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Der Beitrag führt in das sozialpsychologische Phänomen des Gruppendenkens ein. Kennzeichen und Gegenstrategien werden anhand von Zeugenaussagen vor dem Wirecard-Untersuchungsausschuss am Beispiel des Aufsichtsrats illustriert. Normative Implikationen de lege ferenda schließen sich an. Sie betreffen unabhängige Mitglieder (auch auf der Arbeitnehmerbank), Direktinformationsrechte im Unternehmen (unter Einschluss von Hinweisgebern) und den Investorendialog (auch mit Leerverkäufern).
This paper studies the interactions between corporate law and VC exits by acquisitions, an increasingly common source of VC-related litigation. We find that transactions by VC funds under liquidity pressure are characterized by (i) a substantially lower sale price; (ii) a greater probability of industry outsiders as acquirers; (iii) a positive abnormal return for acquirers. These features indicate the existence of fire sales, which satisfy VCs' liquidation preferences but hurt common shareholders, leaving board members with conflicting fiduciary duties and litigation risks. Exploiting an important court ruling that establishes the board’s fiduciary duties to common shareholders as a priority, we find that after the ruling maturing VCs become less likely to exit by fire sales and they distribute cash to their investors less timely. However, VCs experience more difficult fundraising ex-ante, highlighting the potential cost of a common-favoring regime. Overall the evidence has important implications for optimal fiduciary duty design in VC-backed start-ups.
Under Solvency II, corporate governance requirements are a complementary, but nonetheless essential, element to build a sound regulatory framework for insurance undertakings, also to address risks not specifically mitigated by the sole solvency capital requirements. After recalling the provisions of the second pillar concerning the system of governance, the paper is devoted to highlight the emerging regulatory trends in the corporate governance of insurance firms. Among others, it signals the exceptional extension of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the Board of directors, far beyond the traditional role of both monitoring the chief executive officer, and assessing the overall direction and strategy of the business. However, a better risk governance is not necessarily built on narrow rule-based approaches to corporate governance.
Under Solvency II, corporate governance requirements are a complementary, but nonetheless essential, element to build a sound regulatory framework for insurance undertakings, also to address risks not specifically mitigated by the sole solvency capital requirements. After recalling the provisions of the Second Pillar concerning the system of governance, the paper highlights the emerging regulatory trends in the corporate governance of insurance firms. Among others things, it signals the exceptional extension of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the board of directors, far beyond the traditional role of both monitoring the chief executive officer, and assessing the overall direction and strategy of the business. However, a better risk governance is not necessarily built on narrow rule-based approaches to corporate governance.
Since August 2009, German legislation allows for voluntary Say on Pay Votes (SoPV) during Annual General Meetings (AGMs). We examine 1,169 AGMs of all German listed firms with more than 10,000 agenda items over the period 2010-2013 to identify (1) determinants and approval rates of voluntary SoPVs, (2) the effect of voluntary SoPVs on AGM participation, and (3) the effect of SoP on executive compensation. Our data reveals that in the first four years of the voluntary say on pay regime every second firm in our sample has opted for having a SoPV. The propensity for a SoPV increases with firm size, abnormal executive compensation and free float of shares. Indeed, smaller firms with concentrated ownership do not only have a lower propensity for a SoPV, but also show a higher propensity to opt for only limited disclosure of executive compensation. Approval rates of SoPVs are lower than the approval rate for the average AGM agenda item and this effect is stronger in (i) widely held firms as well as in (ii) firms with abnormal executive compensation. Additionally, SoPVs actually can increase AGM participation; however, this result is particularly evident for widely held firms. Finally, we find stronger pay for performance elements within total executive compensation, particularly when the effect of executive compensation is lagged over the years following the vote. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that firms use voluntary SoPV to gain legitimation for executive remuneration policies in firms with low ownership concentration. This is enforced, where (small) shareholders consider executive compensation a part of the agency problem of listed firms, and where (small) shareholders consider SoPVs as a possibility to actively influence corporate decisions, with these decisions leading to a higher degree of alignment between executive management boards and shareholders.
This paper contrasts the recent European initiatives on regulating corporate groups with alternative approaches to the phenomenon. In doing so it pays particular regard to the German codified law on corporate groups as the polar opposite to the piecemeal approach favored by E.U. legislation.
It finds that the European Commission’s proposal to submit (significant) related party transactions to enhanced transparency, outside fairness review, and ex ante shareholder approval is both flawed in its design and based on contestable assumptions on informed voting of institutional investors. In particular, the contemplated exemption for transactions with wholly owned subsidiaries allows controlling shareholders to circumvent the rule extensively. Moreover, vesting voting rights with (institutional) investors will not lead to the informed assessment that is hoped for, because these investors will rationally abstain from active monitoring and rely on proxy advisory firms instead whose competency to analyze non-routine significant related party transactions is questionable.
The paper further delineates that the proposed recognition of an overriding interest of the group requires strong counterbalances to adequately protect minority shareholders and creditors. Hence, if the Commission choses to go down this route it might end up with a comprehensive regulation that is akin to the unpopular Ninth Company Law Directive in spirit, though not in content. The latter prediction is corroborated by the pertinent parts of the proposal for a European Model Company Act.
