Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting
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142
We investigate the connection between corporate governance system configurations and the role of intermediaries in the respective systems from a informational perspective. Building on the economics of information we show that it is meaningful to distinguish between internalisation and externalisation as two fundamentally different ways of dealing with information in corporate governance systems. This lays the groundwork for a description of two types of corporate governance systems, i.e. insider control system and outsider control system, in which we focus on the distinctive role of intermediaries in the production and use of information. It will be argued that internalisation is the prevailing mode of information processing in insider control system while externalisation dominates in outsider control system. We also discuss shortly the interrelations between the prevailing corporate governance system and types of activities or industry structures supported.
140
When options are traded, one can use their prices and price changes to draw inference about the set of risk factors and their risk premia. We analyze tests for the existence and the sign of the market prices of jump risk that are based on option hedging errors. We derive a closed-form solution for the option hedging error and its expectation in a stochastic jump model under continuous trading and correct model specification. Jump risk is structurally different from, e.g., stochastic volatility: there is one market price of risk for each jump size (and not just \emph{the} market price of jump risk). Thus, the expected hedging error cannot identify the exact structure of the compensation for jump risk. Furthermore, we derive closed form solutions for the expected option hedging error under discrete trading and model mis-specification. Compared to the ideal case, the sign of the expected hedging error can change, so that empirical tests based on simplifying assumptions about trading frequency and the model may lead to incorrect conclusions.
138
This paper deals with the superhedging of derivatives and with the corresponding price bounds. A static superhedge results in trivial and fully nonparametric price bounds, which can be tightened if there exists a cheaper superhedge in the class of dynamic trading strategies. We focus on European path-independent claims and show under which conditions such an improvement is possible. For a stochastic volatility model with unbounded volatility, we show that a static superhedge is always optimal, and that, additionally, there may be infinitely many dynamic superhedges with the same initial capital. The trivial price bounds are thus the tightest ones. In a model with stochastic jumps or non-negative stochastic interest rates either a static or a dynamic superhedge is optimal. Finally, in a model with unbounded short rates, only a static superhedge is possible.
137
This paper suggests a motive for bank mergers that goes beyond alleged and typically unverifiable scale economies: preemtive resolution of banks´ financial distress. Such "distress mergers" can be a significant motivation for mergers because they can foster reorganizations, realize diversification gains, and avoid public attention. However, since none of these potential benefits comes without a cost, the overall assessment of distress mergers is unclear. We conduct an empirical analysis to provide evidence on consequences of distress mergers. The analysis is based on comprehensive data from Germany´s savings and cooperatives banks sectors over the period 1993 to 2001. During this period both sectors faced significant structural problems and superordinate institutions (associations) presumably have engaged in coordinated actions to manage distress mergers. The data comprise 3640 banks and 1484 mergers. Our results suggest that bank mergers as a means of preemtive distress resolution have moderate costs in terms of the economic impact on performance. We do find strong evidence consistent with diversification gains. Thus, distress mergers seem to have benefits without affecting systematic stability adversely.
136, Versi
Tests for the existence and the sign of the volatility risk premium are often based on expected option hedging errors. When the hedge is performed under the ideal conditions of continuous trading and correct model specification, the sign of the premium is the same as the sign of the mean hedging error for a large class of stochastic volatility option pricing models. We show, however, that the problems of discrete trading and model mis-specification, which are necessarily present in any empirical study, may cause the standard test to yield unreliable results.
133
When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devote too many resources (too much effort) to acquiring information. Doing so can be costly to the principal because the agent can use information to game the performance measure to the detriment of the principal. We analyze the impact of endogenous information acquisition on the optimal incentive strength and the quality of the performance measure used.
132
This paper compares the accuracy of credit ratings of Moody s and Standard&Poors. Based on 11,428 issuer ratings and 350 defaults in several datasets from 1999 to 2003 a slight advantage for the rating system of Moody s is detected. Compared to former research the robustness of the results is increased by using nonparametric bootstrap approaches. Furthermore, robustness checks are made to control for the impact of Watchlist entries, staleness of ratings and the effect of unsolicited ratings on the results.
131
The question whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) will result in measurable economic benefits is of special policy relevance in particular given the European Union’s decision to require the application of IFRS by listed companies from 2005/2007. In this paper, I investigate the common con-jecture that internationally recognized high quality reporting standards (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP) reduce the cost of capital of adopting firms (e.g. Levitt 1998; IASB 2002). Building on Leuz/Verrecchia (2000), I use a set of German firms which pre-adopted such standards before 2005, but investigate the potential economic benefits by analyzing their expected cost of equity capital utilizing and customizing avail-able implied estimation methods (e.g. Gebhardt/Lee/Swaminathan 2001, Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis 2002, Easton 2004). Evidence from a sample of about 13,000 HGB, 4,500 IAS/IFRS and 3,000 US-GAAP firm-month observations in the period 1993-2002 generally fails to document lower expected cost of equity capital and therefore measurable economic benefits for firms applying IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP. Accordingly, I caution to state that reporting under internationally accepted standards, per se, lowers the cost of equity capital of adopting firms.
129
We show that multi-bank loan pools improve the risk-return profile of banks’ loan business. Banks write simple contracts on the proceeds from pooled loan portfolios, taking into account the free-rider problems in joint loan production. Thus, banks benefit greatly from diversifying credit risk while limiting the efficiency loss due to adverse incentives. We present calibration results that the formation of loan pools reduce the volatility in default rates, proxying for credit risk, of participating banks’ loan portfolios by roughly 70% in our sample. Under reasonable assumptions, the gain in return on equity (in certainty equivalent terms) is around 20 basis points annually.
128
This paper investigates the magnitude and the main determinants of share price reactions to buy-back announcements of German corporations. For our comprehensive sample of 224 announcements that took place between May 1998 and April 2003 we find average cumulative abnormal returns around -7.5% for the thirty days preceding the announcement and around +7.0 % for the ten days following the announcement. We regress post-announcement abnormal returns with multiple firm characteristics and provide evidence which supports the undervaluation signaling hypothesis but not the excess cash hypothesis or the tax-efficiency hypothesis. In extending prior empirical work, we also analyze price effects from initial statements of firms that they intend to seek shareholder approval for a buy-back plan. Observed cumulative abnormal returns on this initial date are in excess of 5% implying a total average price effect between 12% and 15% from implementing a buy-back plan. We conjecture that the German regulatory environment is the main reason why market variations to buy-back announcements are much stronger in Germany than in other countries and conclude that initial statements by managers to seek shareholders’ approval for a buy-back plan should also be subject to legal ad-hoc disclosure requirements.