Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (4)
Language
- English (4)
Has Fulltext
- yes (4) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (4) (remove)
Keywords
- Financial Crises (4) (remove)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (4) (remove)
The centrality of the United States in the global financial system is taken for granted, but its response to recent political and epidemiological events has suggested that China now holds a comparable position. Using minute-by-minute data from 2012 to 2020 on the financial performance of twelve country-specific exchange-traded funds, we construct daily snapshots of the global financial network and analyze them for the centrality and connectedness of each country in our sample. We find evidence that the U.S. was central to the global financial system into 2018, but that the U.S.-China trade war of 2018–2019 diminished its centrality, and the Covid-19 outbreak of 2019–2020 increased the centrality of China. These indicators may be the first signals that the global financial system is moving from a unipolar to a bipolar world.
The paper analyses the contagion channels of the European financial system through the stochastic block model (SBM). The model groups homogeneous connectivity patterns among the financial institutions and describes the shock transmission mechanisms of the financial networks in a compact way. We analyse the global financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis and show that the network exhibits a strong community structure with two main blocks acting as shock spreader and receiver, respectively. Moreover, we provide evidence of the prominent role played by insurances in the spread of systemic risk in both crises. Finally, we demonstrate that policy interventions focused on institutions with inter-community linkages (community bridges) are more effective than the ones based on the classical connectedness measures and represents consequently, a better early warning indicator in predicting future financial losses.
The experience in the period during and after the Asian crisis of 1997-98 has provoked an extensive debate about the credit rating agencies' evaluation of sovereign risk in emerging markets lending. This study analyzes the role of credit rating agencies in international finan-cial markets, particularly whether sovereign credit ratings have an impact on the financial stability in emerging market economies. The event study and panel regression results indicate that credit rating agencies have substantial influence on the size and volatility of emerging markets lending. The empirical results are significantly stronger in the case of government's downgrades and negative imminent sovereign credit rating actions such as credit watches and rating outlooks than positive adjustments by the credit rating agencies while by the market participants' anticipated sovereign credit rating changes have a smaller impact on financial markets in emerging economies.
This paper studies the long-run effects of credit market disruptions on real firm outcomes and how these effects depend on nominal wage rigidities at the firm level. I trace out the long-run investment and growth trajectories of firms which are more adversely affected by a transitory shock to aggregate credit supply. Affected firms exhibit a temporary investment gap for two years following the shock, resulting in a persistent accumulated growth gap. I show that affected firms with a higher degree of wage rigidity exhibit a steeper drop in investment and grow more slowly than affected firms with more flexible wages.