition, associations between serum concentrations of 25-hydroxyvitamin D3 (25[OH]D3) and treatment outcome were analysed. CYP27B1-1260 rs10877012 was found to be an independent predictor of sustained virologic response (SVR) in patients with poor-response IL28B genotypes (15% difference in SVR for rs10877012 genotype AA vs. CC, p = 0.02, OR = 1.52, 95% CI = 1.061–2.188), but not in patients with favourable IL28B genotype. Patients with chronic hepatitis C showed a high prevalence of vitamin D insufficiency (25[OH]D3<20 ng/mL) during all seasons, but 25(OH)D3 serum levels were not associated with treatment outcome.
Conclusions/Significance: Our study suggests a role of bioactive vitamin D (1,25[OH]2D3, calcitriol) in the response to treatment of chronic hepatitis C. However, serum concentration of the calcitriol precursor 25(OH)D3 is not a suitable predictor of treatment outcome.
Der Erfolg einer nationalen Forschungsdateninfrastruktur hängt von der Einbindung der gesamten Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft und -infrastruktur ab. In zahlreichen Bundesländern existieren Landesinitiativen für Forschungsdatenmanagement oder ähnliche Einrichtungen, die dazu beitragen können, diese Einbindung zu erreichen. Das gemeinsame Papier von Vertretern aus verschiedenen Bundesländern argumentiert, dass eine enge Verknüpfung der Landesinitiativen mit dem NFDI e.V. erfolgen sollte, um die Potentiale der Zusammenarbeit zu nutzen.
Der NFDI e. V. wird einen bedeutsamen Beitrag für einen besseren Umgang mit Forschungsdaten leisten, doch der Erfolg der nationalen Forschungsdateninfrastruktur ist letztlich von einer Einbindung der gesamten Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft und -infrastruktur abhängig. Die vielfältigen Forschungseinrichtungen einzubinden, erfordert Koordination auf vielen Ebenen. Speziell Hochschulen haben eine tragende Rolle für sowohl disziplinäre und interdisziplinäre Forschung als auch wissenschaftliche Ausbildung in Deutschland und sind damit zentrale Akteure für die fachübergreifende Forschungsdateninfrastruktur. Durch die Förderung von Kooperationen und Koordination auf Ebene von Ländern oder Länderverbünden lässt sich die Entwicklung der nationalen Forschungsdateninfrastruktur unterstützen. Landesinitiativen für Forschungsdatenmanagement (FDM) oder ähnliche koordinierende Einrichtungen können die digitale Transformation in der Forschung durch Information, den Aufbau von Kooperationen und die Qualifikation von Personal unterstützen. Ihre Einrichtung, dauerhafte Etablierung und Einbeziehung in die Arbeit des NFDI e. V. ist ein wichtiger Beitrag zur Schaffung einer nationalen Forschungsdateninfrastruktur.