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This dissertation analyses the degrees and trajectories of financialisation in the region of South-Eastern Europe. It modifies and applies an eclectic comparative framework for comparing the degrees of financialisation across time and space on different levels. The thesis finds that from the turn of the century until the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, most South-Eastern European countries have increased their degree of financialisation on the different levels, especially on the levels of household, international financialisation and partly the financial sector. Financialisation of non-financial companies is barely existing. After the financial crisis, financialisation is revealed to stagnate in the region. In a second step, the dissertation conducts three case studies on extreme cases: financial sector financialisation in Bulgaria, international financialisation in Serbia and non-financial company and household financialisation in Croatia. Their trajectories are exposed to be mainly driven by deregulation, changed practices by foreign banks, the privatisation of public goods and the liberation of capital controls. The dissertation serves to geographically enlarge the research of financialisation to a peripheral region of the Global North and to add to the discussion on comparative financialisation approaches.
Pluralization strategies of monolingual German children aged 3-6, median 4;2 (N = 810), and adults aged 18-96, median 24;0 (N = 582), were compared on the basis of eight nonce nouns from the language test SETK 3-5. Differences between younger and older Germans resembled previously described differences between German and immigrant pre-schoolers for most aspects, e.g., use of fewer plural allomorphs (types), more errors in umlauting, and more avoidance strategies in the linguistically weaker groups. However, both German children and adults demonstrated the same universal frequency- and phonology-based pluralization patterns. Surprisingly, ungrammatical plural forms were equally frequent in both children’s and adults' answers.
Rezension zu: Fabian Schuppert, Freedom, Recognition and Non-Domination: A Republican Theory of (Global) Justice (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014).
Hallin and Mancini’s seminal work Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and
Politics has generated great interest and enthusiasm among media scholars to advance comparative
studies by applying the four dimensions to analyze media performance in different countries. Media
scholars agree that the four variables suggested by the two authors, i.e. the structure of media
markets, political parallelism, role of the state, and professionalization of journalism, provide a
good theoretical framework for the analysis of relationship between political and media system.
Their models for comparing media systems are based on a ‘most similar’ strategy,
analysing media and journalism only in stable Western democracies (i.e. Western European and
North American nations), and the purpose of the research presented in this paper was to develop
the model to include other parts of the world as well.
The most recent attempts to integrate East Central European media systems into the Hallin
and Mancini model, the conclusion being that the East Central European media share most
similarities with the Polarized Pluralist model. This conclusion follows not only Hallin and
Mancini, but also Splichal. The researcher in his earlier works argued that the changes in post-
Soviet media systems could be best explained by referring to the concept of Italianization - the
media are under strong state control, the degree of mass media partisanship is strong, low level of
journalistic professionalism, commercialization.
In fact, out of the three models only two (the Liberal and the Democratic Corporatist
model) are models in any strict sense, whereas the third - Polarized Pluralism - is better defined
as the lack of a model: the Liberal and Democratic Corporatist model are both built on a
consensus around core values, whereas the key feature of the Polarized Pluralism model is that
there is no consensus and no core values. De Albuquerque introduced other variables that also
would be highly relevant to the comparative analysis of media systems, but that have no place in
the Hallin & Mancini framework, the most important one being whether the political system is
presidential or parliamentary. For example, it has been demonstrated that media in presidential systems are more likely to focus on individual politicians and the administrative aspects of
government, as well as acting as an intermediary between different branches of government, than
are media in parliamentary systems.
Scholars dealing with the East Central Europe (and elsewhere) are too interested in fitting
their respective nations to one of the three models, rather than focusing on the variables and on the
comparative dimension. The scholars focus on the variables and on the comparative dimension: it
is strucking that their conclusions are precisely that a strict modeling approach (i.e. trying to fit
any given nation into the three-system model) is not enough if we want to understand media
system differences properly.
