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The first part of the following paper deals with varying points of criticism forwarded against Ordoliberalism. Here, it is not the aim to directly falsify each argument on its own; rather, the author tries to give a precise overview of the spectrum of critique. The second section picks out one argument of critical review – namely that the ordoliberal concept of the state is somewhat elitist and grounded on intellectual experts. Based on the previous sections, the final part differentiates two kinds of genesis of norms: an evolutionary and an elitist one – both (latently) present within Ordoliberalism. In combination with the two-level differentiation between individual and regulatory ethics, the essay allows for a distinction between individual-ethical norms based on an evolutionary genesis of norms and regulatory-ethical norms based on an elitist understanding of norms. A by-product of the author’s argument is a (further) demarcation within neoliberalism.
Based on Foucault’s analysis of German Neoliberalism and his thesis of ambiguity, the following paper draws a two-level distinction between individual and regulatory ethics. The individual ethics level – which has received surprisingly little attention – contains the Christian foundation of values and the liberal-Kantian heritage of so called Ordoliberalism – as one variety of neoliberalism. The regulatory or formal-institutional ethics level on the contrary refers to the ordoliberal framework of a socio-economic order. By differentiating these two levels of ethics incorporated in German Neoliberalism, it is feasible to distinguish dissimilar varieties of neoliberalism and to link Ordoliberalism to modern economic ethics. Furthermore, it allows a revision of the dominant reception of Ordoliberalism which focuses solely on the formal-institutional level while mainly neglecting the individual ethics level.
In the retrospect of almost a decade, the year 2015 seems to offer at least two openings which can help us better understand and localize the "end of theory" narratives that began to take hold sometime around the end of the millennium. Rita Felski's much-discussed and much-maligned 2015 book, "The Limits of Critique", construed the long history of "critique" as largely continuous with the more recent (postwar) idea of "theory," which allowed her to question the presupposed progressivity and utility of the dominant critical-theoretical discourses of late 20th-century North American academia. In the same year, Philipp Felsch's "Der lange Sommer der Theorie" (which was recently published in English as "The Summer of Theory") went so far as to assign specific dates, 1960–1990, and tended to define theory not as a purely academic product, but as a much wider cultural movement. Between the two books, questions of the difference between theory and critique, their specific institutional locus within and beyond academia, became objects of acute concern.
The resistance of aesthetics consists in the mode of experience that art affords, which promotes individual consciousness and political awareness by exploding the dualisms with which we tend to simplify things: centralization and decentralization, totality and fragmentation, communism and neoliberal capitalism, dictatorship and democracy. Although the formal complexity and ambiguous compositions met in works by the likes of Picasso, Woolf, and Schönberg most obviously support this sort of experience, it can be drawn out of all art to various degrees. Indeed, what distinguishes these modernists from the artists who came before and after them is how they set aesthetic experience as the aim of artistic production. But no work of art can be reduced either to the whole or to the sum of its parts; either to systematicity or to formlessness. Strictly speaking, the opposing ideals of classical and critical aesthetics are not two distinct aesthetic positions, but the theoretical limits between which art unfolds. By analogy, totalitarian governance and social atomism are not oppositional political materializations, but the two extremes at which politics ends.
This paper deals with the proposed use of sovereign credit ratings in the "Basel Accord on Capital Adequacy" (Basel II) and considers its potential effect on emerging markets financing. It investigates in a first attempt the consequences of the planned revisions on the two central aspects of international bank credit flows: the impact on capital costs and the volatility of credit supply across the risk spectrum of borrowers. The empirical findings cast doubt on the usefulness of credit ratings in determining commercial banks' capital adequacy ratios since the standardized approach to credit risk would lead to more divergence rather than convergence between investment-grade and speculative-grade borrowers. This conclusion is based on the lateness and cyclical determination of credit rating agencies' sovereign risk assessments and the continuing incentives for short-term rather than long-term interbank lending ingrained in the proposed Basel II framework.