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The Åland Islands archipelago enjoys a special international status sui generis, which essentially encompasses demilitarisation, neutralisation, and autonomy. This status is guaranteed under international law by the agreements of 1921, 1940, and 1947, which are still in force. Furthermore, there are convincing reasons to assume that the Åland Islands regime has grown into European customary law. By virtue of her international (treaty) obligations, Finland cannot unilaterally change this status under the present conditions, irrespective of domestic (constitutional) decisions. While integration into NATO’s collective defence system and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy structures is compatible with the special status of the Åland Islands, care must be taken by Finland and her partners to ensure that the obligations arising from these developments are fulfilled in accordance with the demilitarised and neutralised status of the archipelago. This includes that the use by Finnish troops for preventive defence, beyond the exceptions laid down in the 1921 Åland Agreement, is only permitted in the case (of threat) of an immediate and clearly identifiable attack.
The autonomous character of the Åland Islands was established under a League of Nations dispute settlement and implemented, inter alia, in Finnish legislation. Its essence even grew into customary law. The arrangements of 1921, however, do not constitute a bilateral treaty between Finland and Sweden. The UN assumes that the international mechanism to protect Åland’s autonomy did not become obsolete with the demise of the League of Nations, but was only “suspended until such time as an express decision has been taken by the United Nations to put it back into force”. A corresponding proposal could be submitted, in any case, both by Finland and/or Sweden or possibly even by any other UN member state, for discussion in the Sixth Committee. However, the final decision to re-activate this special mechanism would have to be adopted by the UN General Assembly.
EU Law applies to the Åland Islands in principle; however, Finland’s Accession Treaty to the EU to which Protocol No. 2 on the Åland Islands was annexed, established a number of specific rules which are still in force today. This, most notably, results in the limited application of value added tax and excise duties in the Åland Islands. Therefore, the rules on customs procedures apply with respect to the movement of goods to and from the Åland Islands. In addition, other provisions of Union law, in particular those relating to fundamental freedoms and European state aid law, may be relevant in view of the special fiscal status of the Åland Islands. However, assessing individual cases would require further information and in-depth studies. Irrespective of the requirements set out in the said Protocol, the EU is obliged to respect the national identity of Member States pursuant to Article 4 para. 2 TEU; this obligation includes respect for the special status of the Åland Islands under both international and Finnish constitutional law.
This study analyses potential consequences of exiting the Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO) of the European Central Bank (ECB). Thanks to its asset purchase programs, the Eurosystem still holds plenty of reserves even with a full exit from the TLTROs. This explains why voluntary and mandatory repayments of TLTRO III borrowing went smoothly. Nevertheless, the more liquidity is drained from the banking system, the more important becomes interbank market borrowing and lending, ideally between euro area member states. Right now, the usual fault lines of the euro area show up. The German banking system has plenty of reserves while there are first signs of aggregate scarcity in the Italian banking system. This does not need to be a source of concern if the interbank market can be sufficiently reactivated. Moreover, the ECB has several tools to address possible future liquidity shortages.
This document was provided/prepared by the Economic Governance and EMU scrutiny Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
Almost ten years after the European Commission action plan on building a capital markets union (CMU) and despite incremental progress, e.g. in the form of the EU Listing Act, the picture looks dire. Stock exchanges, securities markets, and supervisory authorities remain largely national, and, in many cases, European companies have decided to exclusively list overseas. Notwithstanding the economic and financial benefits of market integration, CMU has become a geopolitical necessity. A unified capital market can bolster resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic sovereignty, reduce dependence on external funding, and may foster economic cooperation between member states.
The reason for the persistent stand-still in Europe’s CMU development is not so much the conflict between market- and state-based integration, but rather the hesitancy of national regulatory and supervisory bodies to relinquish powers. If EU member states wanted to get real about CMU (as they say, and as they should), they need to openly accept the loss of sovereignty that follows from a true unified capital market. Building on economic as well as historical evidence, the paper offers viable proposals on how to design competent institutions within the current European framework.
This note outlines the case for speedy capital market integration and for the adoption of a common regulatory framework and single supervisory authority from a political economy perspective. We also show the alternative case for harmonization and centralization via regulatory competition, elaborating how competition between EU jurisdictions by way of full mutual recognition may lead to a (cost-)efficient and standardized legal framework for capital markets. Lastly, the note addresses the political economy conflict that underpins the implementation of both models for integrating capital markets. We point out that, in both cases, national authorities experience a loss of legislative and jurisdictional competence at the national level. We predict that any plan to foster a stronger capital market union, following an institution based or a market-based strategy, will face opposition from powerful national stakeholders.