Hallin and Mancini (2004: 305) write that “The Democratic Corporatist Model, we suspect,
will have particularly strong relevance for the analysis of those parts of Eastern and Central
Europe that share much of the same historical development, like Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and the Baltic States”. At the same time, however, they suspect that scholars working on
the East Central European media will find much that is relevant in their analysis of the
Mediterranean region.
The recent attempts integrate East Central European media systems into the Hallin and
Mancini model, the conclusion being that the East Central European media share most similarities
with the Polarized Pluralist model. This conclusion follows not only Hallin and Mancini, but also
Splichal. The researcher in his earlier works argued that the changes in post-Soviet media systems
could be best explaind by referring to the concept of Italianization - including the role of
clientelism, the strong role of the state, the role of the media as an instrument of political struggle,
and a low level of journalistic professionalism.
The Polarized Pluralist model all too often seems to be the default model – what is really
gained, analytically, by saying that post-Communist countries are all basically Polarized Pluralist
media system when they are different in many ways. This question needs further elaboration.
Instead of fitting the Italianization model into East Central Europe, scholars should start working on their own model, introducing other variables, that would allow them to investigate the
media in the region adequately.
Large companies are increasingly on trial. Over the last decade, many of the world’s biggest firms have been embroiled in legal disputes over corruption charges, financial fraud, environmental damage, taxation issues or sanction violations, ending in convictions or settlements of record-breaking fines, well above the billion-dollar mark. For critics of globalization, this turn towards corporate accountability is a welcome sea-change showing that multinational companies are no longer above the law. For legal experts, the trend is noteworthy because of the extraterritorial dimensions of law enforcement, as companies are increasingly held accountable for activities independent of their nationality or the place of the activities. Indeed, the global trend required understanding the evolution of corporate criminal law enforcement in the United States in particular, where authorities have skillfully expanded its effective jurisdiction beyond its territory. This paper traces the evolution of corporate prosecutions in the United States. Analyzing federal prosecution data, it then shows that foreign firms are more likely to pay a fine, which is on average 6,6 times larger.
Recent developments in Hungary and Poland have made democratic backsliding a major issue of concern within the European Union (EU). This article focuses on the secondary agents that facilitate democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland: the European People’s Party (EPP), which has continually protected the Hungarian Fidesz government from EU sanctions, and the Hungarian ruling party Fidesz, which repeatedly promised to block any EU-level sanctions against Poland in the Council. The article analyses these agents’ behaviour as an instance of transnational complicity and passes a tentative judgment as to which of the two cases is normatively more problematic. The analysis has implications for possible countervailing responses to democratic backsliding within EU member states.
Populism is widely thought to be in tension with liberal democracy. This article clarifies what exactly is problematic about populism from a liberal–democratic point of view and goes on to develop normative standards that allow us to distinguish between more and less legitimate forms of populism. The point of this exercise is not to dismiss populism in toto; the article strives for a more subtle result, namely, to show that liberal democracy can accommodate populism provided that the latter conforms to particular discursive norms. What the article calls a ‘liberal ethics of populism’ turns out to be closely bound up with a broader ethics of peoplehood, understood as a way of articulating who ‘the people’ are in a way that is compatible with liberal–democratic principles of political justification. Such an ethics, concludes the article, inevitably has a much wider audience than populist political actors: its addressees are all those who seek legitimately to exercise power in the name of the people.
This paper considers ways in which rulers can respond to, generate, or exploit fear of COVID-19 infection for various ends, and in particular distinguishes between ‘fear-invoking’ and ‘fear-minimising’ strategies. It examines historical precedent for executive overreach in crises and then moves on to look in more detail at some specific areas where fear is being mobilised or generated: in ways that lead to the suspension of civil liberties; that foster discrimination against minorities; and that boost the personality cult of leaders and limit criticism or competition. Finally, in the Appendix, we present empirical work, based on the results of an original survey in Brazil, that provides support for the conjectures in the previous sections. While it is too early to tell what the longer-term outcomes of the changes we note will be, our purpose here is simply to identify some warning signs that threaten the key institutions and values of democracy.