Refine
Document Type
- Report (13)
- Article (2)
- Doctoral Thesis (1)
Language
- English (15)
- Portuguese (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (16)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (16) (remove)
Keywords
- terrorism (16) (remove)
Institute
O 11 de setembro acelerou o desenvolvimento de uma arquitetura transnacional de segurança que intervém profundamente nas liberdades civis individuais, tanto nos direitos básicos dos cidadãos dos Estados como nos direitos humanos dos cidadãos mundiais. O artigo delineia essa arquitetura, mostra como ela dissolve as categorias jurídicas tradicionais que preservam a liberdade e discute por que hoje se aceita amplamente a prioridade da segurança sobre a liberdade.
Part IV of our series on ISIS : "Blogforum 'Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat".
One element within US counter-terrorism strategies is “reducing terrorist group cohesion”, as the think tank RAND recommends in one of its reports. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) puts these recommendations into actions. Reports like ”Cracks in the Foundation” or ”Dysfunction and Decline” vividly depict the internal disagreement and disunity between al-Qaeda central (AQ) and its regional affiliates, most of all AQ in Iraq (AQI). Albeit these reports are drafted by pundits and certainly provide meaningful and often rare insights into the inner life of the global jihadi movement, they also serve another purpose: to deliberately amplify the very same trend they describe: disunity...
Part II of our series on ISIS : Blogforum "Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat"
On Thursday January 15, only a week after the bloodyattacks in Paris by the Kouachi brothers and AmedyCoulibali, Belgium was on high alert. In a raid carriedout by police and security forces in the small villageof Verviers, two alleged terrorists were shot dead, a third suspect wasarrested. The action was part of a larger operation carried out throughout thecountry to prevent imminent attacks by a group of Islamists, some of whomwere directly tied to the war in Syria and Iraq. In the days that followed itbecame clear that the prevented attacks probably were aimed at a highranking police official. The terror threat level was subsequently raised tolevel three, indicating that the threat of attacks was imminent. What makesBelgium such a hub for Jihadis?..
Last November, the media organisation of the „Islamic State“ (IS) published a video, the sole purpose of which was to prove that the „caliphate“ which the IS has established in June 2014 was in fact a proper state. The video highlighted a host of institutions in order to drive home the claim of real statehood, including examples like a working judiciary, a prison administration, a schooling system, and so on. At one point in the video, the IS claimed that it was also financially independent and had apt resources at its disposal, namely oil and gas.
However, while it is true that the IS controls a number of oil and gas fields in Syria as well as in Iraq, we have by now enough evidence to be rather sure that the economic base of the „caliphate“ is by no means sustainable...
Part VI of our series on ISIS : "Blogforum 'Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat".
In 2014, two insurgency organisations stood out by their expansion, success and brutality: The Islamic State (IS) and Boko Haram (BH). The former emerged from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and became a major actor in the Middle East, its influence reaching beyond the borders of its self-proclaimed “caliphate”, while the latter spread its violence throughout north-eastern Nigeria, spilling over into Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Because of their still growing success, many wonder about a possible partnership between IS and BH. To this I answer that there is a connection, but no partnership. Currently, any evidence suggesting a partnership is circumstantial at best...
Part V of our series on ISIS : "Blogforum 'Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat".
Since 2003, several organizations in the Arab world swore allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida and became part of what was been called “al-Qaeda’s affiliate network”. The emergence of al-Qaeda groups in Saudi Arabia 2003, Iraq 2004, Algeria 2007 and Yemen 2009 convinced many supporters and enemies that there was a truly global network of jihadist groups at work, commanded and controlled by the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.
However, the reality was a lot more complicated. Far from being subordinate to Osama Bin Laden and Aiman al-Zawahiri, these organizations were not willing to submit to al-Qaeda command and control. Their relationship with “al-Qaeda central” was rather an alliance between independent partners of different strength. Although the al-Qaeda leadership sometimes influenced decisions taken by the regional groupings, there are numerous examples of “affiliates” ignoring its advice even regarding strategic issues.
This is the fifth article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
The threat that the far right poses to civil society changes across time and space. In Britain this threat has generally been in the form of hate-crimes and public disorder, yet in the past two decades there has been a shift towards solo-actor terrorism. By examining far right groups in the UK in the post-war period this paper explores the drivers of this change; namely, how membership in extremist groups combined with the proliferation of far right networks created by the internet can create a pathway to radicalisation which ends in acts of terror.
This is the 15. article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right.
Germany’s political culture currently faces a shift to the right as anti-immigrant violence and attacks on refugee camps are on the brink of becoming a daily routine. The populist party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) did achieve successes in every recent federal state election. Through their success politics gained a new political quality. Anti-immigrant groups such as PEGIDA in Dresden regularly mobilize hundreds and sometimes thousands of people. The increased number of refugees that came to Germany in 2015 is instrumentalized to fuel racism and to spread nationalist sentiments...
Terrorism isn't new to the country; in its history, France has experienced a significant number of attacks. In 1995, the GIA-affiliated terrorist network of which Khaled Kelkal was part conducted several attacks, as did the Al Qaida-affiliated gang de Roubaix one year later; but until Mohammed Merah’s murders in 2012 in Toulouse and Montauban, terrorist attacks were treated as political violence in the context of anti-colonial struggles or connected to other kinds of violent conflicts abroad, such as the Bosnian War, rather than as religiously inspired or connected to social, societal and/or political issues within the country, or as some sort of atypical pathology. Terrorist perpetrators, their networks and milieus were met with repressive instruments – a wider angle of analysis which would have allowed to tackle the threat from a more holistic perspective had not been incorporated in a counter-terrorism policy design.
It is widely thought that the international community, taken as a whole, is required to take action to prevent terrorism. Yet, what each state is required to do in this project is unclear and contested. This article examines a number of bases on which we might assign responsibilities to conduct counterterrorist operations to states. I argue that the ways in which other sorts of responsibilities have been assigned to states by political philosophers will face significant limitations when used to assign the necessary costs of preventing terrorism. I go on to suggest that appealing to the principle of fairness—which assigns obligations on the basis of benefits received from cooperative endeavours—may be used to make up the shortfall, despite this principle having received relatively little attention in existing normative accounts of states’ responsibilities.