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The recent financial crisis has highlighted the limits of the “originate to distribute” model of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy and monetary policy remains unexplored. I build a DSGE model with banks (along the lines of Holmström and Tirole [28] and Parlour and Plantin [39] and examine its properties with and without active secondary markets for credit risk transfer. The possibility of transferring credit reduces the impact of liquidity shocks on bank balance sheets, but also reduces the bank incentive to monitor. As a result, secondary markets allow to release bank capital and exacerbate the effect of productivity and other macroeconomic shocks on output and inflation. By offering a possibility of capital recycling and by reducing bank monitoring, secondary credit markets in general equilibrium allow banks to take on more risk. Keywords: Credit Risk Transfer , Dual Moral Hazard , Monetary Policy , Liquidity , Welfare JEL Classification: E3, E5, G3 First Draft: December 2009, This Draft: September 2010
At the upcoming G20 meetings the issue what can be done to avoid a repetition of the current deep financial crisis will again be debated. Much attention and criticism will be directed to central banks. That is unavoidable: central banks must never again permit the development of financial imbalances that are large enough to lead to the collapse of major parts of the financial system when they unwind. In the future, policy makers must “lean against the wind” and tighten financial conditions if they perceive that imbalances are forming, even if there is little hard data to rely on. And they must be mindful that the costs of acting too late can dwarf those of acting too early.
This European Policy Analysis discusses the need to strengthen the institutions underpinning the euro and makes several policy recommendations. The Stability and Growth Pact must be reinforced, have greater automaticity and entail graduated sanctions. Fiscal surveillance must be improved through the establishment of a European Fiscal Stability Agency. Finally, the European Financial Stability Facility must be made permanent.
We study the impact of the arrival of macroeconomic news on the informational and noise-driven components in high-frequency quote processes and their conditional variances. Bid and ask returns are decomposed into a common ("efficient return") factor and two market-side-specific components capturing market microstructure effects. The corresponding variance components reflect information-driven and noise-induced volatilities. We find that all volatility components reveal distinct dynamics and are positively influenced by news. The proportion of noise-induced variances is highest before announcements and significantly declines thereafter. Moreover, news-affected responses in all volatility components are influenced by order flow imbalances. JEL Classification: C32, G14, E44
Capturing the zero: a new class of zero-augmented distributions and multiplicative error processes
(2010)
We propose a novel approach to model serially dependent positive-valued variables which realize a non-trivial proportion of zero outcomes. This is a typical phenomenon in financial time series observed on high frequencies, such as cumulated trading volumes or the time between potentially simultaneously occurring market events. We introduce a flexible pointmass mixture distribution and develop a semiparametric specification test explicitly tailored for such distributions. Moreover, we propose a new type of multiplicative error model (MEM) based on a zero-augmented distribution, which incorporates an autoregressive binary choice component and thus captures the (potentially different) dynamics of both zero occurrences and of strictly positive realizations. Applying the proposed model to high-frequency cumulated trading volumes of liquid NYSE stocks, we show that the model captures both the dynamic and distribution properties of the data very well and is able to correctly predict future distributions. Keywords: High-frequency Data , Point-mass Mixture , Multiplicative Error Model , Excess Zeros , Semiparametric Specification Test , Market Microstructure JEL Classification: C22, C25, C14, C16, C51
Price pressures
(2010)
We study price pressures in stock prices—price deviations from fundamental value due to a risk-averse intermediary supplying liquidity to asynchronously arriving investors. Empirically, twelve years of daily New York Stock Exchange intermediary data reveal economically large price pressures. A $100,000 inventory shock causes an average price pressure of 0.28% with a half-life of 0.92 days. Price pressure causes average transitory volatility in daily stock returns of 0.49%. Price pressure effects are substantially larger with longer durations in smaller stocks. Theoretically, in a simple dynamic inventory model the ‘representative’ intermediary uses price pressure to control risk through inventory mean reversion. She trades off the revenue loss due to price pressure against the price risk associated with remaining in a nonzero inventory state. The model’s closed-form solution identifies the intermediary’s relative risk aversion and the distribution of investors’ private values for trading from the observed time series patterns. These allow us to estimate the social costs—deviations from constrained Pareto efficiency—due to price pressure which average 0.35 basis points of the value traded. JEL Classification: G12, G14, D53, D61
Recent empirical research suggests that measures of investor sentiment have predictive power for future stock returns over the intermediate and long term. Given the widespread publication of sentiment indicators, smart investors should trade on the information conveyed by such indicators and thus trigger an immediate market response to their publication. The present paper is the first to empirically analyze whether an immediate response can be identified from the data. We use survey-based sentiment indicators from two countries (Germany and the US). Consistent with previous research we find there is predictability at intermediate time horizons. For the US, however, the predictability all but disappears after 1994. Using event study methodology we find that the publication of sentiment indicators affects market returns. The sign of the immediate response is the same as that of the predictability over the intermediate term. This finding is consistent with the idea that sentiment is related to mispricing, but is inconsistent with the idea that the sentiment indicator provides information about future expected returns.
SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS 1. One of the major lessons from the current financial crisis refers to the systemic dimension of financial risk which had been almost completely neglected by bankers and supervisors in the pre-2007 years. 2. Accordingly, the most needed change in financial regulation, in order to avoid a repetition of such a crisis in the future, consists of influencing individual bank behaviour such that systemic risk is decreased. This objective is new and distinct from what Basle II was intended to achieve. 3. It is important, therefore, to evaluate proposed new regulatory instruments on the ground of whether or not they contribute to a reduction, or containment of systemic risk. We see two new regulatory measures of paramount importance: the introduction of a Systemic Risk Charge (SRC), and the implementation of a transparent bank resolution regime. Both measures complement each other, thus both have to be realized to be effective. 4. We propose a Systemic Risk Charge (SRC), a levy capturing the contribution of any individual bank to the overall systemic risk which is distinct from the institution’s own default risk. The SRC is set up such that the more systemic risk a bank contributes, the higher is the cost it has to bear. Therefore, the SRC serves to internalize the cost of systemic risk which, up to now, was borne by the taxpayer. 5. Major details of our SRC refer to the use of debt that may be converted into equity when systemic risk threatens the stability of the banking system. Also, the SRC raises some revenues for government. 6. The SRC has to be compared to several bank levies currently debated. The Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) does not directly address systemic risk and is therefore inferior to a SRC. Nevertheless, a FTT may offer the opportunity to subsidize on-exchange trading at the expense of off-exchange (over-the-counter, OTC) transactions, thereby enhancing financial market stability. The Financial Activity Tax (FAT) is similar to a VAT on financial services. It is the least adequate instrument among all instruments discussed above to limit systemic risk. 7. Bank resolution regime: No instrument to contain systemic risk can be effective unless the restructuring of bank debt, and the ensuing loss given default to creditors, is a real possibility. As the crisis has taught, bank restructuring is very difficult in light of contagion risk between major banks. We therefore need a regulatory procedure that allows winding down banks, even large banks, on short notice. Among other things, the procedure will require to distinguish systemically relevant exposures from those that are irrelevant. Only the former will be saved with government money, and it will then be the task of the supervisor to ensure a sufficient amount of nonsystemically relevant debt on the balance sheet of all banks. 8. Further issues discussed in this policy paper and its appendices refer to the necessity of a global level playing field, or the lack thereof, for these new regulatory measures; the convergence of our SRC proposal with what is expected to be long-term outcome of Basle III discussions; as well as the role of global imbalances.
Many studies show that most people are not financially literate and are unfamiliar with even the most basic economic concepts. However, the evidence on the determinants of economic literacy is scant. This paper uses international panel data on 55 countries from 1995 to 2008, merging indicators of economic literacy with a large set of macroeconomic and institutional variables. Results show that there is substantial heterogeneity of financial and economic competence across countries, and that human capital indicators (PISA test scores and college attendance) are positively correlated with economic literacy. Furthermore, inhabitants of countries with more generous social security systems are generally less literate, lending support to the hypothesis that the incentives to acquire economic literacy are related to the amount of resources available for private accumulation. JEL Classification: E2, D8, G1
We estimate the risk and expected returns of private equity investments based on the market prices of exchange traded funds of funds that invest in unlisted private equity funds. Our results indicate that the market expects unlisted private equity funds to earn abnormal returns of about one to two percent. We also find that the market expects listed private equity funds to earn zero to marginally negative abnormal returns net of fees. Both listed and unlisted private equity funds have market betas close to one and positive factor loadings on the Fama-French SMB factor. Private equity fund returns are positively correlated with GDP growth and negatively correlated with the credit spread. Finally, we find that market returns of exchange traded funds of funds and listed private equity funds predict changes in self-reported book values of unlisted private equity funds.