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In this article we dealt with the relations between the state and religion / Islam and its interpreters i.e., the ulama, their needs each other. As a case, with an original source, we focused on the time of the Mahmud II (1808-1839) The Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century is reconciliation between Islam and Western civili-sation. In this process the ulama played key role by commenting Islam accordance with the need of the age or of the Ottoman Empire. The reformers, chiefly the Sultan and his close friends needed the support of the ulama to legitimate their reform programmes In this crucial stage the head of the ulama the Shaykhulislam, used his own religious knowledge and influence, derived from his office by writing a treatise to persuade the masses to accept the reforms. Applying the traditional virtue literature on the Ottoman dynasty he presented in this pamphlet one of the Western-minded Ottoman sultans as an ideal caliph-sultan. This attitude helped to transform the middle-aged Ottoman political structure and society into modern ages in Western line.
Pope Benedict XVI’s Regensburg lecture has been exposed by some learned voices of 'the Muslim world' as alluding, by the means of one particular quotation, to age-old stereotypes about Islam being an essentially violent creed in which moderation through reason has no legitimate place, and of representing Muhammadas an evil and inhuman man who preached that Islam should be spread by the sword. While none of these presumably 'Muslim' voices deny that the Pope has the right to express his opinions, even when they are plainly wrong in the face of historic facts that show how Islam and Christianity were spread (or were made to spread) across the world, he is criticised for a host of omissions in terms of intellectual honesty and factual accuracy. These omissions, it is argued here, cast an unfortunate light on the compatibility of scientific and religious rationality much advocated by the Pope in his 12 September 2006 lecture. This flagrant 'performative contradiction' (Habermas) leaves room for speculation about the true aim of the speech. Is Benedict XVI's appeal to theology as a legitimate academic discipline a credible attempt to explicate Roman Catholicism's rightful place in a modern world governed by liberal democracy and ethical-political pluralism, or is it a reflection of a move to restore the age-old, intolerant, anti-scientific, and anti-democratic legacy of the pre-Vatican II Catholic Church?
Alternative education or teaching radicalism? New literature on Islamic education in Southeast Asia
(2009)
This review article focuses on three recent publications on Islamic education in Southeast Asia. While two are monographs on South Thailand and Myanmar/ Burma, one is a collection of essays on Indonesia, Malaysia, South Thailand, Cambodia, and the Southern Philippines. All works highlight local, regional and international educational networks, as well as their connections to the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. Based chiefly on first-hand fieldwork, the works deliver an up-to-date and detailed picture of current discussions and developments regarding Islamic education in Southeast Asia. Key words Education ; Islam ; Southeast Asia ; Indonesia ; Malaysia ; Thailand ; Myanmar
Nusa Tenggara Timor, a south-eastern province of Indonesia, is populated mainly by Christians. The Alor-Pantar Archipelago has a majority of Protestant inhabitants who were baptized by Dutch Calvinists in the first half of the twentieth century. In addition, there are some coastal enclaves that have been inhabited by Muslims for centuries. In some areas, such as in the headland of Muna (Tanjung Muna) forming the northeast of Pantar Island, there is an even greater diversity of monotheistic religions, with some Catholic families living next to Protestants and Muslims. All adherers of the three religious faiths living at Tanjung Muna share core elements of the local adat, which consists of core rules relating to social behavior. It is believed that the ancestors will notice transgressions of these rules, and may use their supernatural power to punish their human descendants. In Indonesia, the term adat was first used by Muslims to distinguish the non-Islamic practices from Muslim faith (Keane 1997:260-261). This is definitely not the case in the village of Pandai at the coast of Tanjung Muna, where Islam tolerates ancestral worship. The same is true for the Catholics in the inland village of Helangdohi, who do not only tolerate but even support such customs. Some villagers from Helangdohi had become acquainted with this kind of Catholicism on the nearby island of Flores, where ancestral worship is encouraged by the missionaries of the Societas Verbi Divini (SVD). The attitude of Protestantism, at least in the Alor Archipelago, is quite the contrary of the permissive views held by Catholicism and Islam. In the 1930s the Protestant-Calvinist missionaries banned any kind of ancestral worship and destroyed most relics (Dalen 1928: Picture 1). These drastic measures demanded the disavowal of the ancestors, including the destruction of heirlooms and omitting of rituals.
From the very outset of European expansion, scholars have been preoccupied with the impact of proselytization and colonization on non-European societies. Anthropologists such as Margaret Mead and Bronislaw Malinowski, who witnessed these processes at the beginning of the twentieth century while at the same time benefitting from the colonial structure, were convinced that the autochthonous societies could not possibly withstand the onslaught of the dominant European cultures, and thus were doomed to vanish in the near future. The fear of losing their object of research, which had just recently been discovered, hung above the heads of the scholars like a sword of Damocles ever since the establishment of anthropology as a discipline. They felt hurried to document what seemed to be crumbling away. Behind these fears there was the notion that the indigenous cultures were comparatively static entities that had existed untouched by any external influences for many centuries, or even millennia, and were unable to change. This idea was shared by proponents of other disciplines; in religious studies, for example, up to the late 1980s the view prevailed that the contact between the great world religions and the belief systems of small, autochthonous societies doomed the latter to extinction. However, more recent studies have shown that this assumption, according to which indigenous peoples have not undergone any changes in the course of history, is untenable. It became apparent that groups supposedly living in isolation have extensive contact networks, and that migration, trade, and conquest are not privileges of modern times. Myths and oral traditions bore witness of journeys to faraway regions, new settlements founded in unknown territories, or the arrival of victorious foreigners who introduced new ways and customs and laid claim to a place of their own within society.
Indonesia is a multicultural and multireligious nation whose heterogeneity is codified in the state doctrine, the Pancasila. Yet the relations between the various social, ethnic, and religious groups have been problematic down to the present day, and national unity has remained fragile. In several respects, Christians have a precarious role in the struggle for shaping the nation. They are a small minority (about 9% of the population) in a country predominantly inhabited by Muslims; in the past they were interconnected in manifold ways with the Dutch colonial government; they exert great influence in economy and the military, and constitute the majority of the population in some parts of the so-called Outer Islands (such as Flores, Sumba, and Timor), which are characterized by an attitude fraught with ambivalence towards the state apparatus perceived as ‘Javanese’ and ‘Muslim’. In the aftermath of the former president Suharto’s resignation and in the course of the ensuing political changes – in particular the independence of East Timor – Christians were repeatedly discredited for allegedly posing a threat to Indonesian unity, and have been involved both as victims and perpetrators in violent regional clashes with Muslims that claimed thousands of lives. Since the beginning of the new millennium the violent conflicts have lessened, yet the pressure exerted on Christians by Islamic fundamentalists still continues undiminished in the Muslim-majority regions. The future of the Christians in Indonesia remains uncertain, and pluralist society is still on trial. For this reason the situation of Christians in Indonesia is an important issue that goes far beyond research on a minority, touching on general issues relating to the formation of the nation-state.
From the 1980 Maitatsine uprising to the 2009 Boko Haram uprising, Nigeria was bedevilled by ethno-religious conflicts with devastating human and material losses. But the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 was significant in that it not only set a precedent, but also reinforced the attempts by Islamic conservative elements at imposing a variant of Islamic religious ideology on a secular state. Whereas the religious sensitivity of Nigerians provided fertile ground for the breeding of the Boko Haram sect, the sect’s blossoming was also aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian society, the advent of party politics (and the associated desperation of politicians for political power), and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on insurrection, either did nothing to stop it from fomenting, or only feebly condemned it. These internal factors coupled with growing Islamic fundamentalism around the world make a highly volatile Nigerian society prone to violence, as evidenced by the Boko Haram uprising. Given the approach of the Nigerian state to religious conflict, this violence may remain a recurring problem. This paper documents and analyses the Boko Haram uprising, as well as its links with the promotion of Islamic revivalism and the challenges it poses to the secularity of the Nigerian state.
Die Dissertation stellt das Machtgeflecht in der Islamischen Stadt Marawi City (Mindanao, Philippinen) dar, in die die dortigen Gender-Debatten involviert sind. In einer Umgebung, die als Konsequenz des Mindanao Konfliktes als “no war, no peace”-Umgebung definiert werden kann, gibt es drei Hauptdarsteller: die nationale Regierung des mehrheitlich christlichen Staates der Philippinen (GRP), die Autonome Regierung im Muslimischen Mindanao (ARMM), zu der auch Marawi City zählt, und die islamische Rebellengruppe Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), die einen islamischen (unter-)Staat fordert. Die GRP unterstützt Re-Islamisierungs- und Re-Traditionalisierungsbewegungen in der ARMM, um die Opposition zur MILF zu stärken. Die Konsequenz ist jedoch keine Kollaboration zwischen der GRP und der ARMM. Stattdessen nutzen Politiker ihre Privilegien aus, um ihren eigenen Absichten zu folgen. Sei dies, um politische Gegner auszuspielen oder das traditionelle Sultanatssystem zu fördern. Für Gender-Debatten gibt es in diesem Kontext der ungelösten nationalen Frage kaum Spielraum außerhalb einer Islamischen Narrative; dies bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass Gender nicht debattiert wird, sondern, dass die Debatten inner-Islamisch sind, hauptsächlich zwischen Repräsentanten des traditionell synkretistischen Islam und Vertretern Islamischer Revitalisierungsbewegungen. Speziell erstere erscheinen sehr einflussreich bezüglich Gender Strategien in der Region. Dies ist nur teilweise auf die Unterstützung der nationalen Regierung zurückzuführen, sondern ist vor allem eine Frage von Identität. Diese wiederum wird nicht vorranging über Religion, sondern nach ethnischen Maßstäben und im Speziellen im Rahmen von Clanstrukturen definiert.
In this essay, one of the most serious problems highlighted with respect to contemporary Iranians, who are mostly known as Shi‘ite-Perso (Shi‘ite-Persian) citizens of Iran, and what their view toward abusing wine and opium is. On one hand, the wealthy Persian literature is full of poems, narrations and notes with reference to wine and opium, while on the other hand, many parts of Shi‘ite-Islamic thought deem wine unclean and illegal, and abusing opium is forbidden except under certain [hard-fulfilling] conditions. Hereby, in this essay the aim is to express why the question “are drinking wine and abusing opium known as addiction or literal culture?” is suspended throughout the young Iranian generation. In this regard, the standpoints of Persian poets and Iranian religious figures towards wine and opium will be considered.