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Delivery of geospatial information over the Internet for the management of risks from invasive alien species is an increasingly important service. The evolution of information technology standards for geospatial data is a key factor to simplify network publishing and exchange of maps and data. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)-geolocation specification is a recent addition that may prove useful for pest risk management. In this article we implement the W3C-geolocation specification and Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) mapping standards in a Web browser application for smartphones and tablet computers to improve field surveys for alien invasive species. We report our first season field experiences using this tool for online mapping of plant disease outbreaks and host plant occurrence. It is expected that the improved field data collection tools will result in increased data availability and thereby new opportunities for risk assessment, because data-needs and availability are crucial for species distribution modelling and modelbased forecasts of pest establishment potential. Finally, we close with a comment on the future potential of geospatial information standards to enhance the translation from data to decisions regarding pest risks, which should enable earlier detection of emerging risks as well as more robust projections of pest risks in novel areas. The forthcoming standard for processing of geospatial information, the Web Processing Standard (WPS), should open new technological capabilities both for automatic initiation and updating of risk assessment models based on new incoming data, and subsequent early warning.
Basel III and CEO compensation in banks: pay structures as a regulatory signal : [March 6, 2013]
(2013)
This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and shareholders to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown to be a difficult task during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.