Die Stellungnahme befasst sich mit einem wichtigen Aspekt der Offenlegung der Bezüge von Entscheidungsträgern im Bankensektor. Komplementär zu der Diskussion um die Veröffentlichung der Vergütung von Vorstandsmitgliedern börsennotierter Unternehmen ist auch auf Landeseben versucht worden, die Transparenz der Vergütung von Führungskräften kommunaler oder landeseigener Unternehmen zu erhöhen. Namentlich sind die Träger der Sparkassen durch den neuen § 19 Abs. 6 des Sparkassengesetzes von Nordrhein-Westfalen verpflichtet worden, darauf „hinzuwirken“, dass die „gewährten Bezüge jedes einzelnen Mitglieds des Vorstands, des Verwaltungsrates und ähnlicher Gremien unter Namensnennung“ veröffentlich werden. Diese Vorschrift ist jedoch weitgehend wirkungslos geblieben; nicht zuletzt weil das OLG Köln in einer einstweiligen Verfügung die Vorschrift mangels Gesetzgebungskompetenz des Landes als nichtig behandelt hat. In dieser Situation ist am 8. August 2013 der Vorschlag eines Gesetzes „zur Offenlegung der Bezüge von Sparkassenführungskräften im Internet“ durch die Fraktion der Piraten im Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen eingebracht worden. Der Entwurf ist Gegenstand der Stellungnahme, die Helmut Siekmann für den Haushalts- und Finanzausschuss des Landtags Nordrhein-Westfalen erstellt hat. Sie stellt maßgebend darauf ab, dass die Sparkassen als Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts einen öffentlichen Auftrag zu erfüllen haben und den Grundsätzen des Verwaltungsorganisationsrechts unterliegen. Als Teil der (leistenden) Verwaltung müssen sie Transparenz- und Kontrollansprüchen der Bürger und ihren Repräsentanten in den Parlamenten genügen.
Die Frage nach den Zusammenhängen zwischen Normanerkennung und ökonomischem Verhalten lassen sich anhand der Wirkung von Corporate Governance Kodizes schlaglichtartig beleuchten. Der vorliegende Beitrag liefert erste theoretische Bausteine zum Zusammenwirken von Corporate Governance Kodizes und verbindlichen gesetzlichen Normen auf der Grundlage des Comply or Explain-Grundsatzes, indem er zunächst die Wirkungsweise des Kapitalmarktes, wie sie von der ökonomisch fundierten Gesellschaftsrechtstheorie vorausgesetzt wird, dem Mechanismus des Comply or Explain gegenüberstellt. Die empirischen Studien zur Wirksamkeit des Kapitalmarktes bei der Durchsetzung des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex im Wege des Comply or Explain lassen Raum für weitere Normanerkennungs- und –befolgungsmechanismen, die sich in Parallele zur Diskussion im Bereich der Corporate Social Responsibility und den sogenannten „business cases“ hierfür verdeutlichen lassen. Die dabei aufscheinenden Berührungspunkte ökonomischer Motivation mit sozialen Interessen geben Gelegenheit, auf Fairnessnormen als Grenzen des traditionellen Rationalmodells einzugehen. Ein ähnliches Nebeneinander und Ineinandergreifen von Eigennutzinteresse und intrinsischer Motivation lässt sich anhand der Anreizwirkung bei der Managervergütung veranschaulichen. Ihre gesetzliche Regelung im VorstAG lässt zum Teil eine empirische Absicherung vermissen. Damit schließt sich der Kreis der Analyse der Verbindlichkeitsstrukturen im Wirtschaftsrecht, nach der sich diese einem einheitlichen theoretischen Modell entziehen und deren empirische Grundlagen noch nicht zweifelsfrei geklärt sind.
We investigate the decisions of listed firms to go private once again. We start by revealing that while a significant number of firms which go public is VC-backed, an overproportional share of these VC-backed firms go private later on (they stay on the exchange for an average of 8.5 years). We interpret this very robust pattern such that IPOs of VC-backed firms are to a large extent a temporary rather than a permanent feature of the corporate governance of these firms. We investigate various potential hypotheses why VCs actually seem to be able to bring marginal firms to the exchange by relating the going-private decisions to various characteristics of the IPO market as well as to VC characteristics. We find strong support for the certification ability of VCs: more experienced and reputable VCs are more able to bring marginal firms to public exchanges via an IPOs. These marginal firms backed-by more reputable and experienced VCs are more likely to go private later on. Hence, our analysis suggests that IPOs backed by experienced VCs are most likely to be a temporary rather than the final stage in the life of the portfolio firm. We find no support that reputable VCs underprice their IPO-exits more implying that they have no need to leave more money on the table to take the marginal firms public.
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were frequently violated and that the strategic timing of trades and reports was common. Event study abnormal re-turns are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than after reports of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Our results also imply that delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency and lend strong support to the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. JEL Classification: G14, G30, G32 Keywords: Insider Trading , Directors' Dealings , Corporate Governance , Market Efficiency