Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting
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63
Ja, der Ablauf der Lock-up-Frist ist ein kursrelevantes Ereignis. Wir untersuchen Kursreaktionen auf das Ende der Lock-up-Frist bei 142 Unternehmen des Neuen Marktes. Da der Ablauf der Sperrfrist bereits zum Zeitpunkt des Börsengangs bekannt ist, erwarten wir bei einem (semi-)informationseffizienten Kapitalmarkt durchschnittlich keine Kursreaktion. Im Rahmen einer Ereignisstudie zeigen wir aber, dass sich am Ende der Sperrfrist signifikant negative Überrenditen ergeben. Durch eine differenzierte Analyse stellen wir fest, dass firmenspezifische Faktoren (Volatilität, Performance, Free Float) die Kursreaktionen am Ende der Lock-up-Periode beeinflussen. Die Befunde unserer Untersuchung belegen die Notwendigkeit klarer Regeln für mehr Transparenz nach dem Börsengang. Bedeutsam sind die vorliegenden Ergebnisse vor allem vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Diskussion um eine Erweiterung der insiderrechtlichen Meldepflichen im Rahmen des 4. Finanzmarktförderungsgesetzes. This paper explores the materiality of expirations of lock-up provisions that prevent insiders from selling their shares after the initial public offering (IPO). We examine 172 lock-up agreements of 142 IPOs floated on Germany’s New Market. Since the date of the lock-up expiration is common knowledge at the IPO, we would not expect to find abnormal returns surrounding the event day, assuming that markets are informationally efficient. However, using an event-study methodology we detect statistically significant negative abnormal returns and a twenty-five percent increase in trading volume surrounding lock-up expiration. The negative abnormal returns are larger for firms with high volatility, superior performance after the IPO, and low free float. The results of our study raise important regulatory issues with respect to disclosure rules of firms going public. We argue that insiders should be legally required to disclose their sell transactions in order to protect new and less informed shareholders.
62
Im Mittelpunkt dieses Beitrag stehen Verweildauermodelle und deren Verwendung als Analyseinstrumente für die Bewertung und Berechnung von Kreditausfallrisiken. Verschiedene Möglichkeiten zur Berechnung der Dauer des Nichtausfalls eines Kredites werden dabei vorgestellt. Die hier vorgestellten Verfahren werden auf einen aus Kreditakten von sechs deutschen Universalbanken zusammengestellten Datensatz angewendet. Beispiele und Interpretationshilfen zu den jeweils vorgestellten Methoden erleichtern den Zugang zu diesen Modellen. Es werden zahlreiche Hinweise auf weiterführende Literatur gegeben.
61
Dieser Beitrag stellt verschiedene ökonometrische Methoden zur Bewertung und Berechnung von Kreditausfallrisiken vor und wendet diese auf einen Datensatz sechs deutscher Universalbanken an. Im Mittelpunkt stehen dabei Logit- und Probitmodelle, mit deren Hilfe die Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit eines Kredites geschätzt werden kann. Dabei werden auch moderne Verfahren zur Analyse von Paneldaten besprochen. Beispiele undInterpretationshilfen zu den jeweils vorgestellten Methoden erleichtern den Zugang zu diesen Modellen. Es werden zahlreiche Hinweise auf weiterführende Literatur gegeben.
60
Initiated by the seminal work of Diamond/Dybvig (1983) and Diamond (1984), advances in the theory of financial intermediation have sharpened our understanding of the theoretical foundations of banks as special financial institutions. What makes them "unique" is the combination of accepting deposits and issuing loans. However, in recent years the notion of "disintermediation" has gained tremendous popularity, especially among American observers. These observers argue that deregulation, globalisation and advances in information technology have been eroding the role of banks as intermediaries and thus their alleged uniqueness. It is even assumed that ever more efficiently organised capital markets and specialised financial institutions that take advantage of these markets, such as mutual funds or finance companies, will lead to the demise of banks. Using a novel measurement concept based on intermediation and securitisation ratios, the present article provides evidence which shows that banking disintermediation is indeed a reality for the US financial system. This seems to indicate that American banks are not all that "unique"; they can be replaced to a considerable extent. Moreover, many observers seem to believe that what has happened in the US reflects a universal trend. However, empirical results reported in this paper indicate that such a trend has not manifested itself in other financial systems, and in particular, not in Germany or Japan. Evidence on the enormous structural differences between financial systems and the lack of unequivocal signs of convergence render any inferences from the American experience to other financial systems very problematic.
