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Constitutionalization beyond the nation state can be observed as an evolutionary process that leads in two quite different directions: (1) constitutions evolve in transnational political processes outside the nation state; (2) simulta-neously, constitutions evolve outside international politics in global society’s ‘private’ sectors. What, however, is the specifically societal element in societal constitutionalism? This is currently the object of a controversy regarding the subjects of non-state constitutions, their origin, their legitimization, their scope, and their internal structures. This article interprets the controversy as a theme with a number of variations. What is the distinctive ‘compositional principle’ in each particular variation? Which problems become evident in its ‘development’? What are its most valuable ‘motifs’? The article starts with David Sciulli’s theme of societal constitutionalism. Then it presents six variations on Sciulli. In a first group, constitutionalization is perceived as the expansion of a single rationality into all spheres of society. In a second group, the motif of the unity of the consti-tution can still be heard, despite the essential pluralism of societal constitution-alism. In the final movement, three further variations will then reprise and devel-op further the most important motifs, in a resumption of the original theme.
The article, which summarizes key findings of my German book ‘Die Gemeinfreiheit. Begriff, Funktion, Dogmatik’ (‘The Public Domain: Theory, Func-tion, Doctrine’), asks whether there are any provisions or principles under Ger-man and EU law that protect the public domain from interference by the legisla-ture, courts and private parties. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to step out of the intellectual property (IP) system and to analyze this body of law from the outside, and – even more important – to develop a positive legal conception of the public domain as such. By giving the public domain a proper doctrinal place in the legal system, the structural asymmetry between heavily theorized and protected IP rights on the one hand and a neglected public do-main on the other is countered. The overarching normative purpose is to devel-op a framework for a balanced IP system, which can only be achieved if the public domain forms an integral part of the overall regulation of information.
On 14 September 2016, the European Commission proposed a Directive on “copyright in the Digital Single Market”. This proposal includes an Article 11 on the “protection of press publications concerning digital uses”, according to which “Member States shall provide publishers of press publications with the rights provided for in Article 2 and Article 3(2) of Directive 2001/29/EC for the digital use of their press publications.” Relying on the experiences and debates surrounding the German and Spanish laws in this area, this study presents a legal analysis of the proposal for an EU related right for press publishers (RRPP). After a brief overview over the general limits of the EU competence to introduce such a new related right, the study critically examines the purpose of an RRPP. On this basis, the next section distinguishes three versions of an RRPP with regard to its subject-matter and scope, and considers the practical and legal implications of these alternatives, in particular having regard to fundamental rights.
This article compares the legislation promulgated by the Synod of Granada (1572) and the Third Mexican Provincial Council (1585) regarding procedural canonical law. Diego Romano, bishop of Puebla, served as a vehicle between the Spanish and Mexican Assemblies, and he was clearly inspired by the former when drafting the latter. The article pays attention to the level of appropriation and via a comparison of the texts addresses the question whether it is possible to say that Iberian procedural law was copied by the prelate.
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between customary international law and general principles of law. Both are distinct sources of public international law (Art. 38(1)(b) and (c) of the Statue of the International Court of Justice). In a first step, I analyze the different meanings of principles as a “source” of international law. Second, I consider different approaches to principles as a norm type in legal theory. Third, I discuss attempts in international legal doctrine to facilitate conceptual issues by either unifying general principles as a source with the source of customary international law or by equating general principles as a source and as a norm type. Finally, I propose that the delimitation between customary international law and general principles of law as sources of international law should follow the distinction between situations dominated by factual reciprocity (which justify customary norms) and situations where such factual reciprocity is absent (which justify general principles). The jurisgenerative processes leading to the emergence of general principles of international law are processes of changing identities and argumentative self-entrapment.
This paper reflects on legal pluralism. How did medieval societies incorporate both unwritten customs and written law at the same time? How did they constitute the process of finding justice? What is the essense of legal pluralism, and will it help us understand the situation of Taiwan’s indigenous population?
