Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting
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135
Tractable hedging - an implementation of robust hedging strategies : [This Version: March 30, 2004]
(2004)
This paper provides a theoretical and numerical analysis of robust hedging strategies in diffusion–type models including stochastic volatility models. A robust hedging strategy avoids any losses as long as the realised volatility stays within a given interval. We focus on the effects of restricting the set of admissible strategies to tractable strategies which are defined as the sum over Gaussian strategies. Although a trivial Gaussian hedge is either not robust or prohibitively expensive, this is not the case for the cheapest tractable robust hedge which consists of two Gaussian hedges for one long and one short position in convex claims which have to be chosen optimally.
141 , vers
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank.