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This paper analyses cross-border contagion in a sample of European banks from January 1994 to January 2003. We use a multinomial logit model to estimate the number of banks in a given country that experience a large shock on the same day (“coexceedances”) as a function of variables measuring common shocks and coexceedances in other countries. Large shocks are measured by the bottom 95th percentile of the distribution of the first difference in the daily distance to default of the bank. We find evidence in favour of significant cross-border contagion. We also find some evidence that since the introduction of the euro cross-border contagion may have increased. The results seem to be very robust to changes in the specification.
In den 1980er und den frühen 1990er Jahren waren japanische Banken die weltweit größten Finanzinstitute und galten als Inbegriff „globaler“ Banken. Der Crash der japanischen Wertpapier- und Immobilienmärkte Anfang der 1990er Jahre und die nachfolgende Rezession waren Anlass zu tiefgreifenden Reformen im japanischen Finanzsystem. Die japanischen Banken waren gezwungen, ihre internationalen Strategien zu reformulieren. Als Konsequenz zogen sie sich aus vielen Märkten zurück und strukturierten ihre internationalen Netzwerke um. Vor dem Hintergrund theoretischer Überlegungen zu der Bedeutung von „Globalität“ und einer empirischen Untersuchung der Entwicklung der Auslandsstellennetze japanischer Banken in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren stellt der vorliegende Beitrag die Globalität japanischer Banken in Frage.
An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond/ Dybvig style and an asset market coexist is modelled. Firstly, within this framework we characterize distinct financial systems depending on the fraction of households with direct investment opportunities that are less efficient than those available to banks. With this fraction comparatively low, the evolving financial system can be interpreted as market-oriented. In this system, banks only provide efficient investment opportunities to households with inferior investment alternatives. Banks are not active in the secondary financial market nor do they provide any liquidity insurance to their depositors. Households participate to a large extent in the primary as well as in the secondary financial markets. In the other case of a relatively high fraction of households with inefficient direct investment opportunities, a bank-dominated financial system arises, in which banks provide liquidity transformation, are active in secondary financial markets and are the only player in primary markets, while households only participate in secondary financial markets. Secondly, we analyze the effect a run on a single bank has on the entire financial system. Interestingly, we can show that a bank run on a single bank causes contagion via the financial market neither in market-oriented nor in extremely bank-dominated financial systems. But in only moderately bank-dominated (or hybrid) financial systems fire sales of long-term financial claims by a distressed bank cause a sudden drop in asset prices that precipitates other banks into crisis.