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This paper argues that banks must be sufficiently levered to have first-best incentives to make new risky loans. This result, which is at odds with the notion that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking, derives from two key premises that focus squarely on the role of banks as informed lenders. First, banks finance projects that they do not own, which implies that they cannot extract all the profits. Second, banks conduct a credit risk analysis before making new loans. Our model may help understand why banks take on additional unsecured debt, such as unsecured deposits and subordinated loans, over and above their existing deposit base. It may also help understand why banks and finance companies have similar leverage ratios, even though the latter are not deposit takers and hence not subject to the same regulatory capital requirements as banks.
Corporate borrowers care about the overall riskiness of a bank’s operations as their continued access to credit may rely on the bank’s ability to roll over loans or to expand existing credit facilities. As we show, a key implication of this observation is that increasing competition among banks should have an asymmetric impact on banks’ incentives to take on risk: Banks that are already riskier will take on yet more risk, while their safer rivals will become even more prudent. Our results offer new guidance for bank supervision in an increasingly competitive environment and may help to explain existing, ambiguous findings on the relationship between competition and risk-taking in banking. Furthermore, our results stress the beneficial role that competition can have for financial stability as it turns a bank’s "prudence" into an important competitive advantage.
American households have received a triple dose of bad news since the beginning of the current recession: The greatest collapse in asset values since the Great Depression, a sharp tightening in credit availability, and a large increase in unemployment risk. We present measures of the size of these shocks and discuss what a benchmark theory says about their immediate and ultimate consequences. We then provide a forecast based on a simple empirical model that captures the effects of wealth shocks and unemployment fears. Our short-term forecast calls for somewhat weaker spending, and somewhat higher saving rates, than the Consensus survey of macroeconomic forecasters. Over the longer term, our best guess is that the personal saving rate will eventually approach the levels that preceded period of financial liberalization that began in the late 1970s. Classification: C61, D11, E24