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This paper expands on the concept of legal machine which was presented first at IRIS 2011 in Salzburg. The research subjects are (1) the creation of institutional facts by machines, and (2)
multimodal communication of legal content to humans. Simple examples are traffic lights and vending machines. Complicated examples are computer-based information systems in organisations, form proceedings workflows, and machines which replace officials in organisations. The actions performed by machines have legal importance and draw legal consequences. Machines similarly as humans can be imposed status-functions of legal actors. The analogy of machines with humans is in the focus of this paper. Legal content can be communicated by machines and can be perceived by all of our senses. The content can be expressed in multimodal languages: textual, visual, acoustic, gestures, aircraft manoeuvres, etc. The concept of encapsulatation of human into machine is proposed. Herein humanintended actions are communicated through the machine’s output channel. Encapsulations can be compared with deities and mythical creatures that can send gods’ messages to people through the human mouth. This paper also aims to identify law production patterns by machines.
"Community and law approach" provides an illuminating insight into alternative legal orderings within a social unit. The comprehensiveness of legal systems within a community or a social unit, provides a suitable basis for a structural framework of alternative legal systems or Legal Pluralism, which is missing in the discourse on Legal Pluralism. "Identifying the locus of law within a community", provides us with an indication on how autopoetic a legal system can be within a social unit, taking into account the social rootedness of legal norms.
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is a systematic risk assessment tool, enabling organizations to maintain compliance with data protection regulations, to manage privacy risks and to provide public benefits through the success of privacy-by-design efforts. An actual practical implementation of a PIA framework has been realized in the context of RFID applications encompassing detailed steps for the PIA process; a first successful review has been completed. The PIA also allows to introduce a pro-active mitigation of privacy risks through technical and organizational controls. The better the precautionary measures realize the relevant privacy objectives, the less likely will occur with the PIA process afterwards. The recent proposal for a far-reaching revision of the EU Data Protection Directive envisages to state a specific requirement to implement a PIA process. Indeed, since risks for privacy and non-disclosure of personal data are different in not identical circumstances, the protection measures should also be different, i.e. technology should assist in trying to achieve the (at least) second-best solution for the implementation of the data protection regime by a PIA. Insofar, privacy rules can be individualized and matched with the concrete needs in the given environment.
The very idea of the European Convention on Human Rights is to bring the laws of contracting states into line with fundamental human rights principles. Where the Convention is not explicit, the Court should never rule restrictively so as to reduce the scope of a general right. In the case of homeschooling, the Convention sets forth the general principle that “the state shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.” It must not, therefore, allow a contracting state to eliminate a means of achieving this desired by parents—unless the state can show that the means in question is ineffective.
Dworkin`s political theory is characterized by the interpretative integrity of morality, law, and politics, the so-called “hedgehog’s approach”. The interpretative integrity approach functions on multiple levels. Firstly, philosophical foundations of his theory of justice are linked to his conception of just liberal society and state. Secondly, from the perspective of political morality, interpretative concepts of law and morality are internally connected, in addition to interpretative concepts of equality, liberty, and democracy. Thirdly, from the perspective of philosophical foundations, individual ethics, personal morality and political morality are mutually connected. The aforementioned ethical and moral foundations are also related – in a wider sense of philosophical foundations - with his gnoseological conception regarding value concepts in law, politics and morality, and with his episthemological conception regarding an objective truth in the field of values, in a sense that the value concepts are interpretative and can be objectively true when articulated in accordance with methodological rules and standards of a »reflexive equilibrium« and an interpretative integrity, and in accordance with the so-called internal scepticism in the context of value pluralism.
The term “ethics” in a “narrower” sense refers to individual ethics, the study of how to live well, while the “ethics” in a “broader” sense refers to personal morality, the study of how we must treat other people. The term “morality” however, is used primarily to denote a political morality, the issue of how a sovereign power should treat its citizens.
Philosophical foundations of Dworkin`s political theory of justice, his conception of two cardinal values of humanity, his concievement of individual ethics, personal morality and political morality will be in the focus of consideration.
