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The Transition Radiation Detector (TRD) was designed and built to enhance the capabilities of the ALICE detector at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). While aimed at providing electron identification and triggering, the TRD also contributes significantly to the track reconstruction and calibration in the central barrel of ALICE. In this paper the design, construction, operation, and performance of this detector are discussed. A pion rejection factor of up to 410 is achieved at a momentum of 1 GeV/c in p-Pb collisions and the resolution at high transverse momentum improves by about 40% when including the TRD information in track reconstruction. The triggering capability is demonstrated both for jet, light nuclei, and electron selection.
The Transition Radiation Detector (TRD) was designed and built to enhance the capabilities of the ALICE detector at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). While aimed at providing electron identification and triggering, the TRD also contributes significantly to the track reconstruction and calibration in the central barrel of ALICE. In this paper the design, construction, operation, and performance of this detector are discussed. A pion rejection factor of up to 410 is achieved at a momentum of 1 GeV/c in p–Pb collisions and the resolution at high transverse momentum improves by about 40% when including the TRD information in track reconstruction. The triggering capability is demonstrated both for jet, light nuclei, and electron selection.
Inclusive transverse momentum spectra of primary charged particles in Pb–Pb collisions at √sNN=2.76 TeV have been measured by the ALICE Collaboration at the LHC. The data are presented for central and peripheral collisions, corresponding to 0–5% and 70–80% of the hadronic Pb–Pb cross section. The measured charged particle spectra in |η|<0.8 and 0.3<pT<20 GeV/c are compared to the expectation in pp collisions at the same sNN, scaled by the number of underlying nucleon–nucleon collisions. The comparison is expressed in terms of the nuclear modification factor RAA. The result indicates only weak medium effects (RAA≈0.7) in peripheral collisions. In central collisions, RAA reaches a minimum of about 0.14 at pT=6–7 GeV/c and increases significantly at larger pT. The measured suppression of high-pT particles is stronger than that observed at lower collision energies, indicating that a very dense medium is formed in central Pb–Pb collisions at the LHC.
This paper starts out by pointing out the challenges and weaknesses which the German banking systems faces according to the prevailing views among national and international observers. These challenges include a generalproblem of profitability and, possibly as its main reason, the strong role of public banks. These concerns raise the questions whether the facts support this assessment of a general profitability problem and whether there are reasons to expect a fundamental or structural transformation of the German banking system. The paper contains four sections. The first one presents the evidence concerning the profitability problem in a comparative, international perspective. The second section presents information about the so-called three-pillar system of German banking. What might be surprising in this context is that the group of pub lic banks is not only the largest segment of the German banking system, but that the primary savings banks also are its financially most successful part. The German banking system is highly fragmented. This fact suggests to discuss past, present and possible future consolidations in the banking system in the third section. The authors provide evidence to the effect that within- group consolidation has been going on at a rapid pace in the public and the cooperative banking groups in recent years and that this development has not yet come to an end, while within-group consolidation among the large private banks, consolidation across group boundaries at a national level and cross-border or international consolidation has so far only happened at a limited scale, and do not appear to gain momentum in the near future. In the last section, the authors develop their explanation for the fact that large-scale and cross border consolidation has so far not materialized to any great extent. Drawing on the concept of complementarity, they argue that it would be difficult to expect these kinds of mergers and acquisitions happening within a financial system which is itself surprisingly stable, or, as one cal also call it, resistant to change.
Stakeholderorientierung, Systemhaftigkeit und Stabilität der Corporate Governance in Deutschland
(2006)
Since the time of Germany’s belated industrialisation, corporate governance in Germany has been stakeholder oriented in the dual sense of attaching importance to the interests of stakeholders who are not at the same time shareholders, and of providing certain opportunities for these stakeholders to influence corporate decisions. Corporate governance is also systemic. It is a system of elements that are complementary to each other, and also consistent. In other word, it is composed of elements for which it is important that they fit together well, and in the German case these elements did fit together well until quite recently. Corporate governance as a system is itself an element of the German bank-based financial system at large and possibly even of the entire German business and economic system. Stakeholder orientation of governance is consistent with the general structure this system, and even represents one of its central elements. In retrospect, German corporate governance has also proved to be surprisingly stable. Its fundamental traits date back to the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. There are strong reasons to assume that the systemic features, that is, its complementarity and consistency, have greatly contributed to its past stability. Since about ten years now, there are growing tendencies to question the viability and stability of the German corporate governance system and even the financial system as a whole. One of the central topics in the new debate concerns the stakeholder orientation of the system, which some observers and critics consider as the main weakness of the “German model” under the increasing pressures of globalisation and European integration. As far as their development over time is concerned, systems of complementarity elements exhibit certain peculiarities: (1) They do not adjust easily to changing circumstances. (2) Changes concerning important individual elements, such as the stakeholder orientation of governance, tend to jeopardize the viability and the stability of the entire system. (3) While they appear to be stable, systems shaped by complementary may simply be rigid and tend to break under strong external pressure. “Breaking” means that a system undergoes a fundamental transformation. It seems plausible to assume that the German financial system is already in the middle of such a transformation. It is yet another consequence of its systemic character that this transformation is not likely to be a smooth and gradual process and that it will not lead to a “mixed model” but rather to the adoption of a capital market-based financial system as it prevails in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In such a system, corporate governance cannot be geared to catering to the interests of stakeholders, and an active role for them would not even make any economic sense.
