Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting
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200
Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, ob der Mehrheitsaktionär einer Gesellschaft im Vorfeld eines Zwangsausschlusses von Minderheitsaktionären (sog. Squeeze-Out) versucht, die Kapitalmarkterwartungen negativ zu beeinflussen. Ein solches "manipulatives" Verhalten wird häufig in der juristischen wie betriebswirtschaftlichen Literatur unterstellt, da der Aktienkurs fü die Abfindungshöhe die Wertuntergrenze bildet. Unsere empirische Untersuchung der Bilanz- und Pressemitteilungspolitik von Squeeze-Out-Unternehmen im Vorfeld der Ankündigung einer solchen Maßnahme am deutschen Kapitalmarkt zeigt, dass in diesem Zeitraum tatsächlich ein signifikanter Anstieg (Rückgang) der im Ton pessimistischen (optimistischen) Pressemitteilungen feststellbar ist. Allerdings zeigt sich weiter, dass die Aktien der Squeeze-Out-Kandidaten bereits im Vorfeld und am Tag der Ankündigung so hohe positive Überrenditen erzielen, dass der von uns quantifizierte kumulierte Effekt der Informationspolitik auf die Börsenbewertung einen insgesamt nur sehr geringen Einfluss ausübt und von anderen Faktoren (z.B. Abfindungsspekulationen) dominiert wird. JEL: M41, M40, G14, K22
128
This paper investigates the magnitude and the main determinants of share price reactions to buy-back announcements of German corporations. For our comprehensive sample of 224 announcements that took place between May 1998 and April 2003 we find average cumulative abnormal returns around -7.5% for the thirty days preceding the announcement and around +7.0 % for the ten days following the announcement. We regress post-announcement abnormal returns with multiple firm characteristics and provide evidence which supports the undervaluation signaling hypothesis but not the excess cash hypothesis or the tax-efficiency hypothesis. In extending prior empirical work, we also analyze price effects from initial statements of firms that they intend to seek shareholder approval for a buy-back plan. Observed cumulative abnormal returns on this initial date are in excess of 5% implying a total average price effect between 12% and 15% from implementing a buy-back plan. We conjecture that the German regulatory environment is the main reason why market variations to buy-back announcements are much stronger in Germany than in other countries and conclude that initial statements by managers to seek shareholders’ approval for a buy-back plan should also be subject to legal ad-hoc disclosure requirements.
124
In this study, we develop a technique for estimating a firm’s expected cost of equity capital derived from analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices. Building on the work of Gebhardt/Lee/-Swaminathan (2001) and Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis (2002), our approach allows daily estimation, using only publicly available information at that date. We then estimate the expected cost of equity capital at the market, industry and individual firm level using historical German data from 1989-2002 and examine firm characteristics which are systematically related to these estimates. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the concept in a contemporary case study for DaimlerChrysler and the European automobile industry.
85
Our study provides evidence on the share price reactions to the announcement of equity issues in Germany, where capital market is characterized by institutional features distinct from the U.S. market. German seasoned equity issues yield a positive market reaction which contrasts to the significant negative abnormal returns reported for the U.S. We provide evidence that these results are due to differences in both issuing characteristics and floatation methods, and in the corporate governance and ownership structures of the two countries. Our study explains much of the empirical puzzle of different market reactions to seemingly similar events across financial markets.
23
This paper provides a detailed empirical analysis of the call auction procedure on the German stock exchanges. The auction is conducted by the Makler whose position resembles that of a NYSE specialist. We use a dataset which contains information about all individual orders for a sample of stocks traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). This sample allows us to calculate the cost of transacting in a call market and compare them to the costs of transacting in a continuous market. We find that transaction costs for small transactions in the call market are lower than the quoted spread in the order book of the continuous market whereas transaction costs for large transactions are higher than the spread in the continuous market.
We further address the question whether active participation of the Makler is advantageous. On the one hand he may accomodate order imbalances, increase the liquidity of the market and stabilize prices. On the other hand, the discretion in price setting gives him an incentive to manipulate prices. This may increase return volatility. Our dataset identifies the trades the Maklers make for their own accounts. We eliminate these trades and determine the price that would have obtained without their participation. Comparing this hypothetical price series to the actual transaction prices, we find that Makler participation tends to reduce return volatility. A further analysis shows that the actual prices are much closer to the surrounding prices of the continuous trading session than the hypothetical prices that would have obtained without Makler participation. These results indicate that the Maklers provide a valuable service to the market. We further calculate the profits associated with the positions taken by the Maklers and find that, on average, they do not earn profits on the positions they take. Their compensation is thus restricted to the commissions they receive.
1
Insider trading and portfolio structure in experimental asset markets with a long lived asset
(1997)
We report results of a series of nine market experiments with asymmetric information and a fundamental value process that is more "realistic" than those in previous experiments. Both a call market institution and a continuous double auction mechanism are employed. We find considerable pricing inefficiencies that are only partially exploited by insiders. The magnitude of insider gains is analyzed separately for each experiment. We find support for the hypothesis that the continuous double auction leads to more efficient outcomes. Finally, we present evidence of an endowment effect: the initial portfolio structure influences the final asset holdings of experimental subjects.