As is well known, the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was toppled by a military uprising which, after a cruel Civil War, set up an autocratic regime led by General Franco which lasted until his natural death in 1975. According to the contemporary theory of the legal system, a legal order exists on the sole condition that it is efficient in general terms and this was the case for both the Republic and the Dictatorship. In turn, the validity of the legal norms of all legal orders is based on its respective rules of recognition. Thus, neither the existence of the legal order nor the validity of its respective legal norms depends on moral considerations. In this paper, we call this affirmation into question on the base of the fact that the compensatory methods adopted from the Transition to Democracy show an evident concern to repair the damage of taking away a person’s basic rights (life, health, freedom, expression, association etc) although the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue of fundamental rights was not in force at that time. But these measures would not have much sense if, as Raz says, there was no shared content which is common to all legal systems. Like Nino, we claim that one must discriminate between a democratic legal order and an autocratic one to establish the level of validity of its respective legal norms. Thus it can be assigned a presumption of justice to democratic norms. Finally, we state that the criteria to weigh up the justice or injustice of legal norms, as that of legal orders, takes root in the level of respect they show towards human rights.
In reconsideration of the composition and operation of European law, it is the description of its underlying mentality that may cast best light on the query whether European law is the extension of domestic laws or a sui generis product. As to its action, European law is destructive upon the survival of traditions of legal positivism, for it recalls post modern clichés rather. Like a solar system with planets, it is two-centred from the beginning, commissioning both implementation and judicial check to member states. As part of global post modernism, a) European law stems from artificial reality construction freed from particular historical experience and, indeed, anything given hic et nunc. By its operation, b) it dynamises large structures and sets in motion that what is chaos itself. It is owing to reconstructive human intent solely that any outcome can at all be seen as fitting to some ideal of order, albeit neither operation nor daily management strives for implementing any systemicity. This is the way in which the European law becomes adequate reflection of the underlying (macro) economic basis, which it is to serve as superstructure. Accordingly, c) the entire construct is operated (as integrated into one well-working unit) within the framework of an artificially animated dynamism. With its “order out of chaos” philosophy it assures member states’ standing involvement and competition, achieving a flexibly self-adapting (and unprecedentedly high degree of) conformity.
In this article, I examine how open borders can serve the idea of global distributive justice by asking how or how not the existing practices of immigration to rich countries may contribute to global economic redistribution. There are two observations. First, migration is not the redistributive option that anyone has an equal access. In order to make use of migration as a means of global redistribution, rich countries need to provide a chance to migrate to those who cannot afford movement by themselves. Second, as long as brain-drain problems happen, what the perspective of global distributive justice requires is the compensation for some educational cost of raising professionals or some control of their movement. Immigration admissions largely focusing on getting highly skilled professionals may not serve the idea of global redistribution.
The bare life and (the) modern law : a journey to some key concepts or conceptions of Agamben
(2012)
This text is imitating a journey which tries to explore what is completely unknown. It starts Homo Sacer and traces some key concepts namely der Muselmann, bare life, state of exception, sovereignty and nihilism in law. Doing so, it hopes to reach a general picture of biopolitics or biopower according to Agamben. So, first part of this text generally tries to clarify some fundamental concepts or conceptions in order to use them for its aim. The second part suggests an alternative reading of Agamben, centered around his concept of der Muselmann which is the ultimate figure defined by Primo Levi and Agamben chooses the term because of its resemblance to or representation of Homo Sacer. Der Muselmann was a derogatory term in its origin and very meaning has still been unclear today. So, the second part tries to clarify the meaning of der Muselmann (and unbaptized babies) from a different outlook, not from outside but inside of the referred concept. It tries to show a Muslim’s image of a non Muslim world in order to reveal what are the very meanings of sovereignty, law and biopolitics. So at the end of the journey, this text hopes to reach a different picture of modern life and a modern law.
Principles can be directly expressed by law or may be found in jurisprudence, philosophy or literature. Often the principles are contradictory, as in the case of transparency and the taboo of state information disclosure. At the individual level, transparency and taboo, the sense and purpose of privacy may compliment each other. Moreover the rise of cyberspace has blurred the distinction between privacy and public. The taboo is widening. The development of the internet and of the social networks can alter the once apparently stable legal situation, bringing a new dynamic into play in both state and individual spheres. In the context of the internet it is as though the secret workings of the state are projected on its "walls and facades", reminding us of Plato's "Myth of the Cave". As Plato described, disillusionment and reflexive defensiveness can follow.