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The theoretical derivation of credit market segmentation as the result of a free market process
(2003)
Information asymmetries make it difficult for banks to assess accurately whether specific entrepreneurs are able and/or willing to repay their loans. This leads to implicit interest rate ceilings, i.e. banks "refuse" to increase their interest rates beyond this ceiling as this would lower their net returns. Although the maximum interest rate increases as the size of enterprises decreases, such ceilings nonetheless constrain the banks’ ability to set interest rates at a level that would enable them to cover costs. If transaction costs are high, the total costs associated with granting small and medium-sized loans will exceed the maximum average return which the banks can earn by issuing such loans. For this reason, banks do not lend to small and medium-sized enterprises, and, as a consequence, these businesses have no access to formal sector loans. Because micro and small enterprises have a very high RoI, it is worthwhile for them to rely on expensive informal loans to finance their operations, at least until they reach a certain size. Once they have reached this size, however, it does not make economic sense for them to continue taking out informal credits, and thus they face a growth constraint imposed by the credit market. Medium-sized enterprises earn a lower RoI than small ones, which is why borrowing in the informal credit market is not a worthwhile option for them. Moreover, they do not have access to credit from formal financial institutions, and are thus excluded from obtaining any kind of financing in either of the two credit markets. As the result of free, unregulated market forces we get a stable equilibrium in which the credit market is segmented into an informal (small loan) segment, a formal (large loan) segment and, in between, a "non-market" (medium loan) segment.
This paper analyses the long-term effects of improved small-scale lending, often provided by microfinance institutions set up with the support of development aid. The analysis shows that some common assumptions about microfinance are not true at all: First, it shows that the impact on income will accrue not to the microenterprises themselves, but rather to the consumers of their products. Second, microfinance will have a significant positive effect on the wage levels of employees in the informal sector. Third, microfinance will cause high growth rates in the informal production sector, whereas the trade sector will either contract or at best grow very little.
The extension of long-term loans, e.g. to finance housing, is adversely affected by inflation. For one thing, the higher nominal interest rates charged by the banks in response to inflation mean that borrowers have to make (nominally) higher interest payments, which unnecessarily reduces their borrowing capacity. For another, long-term loans with variable interest rates increase the probability that borrowers will become unable to meet their payment obligations. The present paper examines these two assertions in detail. At the same time, it presents a concept for substantially reducing the weaknesses of conventional lending methodologies. We start by investigating the consequences of a stable inflation rate on the borrowing capacity of credit clients, then go on to analyze the impact of fluctuating inflation rates on the risk of default.
Access to loans and other financial services is extremely valuable for micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises in developing and transition countries as it enables their owners as well as their employees to exploit their economic potential and to increase their income. Although this insight has lead development aid institutions to undertake many attempts to create sustainable microfinance institutions, only a small fraction of these has been successful so far. This article analyses what determines the success of attempts to provide financial services in general, and credit in particular, to low income target groups in these countries. We argue that it is crucial to understand, and to mitigate or even eliminate in practice, the serious and numerous incentive problems at the level of the lending operations as well as those at the levels of the human resource management and the governance of microfinance institutions. We attempt to show moreover, that unsolved incentive problems at only one level will ultimately undermine any potential success at the other levels. In our paper, we first analyse information and incentive problems from a theoretical perspective, using and extending the well-known Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit rationing, and derive theoretical requirements for solutions of these problems. In the light of these considerations, we then discuss how problems are solved in practice. Section 3 deals with the credit relationship. Section 4 extends the argument by showing how incentive problems within the institution can be handled, and section 5 analyses corporate governance-related problems of development finance institutions as incentive problems. In section 6 it is demonstrated why, and how, the incentive problems at the different levels, as well as their solutions, are interrelated. From this we derive the proposition that, as the institutional devices for dealing with these problems constitute a complementary system, any sustainable solution requires consistent arrangements of all elements and at all levels of the system. In the last section we will show the potential of strategic networks to set up institutions which we consider to be consistent systems for successfully solving the problems at all three levels simultaneously.