Der folgende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie die Verteilung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten in Unternehmen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance ausgestaltet werden kann. Im Zentrum der Überlegungen steht die Frage, welcher der am Unternehmen beteiligten Interessengruppen diese Rechte sinnvollerweise zukommen sollten. Insbesondere die beiden polaren Systeme - das auf dem Shareholder-Value-Primat aufbauende System einer ausschließlich im Interesse der Aktionäre geführten Unternehmung auf der eine Seite - und einem Corporate Governance-System, das die Interessen aller am Unternehmen beteiligten Stakeholder berücksichtigt, auf der anderen Seite - werden geschildert und mit den Mitteln der ökonomischen Theorie bewertet. Spezifische Investitionen möglicher Stakeholder und die Institutionen und Mechanismen, die eine Absicherung der daraus entstehenden ökonomischen Renten für die jeweiligen Stakeholder erlauben, sind damit wichtige Bestimmungsparameter für die Unternehmensverfassung. Insbesondere die Existenz und Güte von Märkten innerhalb des Finanzsystems, in dem ein Unternehmen tätig ist, lassen das ein oder das andere Corporate Governance-System vorteilhafter erscheinen. Überlegungen zu anderen möglichen Mechanismen, die auf der internen Organisation von Unternehmungen basieren und dadurch eine Feinsteuerung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten - und der damit verbundenen Machtverteilung zwischen den Interessengruppen im Unternehmen - erlaubt, schließen die Arbeit ab.
Until about 25 years ago, almost all European countries had a so-called “three pillar” banking system comprising private banks, (public) savings banks and (mutual) cooperative banks. Since that time, several European countries have implemented far-reaching changes in their banking systems, which have more than anything else affected the two “pillars” of the savings and cooperative banks. The article describes the most important changes in Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Spain and characterizes the former and the current roles of savings banks and cooperative banks in these countries. A particular focus is placed on the German case, which is almost unique in so far as the German savings banks and cooperative banks have maintained most of their traditional features. The article concludes with a plea for diversity of institutional forms of banks and argues that it is important to safeguard the strengths of those types of banks that do not conform to the model of a large shareholder-oriented commercial bank.
Nationale rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen beeinflussen die Möglichkeiten für wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten multinationaler Unternehmen (MNU) in einem Gastland und der Koordination zwischen den Unternehmensteilen in verschiedenen Ländern. Sie sind damit wichtige Bestimmungsfaktoren für Standortentscheidungen von MNU. Die Bedeutung von Recht und Standortwahl unterscheidet sich aber je nach verfolgter MNUStrategie. Seit etwa 10 Jahren verändern MNU ihre strategische Ausrichtung. Gleichzeitig gab es wesentliche Fortschritte bei der Forschung über Geschäftsfeld- und Gesamt-unternehmensstrategien von MNU. Aufbauend auf diesen beiden Entwicklungen wird in diesem Aufsatz die These vertreten, daß heute - im Zeitalter integrierter MNU-Strategien - Einfachheit, Flexibilität und Verläßlichkeit des relevanten nationalen Rechts in einem Land und seine Ähnlichkeiten mit dem Recht anderer Länder eine zentrale Bedeutung erlangt haben. Dies stellt einen wesentlichen Unterschied zu einer – allerdings noch nicht gänzlich überwundenen – Situation dar, in der MNU mehr an einer rechtlichen Situation interessiert sind, die ihnen eine maximale Anpassung an die jeweiligen lokalen Umstände der einzelnen Gastländer erlaubt, worin der Kern von ”multi-domestic” MNU-Strategien besteht. Die Veränderung von MNU-Strategien bietet auch eine Erklärung für die in jüngster Zeit zu beobachtende Veränderung der Lobbyingaktivitäten von MNU bezüglich der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen in ihren jeweiligen Gastländern.
Die Macht der Ratingagenturen beruht auch auf den vielen Gesetzen und Verordnungen, die eine Orientierung an den Ratings der drei großen Agenturen vorschreiben, sagt Wirtschaftsprofessor Reinhard Schmidt. Um die Macht der Ratingagenturen zu begrenzen, empfiehlt er viele dieser Regeln ersatzlos zu streichen.
Rapidity and transverse momentum dependence of inclusive J/ψ production in pp collisions at √s=7 TeV
(2011)
The ALICE experiment at the LHC has studied inclusive J/ψ production at central and forward rapidities in pp collisions at √s=7 TeV. In this Letter, we report on the first results obtained detecting the J/ψ through the dilepton decay into e+e− and μ+μ− pairs in the rapidity ranges |y|<0.9 and 2.5<y<4, respectively, and with acceptance down to zero pT. In the dielectron channel the analysis was carried out on a data sample corresponding to an integrated luminosity Lint=5.6 nb−1 and the number of signal events is NJ/ψ=352±32(stat.)±28(syst.); the corresponding figures in the dimuon channel are Lint=15.6 nb−1 and NJ/ψ=1924±77(stat.)±144(syst.). The measured production cross sections are σJ/ψ(|y|<0.9)=10.7±1.0(stat.)±1.6(syst.)−2.3+1.6(syst.pol.)μb and σJ/ψ(2.5<y<4)=6.31±0.25(stat.)±0.76(syst.)−1.96+0.95(syst.pol.)μb. The differential cross sections, in transverse momentum and rapidity, of the J/ψ were also measured.