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There is a consensus among historians that the School of Salamanca brought something new to the development of early modern European legal thinking and methodology. Francisco de Vitoria is considered, not only by modern researchers but also by his contemporaries (from Melchor Cano onward), the origin of the school and its founding figure. He is famously claimed to have introduced Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologiae as the fundamental text for theological lectures at the University of Salamanca and so prepared the ground for the upsurge of academic activity and intellectual brilliance of late or modern scholasticism at Spanish, Portuguese, and American universities. Regardless of the differences in the assessments of the late scholastics’ political stance (whether viewed as trailblazers on the way to human rights and a modern law of nations or as conservative imperialists, whose sole intent was the perpetuation and legitimation of the Spanish rule in the Americas), Vitoria and his followers are seen as intellectual innovators, opening the restrictive traditions of medieval scholarship to the modern exigencies of a globalized world. This almost universal image has recently been called into question, with Jacob Schmutz showing that Vitoria was not quite the first to introduce Aquinas’s Summa into the teaching of Salamanca’s theological faculty, and Thomas Duve recently asking outright: Did everything actually start with Francisco de Vitoria? ...
The conquista of the Americas confronted Spanish jurists educated in the legal concepts of the European medieval tradition with a different reality, pushing them to develop modern legal concepts on the basis of the European ius commune tradition. Traditionally, the School of Salamanca, theologians and jurists centred around the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria are credited with this intellectual renovation of moral and legal thought. However, the role earlier authors played in the process is still insufficiently researched. The Castilian crown jurist Juan López de Palacios Rubios is one of the most interesting authors of the early phase in the conquest of the Americas. His treatise about the Spanish dominion in the Americas is a central text that shows how at the beginning of the 16th century the knowledge and the experiences of the European past were applied to the American present and, in the process, were shaped into modern ideas.
Adorno führt in seinem Werk der Negativen Dialektik, anhand einer Kant-Kritik, aus, dass Freiheit nur negativ bestimmt werden kann. Dazu bedient dieser sich der Methode der bestimmten Negation. Dieser Ansatz wird auf Nauckes Konzept des negativen Strafrechts übertragen und gezeigt, dass auch Naucke dieses nur negativ bestimmt. Dabei stellt das negative Strafrecht eine Position dar, welche dem affirmativen Strafrecht kritisch gegenübersteht und dieses kontinuierlich hinterfragen und begrenzen soll.
In 2007, the Treaty makers ennobled the former fundamental principles of the Treaty on European Union as European values. Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and the protection of human rights have henceforth transcended the sphere of ‘merely’ legal matters. They have been posited as widely shared and deeply rooted normative orientations and thus the true foundations of the common European house. This step was probably meant to tap a new source of legitimacy and stability.
Does the Polish development concern us — the European citizens and the European institutions we have set up? There is a functional and a normative argument to state that it does. The normative argument is that the European Union organizes a community of states that profess allegiance to a set of fundamental values—among others, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The functional reason is that the European legal space presupposes mutual trust. European law operates on the presumption that all institutions are law-abiding. Otherwise, the legal edifice crumbles.
Fundamental rights protection, once a side show, has become important for the EU, as proved by the newfound treaty recognition of the EU fundamental rights charter (CFREU), and the upcoming accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). At the same time the fundamental rights situation in a considerable number of Member States is an increasing cause for concern. This has mostly been illustrated with reference to minorities and asylum seekers. However, recent reports of organizations like the Council of Europe, the OSCE and various NGOs have also highlighted serious problems with regard to media freedom, such as overt political influence, media concentration, disproportionate sanctions on journalists, misuse of counter-terrorism legislation against the press, deficient protection of journalistic sources and failure to investigate violence against reporters. ...
The application of the EU Commission’s Rule of Law Framework in the current Polish case is a step in the right direction. It seems a good instance to develop the Framework as an EU mechanism to protect European constitutional values in a European legal space which is rife with constitutional crises, but short of instruments to address them. Its pertinence appears even more clearly in comparison to the Council’s (in)activity under its own rule-of-law mechanism, hastily put forward after the Commission’s Framework. The activation of the Framework has shown its potential to mobilize European public opinion and orient public discourses to the current condition of EU values
The illiberal turn in Europe has many facets. Of particular concern are Member States in which ruling majorities uproot the independence of the judiciary. For reasons well described in the Verfassungsblog, the current focus is on Poland. Since the Polish development is emblematic for a broader trend, more is at stake than the rule of law in that Member State alone (as if that were not enough). If the Polish emblematic development is not resisted, illiberal democracies might start co-defining the European constitutional order, in particular, its rule of law-value in Article 2 TEU. Accordingly, the conventional liberal self-understanding of Europe could easily erode, with tremendous implications.