SAFE policy letter
https://safe-frankfurt.de/policy-center/policy-publications.html
Refine
Year of publication
- 2022 (3) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (3)
Language
- English (3) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (3)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (3)
Keywords
- Big Techs (1)
- Cryptocurrencies (1)
- DMA (1)
- DSA (1)
- Energy Embargo (1)
- European Commision (1)
- Invasion (1)
- MiCA (1)
- Public Finance (1)
- Russia (1)
97
Large technology firms («BigTechs») increasingly extend their influence in finance, primarily taking over market shares in payment services. A further expansion of their businesses into the territory of cryptocurrencies could entail new and unprecedented risks for the future, namely for financial stability, competition in the private sector and monetary policy. When creating a regulatory toolbox to address these risks, financial regulatory, antitrust, and platform-specific solutions should be closely intertwined in order to fully absorb all the potential threats and to take account of the complex risks these platform companies bear. This policy letter evaluates the solutions lately proposed by the European Commission, with specific focus on the upcoming regulation of Markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), but also the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital services act (DSA), against the background of cryptocurrencies issued by BigTechs and sheds light on financial regulatory, competition and monetary law issues coming along with the possible designs of these cryptocurrencies.
96
This policy letter collects elementary economic statistics and provides a very basic look on Russian public finances (i) to inform the reader’s opinion on a possible planning process behind the war against Ukraine and (ii) to discuss prospects of an energy embargo and its capability to affect the stability of the Russian economy.
95
This policy note summarizes our assessment of financial sanctions against Russia. We see an increase in sanctions severity starting from (1) the widely discussed SWIFT exclusions, followed by (2) blocking of correspondent banking relationships with Russian banks, including the Central Bank, alongside secondary sanctions, and (3) a full blacklisting of the ‘real’ export-import flows underlying the financial transactions. We assess option (1) as being less impactful than often believed yet sending a strong signal of EU unity; option (2) as an effective way to isolate the Russian banking system, particularly if secondary sanctions are in place, to avoid workarounds. Option (3) represents possibly the most effective way to apply economic and financial pressure, interrupting trade relationships.