We aim to solve these problems by taking a closer look at medieval Saxony: for around 400 years, both laws given by the authorities and traditional customs in Saxony worked fine in parallel. The latter were put into writing by the legal practitioner Eike von Repgow around 1230 for reasons unknown. We refer to his collection of laws and customs of the Saxons as the Sachsenspiegel ("Mirror of Saxons").
While Saxons certainly differed from Taiwan’s indigenous population for many reasons, such as the supposedly weaker egalitarianism among the Saxons than among at least some indigenous groups, the two show some remarkable similarities nonetheless. Just like the Taiwanese Gaya, the Sachsenspiegel’s spiritual origin raises the claim to validity. Furthermore, comparing the handling of a person’s sale of inherited property, the legal situations in the Sachsenspiegel and Taiwan’s unwritten customs resemble each other. The heir can transfer only property he acquired personally. Furthermore, the author discusses the different character of courts and procedure under oral law in contrast to written modern law.
Finally, the paper concludes with some remarks about a learned commentary on the Sachsenspiegel written around 1325, combined with an outlook on the possible future of Taiwanese customs.
The topic of global trade has become central to debates on global justice and on duties to the global poor, two important concerns of contemporary political theory. However, the leading approaches fail to directly address the participants in trade and provide them with normative guidance for making choices in non-ideal circumstances. This paper contributes an account of individuals’ responsibilities for global problems in general, an account of individuals’ responsibilities as market actors, and an explanation of how these responsibilities coexist. The argument is developed through an extended case study of a consumer’s choice between conventional and fair trade coffee. My argument is that the coffee consumer’s choice requires consideration of two distinct responsibilities. First, she has responsibilities to help meet foreigners’ claims for assistance. Second, she has moral responsibilities to ensure that trades, such as between herself and a coffee farmer, are fair rather than exploitative.
Circulation of legal knowledge, ideas, norms and practices has taken place throughout legal history, shaping legal experiences in different corners of the world. Over the past couple of years, approaches to the study of such circulations have changed radically. Legal historians have adopted approaches from cultural studies and transnational history in order to gain a deeper understanding of the complexities inherent in these processes. ...
When I first wrote about linguistic self-defense (discussed in Liav Orgad’s book pp. 198-200) I had a conception of languages in danger, The most visible potential victim were the French in Quebec. But with the help of Charles de Gaulle, the Quebecois have held on well to their culture (majority at home, minority at large, but supported by a large nation in Europe). One form of linguistic self-defense I proposed at the time was insisting on speaking your language in commercial transactions. For the sake of profit, store keepers would play along. Also, public advertising is a critical mode of making a language seem like the background state of normalcy. The key case in Quebec, as I recall, was called Chaussures Brown Shoes. That was the way they wanted their sign to read. The Anglophones objected and lost.
Scholarship and practice
(2016)
How can I as an international lawyer, conscious that international law is deeply implicated in today’s global injustices and that the course of history will not be changed by any grand legal design, practice law responsibly? Taking as a point of departure my own desire not to seek comfort in the formulation of a critique of law, but to aspire to a responsible practice, I consult two quite different bodies of work: first, critical theory of law and second, recent scholarship on international law that argues a practice guided by ethics may enhance the legitimacy of international law. I turn then to my own practice of international economic law focusing on my occasional role as legal expert on the so-called megaregionals the EU aims to conclude with Canada and the United States. I propose that the debate on international economic law lacks an investigation into the role of law in shaping political economy; that this lack can be explained by the compartmentalization of expertise which leads to justification gaps with respect to projects such as the megaregionals. One way how lawyers can assume responsibility is to work on closing these gaps even if it means leaving the ‘inside’ of the legal discipline. Finally, I suggest that a responsible legal practice of social change might follow Roberto Unger’s call for institutional imagination. Maybe I can satisfy my wish for a transformative practice by joining forces with friends in experimenting with institutions, hoping to build an alternative political economy.