59
Vorgestellt wird eine empirische Studie, welche den Zusammenhang zwischen Rendite und Risiko für ein Sample deutscher Versicherungsaktien im Zeitraum 1975-1998 untersucht. Als Methode wurde ein Multifaktorenmodell mit makroökonomischen Faktoren verwendet. Je nach Untersuchungszeitraum beläuft sich der Anteil der erklärten Varianz auf 9,29% bis 13,62%. Es konnte eine signifikanter negativer Einfluß zwischen der Veränderung des allgemeinen Zinsniveaus und den Risikoprämien von Versicherungsaktien identifiziert werden. Weiterhin ist Wechselkurses der DM zum US-Dollar signifikant.
58
Although the world of banking and finance is becoming more integrated every day, in most aspects the world of financial regulation continues to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. The main players here are still national governments and governmental agencies. And until recently, they tended to follow a policy of shielding their activities from scrutiny by their peers and members of the academic community rather than inviting critical assessments and an exchange of ideas. The turbulence in international financial markets in the 1980s, and its impact on U.S. banks, gave rise to the notion that academics working in the field of banking and financial regulation might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation in the United States, and thus ultimately to the stability of the entire financial sector. This provided the impetus for the creation of the “U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee”. In the meantime, similar shadow committees have been founded in Europe and Japan. The specific problems associated with financial regulation in Europe, as well as the specific features which distinguish the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee from its counterparts in the U.S. and Japan, derive from the fact that while Europe has already made substantial progress towards economic and political integration, it is still primarily a collection of distinct nation-states with differing institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. Therefore, any attempt to work towards a European approach to financial regulation must include an effort to promote the development of a European culture of co-operation in this area, and this is precisely what the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) seeks to do. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, discuss the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.
57
We present an empirical study focusing on the estimation of a fundamental multi-factor model for a universe of European stocks. Following the approach of the BARRA model, we have adopted a cross-sectional methodology. The proportion of explained variance ranges from 7.3% to 66.3% in the weekly regressions with a mean of 32.9%. For the individual factors we give the percentage of the weeks when they yielded statistically significant influence on stock returns. The best explanatory power – apart from the dominant country factors – was found among the statistical constructs „success“ and „variability in markets“.
056
The use of catastrophe bonds (cat bonds) implies the problem of the so called basis risk, resulting from the fact that, in contrast to traditional reinsurance, this kind of coverage cannot be a perfect hedge for the primary’s insured portfolio. On the other hand cat bonds offer some very attractive economic features: Besides their usefulness as a solution to the problems of moral hazard and default risk, an important advantage of cat bonds can be seen in the presumably lower transaction costs compared to (re)insurance products. Insurance coverage usually incurs costs of acquisition, monitoring and loss adjustment, all of which can be reduced by making use of the financial markets. Additionally, cat bonds are only weakly correlated with market risk, implying that in perfect financial markets these securities could be traded at a price including just small risk premiums. Although these aspects have been identified in economic literature, to our knowledge there has been no publication so far that formally addresses the trade-off between basis risk and transaction cost. In this paper, therefore, we introduce a simple model that enables us to analyze cat bonds and reinsurance as substitutional risk management tools in a standard insurance demand theory environment. We concentrate on the problem of basis risk versus transaction cost, and show that the availability of cat bonds affects the structure of optimal reinsurance contract design in an interesting way, as it leads to an increase of indemnity for small losses and a decrease of indemnity for large losses.
055 1
Joseph E. Stiglitz (1943 - )
(2000)
Am 24.11.1999 gibt Joseph E. Stiglitz seinen vorzeitigen Rücktritt als Chief Economist und Senior Vice President der Weltbank zum Jahresende bekannt. Er will sich wieder ausschließlich der Forschung und Lehre widmen und kehrt auf seinen Lehrstuhl am Economics Department der Stanford University zurück. Stiglitzs Rückzug aus der aktiven Entwicklungspolitik erfolgt nicht ganz freiwillig. Er selbst kommentiert seinen Entschluß: „It has become obvious to me that it would be difficult to continue to speak out as forcefully and publicly as I have on a variety of issues and still remain as chief economist. Rather than muzzle myself, or be muzzled, I decided to leave.“ (New York Times, 1.12.1999). Seit geraumer Zeit galt seine öffentliche Kritik am Washington Consensus, dem ökonomischen Glaubensbekenntnis, auf das sich die politische Linie des US Treasury genauso stützt wie die Stabilisierungs- und Reformpolitik des IWF, als Dorn im Auge der Vertreter dieser Institutionen. Für sie war Stiglitz - so die Metapher der Financial Times vom 26.11.99 - „a veritable gadfly“, eine wahre Viehbremse, deren lästiges Summen aufgrund von Position und Intellekt nicht einfach ignoriert werden konnte. ...