The EU Commission proposed a regulation on artificial intelligence (AI) on 21 April 2021, which categorizes the use of AI in “social credit” as a prohibited application. This paper examines the definition and structure of the Social Credit System in China, which comprises various systems operating at different levels and sectors. The analysis focuses on two main subsystems: the database and one-stop inquiry platform for financial credit records, and the social governance tool designed to facilitate legal and political compliance. The development of the commercial customer credit reference is also explored. This paper further discusses the impacts and concerns associated with the implementation of the Chinese social credit system to raise awareness. The objective is to offer insights from the existing system and contribute to the ongoing discussion on regulating AI applications in social credit within the EU.
Regulating IP exclusion/inclusion on a global scale: the example of copyright vs. AI training
(2024)
This article builds upon the literature on inclusion/inclusivity in IP law by applying these concepts to the example of the scraping and mining of copyright-protected content for the purpose of training an artificial intelligence (AI) system or model. Which mode of operation dominates in this technological area: exclusion, inclusion or even inclusivity? The features of AI training appear to call for universal and sustainable “inclusivity” instead of a mere voluntary “inclusion” of AI provider bots by copyright holders. As the overview on the copyright status of AI training activities in different jurisdictions and emerging laws on AI safety (such as the EU AI Act) demonstrates, the global regulatory landscape is, however, much too fragmented and dynamic to immediately jump to an inclusive global AI regime. For the time being, legally secure global AI training requires the voluntary cooperation between AI providers and copyright holders, and innovative techno-legal reasoning is needed on how to effectuate this inclusion.
In its first ten years (2014-2023), the banking union was successful in its prudential agenda but failed spectacularly in its underlying objective: establishing a single banking market in the euro area. This goal is now more important than ever, and easier to attain than at any time in the last decade. To make progress, cross-border banks should receive a specific treatment within general banking union legislation. Suggestions are made on how to make such regulatory carve-out effective and legally sound.
This paper addresses the need for transparent sustainability disclosure in the European Auto Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) market, a crucial element in achieving the EU's climate goals. It proposes the use of existing vehicle identifiers, the Type Approval Number (TAN) and the Type-Variant-Version Code (TVV), to integrate loan-level data with sustainability-related vehicle information from ancillary sources. While acknowledging certain challenges, the combined use of TAN and TVV is the optimal solution to allow all stakeholders to comprehensively assess the environmental characteristics of securitised exposure pools in terms of data protection, matching accuracy, and cost-effectiveness.
In recent decades, biodiversity has declined significantly, threatening ecosystem services that are vital to society and the economy. Despite the growing recognition of biodiversity risks, the private sector response remains limited, leaving a significant financing gap. The paper therefore describes market-based solutions to bridge the financing gap, which can follow a risk assessment approach and an impact-oriented perspective. Key obstacles to mobilising private capital for biodiversity conservation are related to pricing biodiversity due to its local dimension, the lack of standardized metrics for valuation and still insufficient data reporting by companies hindering informed investment decisions. Financing biodiversity projects poses another challenge, mainly due to a mismatch between investor needs and available projects, for example in terms of project timeframes and their additionality.
This paper shows that support for climate action is high across survey participants from all EU countries in three dimensions: (1) Participants are willing to contribute personally to combating climate change, (2) they approve of pro-climate social norms, and (3) they demand government action. In addition, there is a significant perception gap where individuals underestimate others' willingness to contribute to climate action by over 10 percentage points, influencing their own willingness to act. Policymakers should recognize the broad support for climate action among European citizens and communicate this effectively to counteract the vocal minority opposed to it.
In times of crisis, insurance companies may invest into riskier assets to benefit from expected price recoveries. Using daily stock market data for 34 European insurers, I investigate how a stock market contraction, as experienced during the Covid-19 pandemic, affects insurers’ decision on the allocation of their corporate bond portfolio. I find that insurers shift their portfolio holdings pro-cyclically towards lower credit risk assets in the first month of the market contraction. As the crisis progresses, I find evidence for counter-cyclical investment behavior by insurers, which can neither be explained by credit rating downgrades of held bonds nor by hedging with CDS derivatives. The observed counter-cyclical investment behavior of insurers could be beneficial for the financial system in attenuating price declines, but excessive risk-taking by insurance companies over longer periods can also reinforce stress in the system.