Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (115)
- Article (8)
- Part of a Book (4)
- Doctoral Thesis (4)
- Conference Proceeding (3)
- Report (3)
- Review (2)
- Book (1)
- Part of Periodical (1)
Language
- English (141) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (141)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (141) (remove)
Keywords
- Deutschland (141) (remove)
Institute
Research has contended youth is an "invention" of the 18th century. This thesis does not contest the fact that youth was already known and accepted as a stage in life even earlier. Certain basic anthropological patterns of youthfulness, for example nonchalance, instability, recklessness, exaggeration, bashfulness looking forward to the future and the ability to make friends have been rhetorically implied, repeated and cited as a matter of course since the time of Aristoteies. The pointed thesis that the concept of youth only arose in the 18th century accentuates that youth as an autonomous way of life is a characteristic of the Modern Age.
Previous research on working memory (WM) in children with poor mathematical skills has yielded heterogeneous results, possibly due to inconsistent consideration of the IQ-achievement discrepancy and additional reading and spelling difficulties. To examine the impact of both, the WM of 68 average-achieving and 68 low-achieving third-graders in mathematics was assessed. Preliminary analyses showed that poor mathematical skills were associated with poor WM. Afterwards, children with isolated mathematical difficulties were separated from those with additional reading and spelling difficulties. Half of each group fulfilled the IQ-achievement discrepancy, resulting in a 2 (additional reading and spelling difficulties: yes/no) by 2 (IQ-achievement discrepancy: yes/no) factorial design. Analyses revealed that not fulfilling the IQ achievement discrepancy was associated with poor visual WM, whereas additional reading and spelling difficulties were associated with poor central executive functioning in children fulfilling the IQ-achievement discrepancy. Therefore, WM in children with poor mathematical skills differs according to the IQ-achievement discrepancy and additional reading and spelling difficulties.
No one seems to be neutral about the effects of EMU on the German economy. Roughly speaking, there are two camps: those who see the euro as the advent of a newly open, large, and efficient regime which will lead to improvements in European and in particular in German competitiveness; those who see the euro as a weakening of the German commitment to price stability. From a broader macroeconomic perspective, however, it is clear that EMU is unlikely to cause directly any meaningful change either for the better in Standort Deutschland or for the worse in the German price stability. There is ample evidence that changes in monetary regimes (so long as non leaving hyperinflation) induce little changes in real economic structures such as labor or financial markets. Regional asymmetries of the sorts in the EU do not tend to translate into monetary differences. Most importantly, there is no good reason to believe that the ECB will behave any differently than the Bundesbank.
Who knows what when? : The information content of pre-IPO market prices : [Version March/June 2002]
(2002)
To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs during the subscription period. We examine these pre-issue prices and find that they are highly informative. They are closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the bookbuilding range and the offer price. The pre-issue prices explain a large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries are much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests.
I analyze the most powerful shareholders in Germany to illustrate the concentration of control over listed corporations. Compared to other developed economies, the German stock market is dominated by large shareholders. I show that 77% of the median firm’s voting rights arecontrolled by large blockholders. This corresponds to 47% of the market value of all firms listed in Germany’s official markets. About two thirds of this amount is controlled by banks, industrial firms, holdings, and insurance companies. I show that due to current legislation it is clear for neither group who ultimate exerts control over the shareholding firm itself. For the remaining blockholders, only blocks controlled by voting pools and individuals can be traced back to the highest level of ownership. In the aggregate, both groups control only 5.6% of all reported blocks. The German government controls 8%, and it is not clear who ultimately is responsible for the consequences of decisions.
What constitutes a financial system in general and the German financial system in particular?
(2003)
This paper is one of the two introductory chapters of the book "The German Financial System". It first discusses two issues that have a general bearing on the entire book, and then provides a broad overview of the German financial system. The first general issue is that of clarifying what we mean by the key term "financial system" and, based on this definition, of showing why the financial system of a country is important and what it might be important for. Obviously, a definition of its subject matter and an explanation of its importance are required at the outset of any book. As we will explain in Section II, we use the term "financial system" in a broad sense which sets it clearly apart from the narrower concept of the "financial sector". The second general issue is that of how financial systems are described and analysed. Obviously, the definition of the object of analysis and the method by which the object is to be analysed are closely related to one another. The remainder of the paper provides a general overview of the German financial system. In addition, it is intended to provide a first indication of how the elements of the German financial system are related to each other, and thus to support our claim from Section II that there is indeed some merit in emphasising the systemic features of financial systems in general and of the German financial system in particular. The chapter concludes by briefly comparing the general characteristics of the German financial system with those of the financial systems of other advanced industrial countries, and taking a brief look at recent developments which might undermine the "systemic" character of the German financial system.
Venture capital exit rights
(2009)
Theorists argue that exit rights can mitigate hold-up problems in venture capital. Using a hand-collected data-set of venture capital contracts from Germany we show that exit rights are included more frequently in venture capital contracts when a hold-up problem associated with the venture capitalist's exit decision is likely. Examples include drag-along and tag-along rights. Additionally, we find that almost all exit rights are allocated to the venture capitalist rather than to the entrepreneur. In addition, we show that besides the basic hold-up mechanism there are other mechanisms such as ex-ante bargaining power and the degree of pledgeable income that drive the allocation of exit rights. JEL Classification: G24, G34, D80
Some of the most widely expressed myths about the German financial system are concerned with the close ties and intensive interaction between banks and firms, often described as Hausbank relationships. Links between banks and firms include direct shareholdings, board representation, and proxy voting and are particularly significant for corporate governance. Allegedly, these relationships promote investment and improve the performance of firms. Furthermore, German universal banks are believed to play a special role as large and informed monitoring investors (shareholders). However, for the very same reasons, German universal banks are frequently accused of abusing their influence on firms by exploiting rents and sustaining the entrenchment of firms against efficient transfers of firm control. In this paper, we review recent empirical evidence regarding the special role of banks for the corporate governance of German firms. We differentiate between large exchangelisted firms and small and medium sized companies throughout. With respect to the role of banks as monitoring investors, the evidence does not unanimously support a special role of banks for large firms. Only one study finds that banks´ control of management goes beyond what nonbank shareholders achieve. Proxyvoting rights apparently do not provide a significant means for banks to exert management control. Most of the recent evidence regarding small firms suggests that a Hausbank relationship can indeed be beneficial. Hausbanks are more willing to sustain financing when borrower quality deteriorates, and they invest more often than arm´s length banks in workouts if borrowers face financial distress.
Universal banking means that banks are permitted to offer all of the various kinds of financial services. This includes classical banking activities like the credit and deposit business, as well as investment services, placement and brokerage of securities, and even insurance activities, trading in real estate and others. German universal banks also hold stock in nonfinancial firms and offer to vote their clients' shares in other firms. This paper deals with universal banks and their role in the investment business, more specifically, their links with investment companies and their various roles as shareholders and providers of financial services to such companies. Banks and investment companies have, as financial intermediaries, one trait in common: they both transform capital of investors (depositors and shareholders of investment funds, respectively) into funds (loans and equity or debt securities, respectively) that are channeled to other firms. So why should a regulation forbid to combine these transformation tasks in one institution or group, and why should the law not allow banks to establish investment companies and provide all kinds of financial services to them in addition to their banking services? German banking and investment company law have answered these questions in the affirmative. This paper argues that the existing regulation is not a sound and recommendable one. The paper is organized as follows: Sections II - V identify four areas where the combination of banking and investment might either harm the shareholders of the investment funds and/or negatively affect other constituencies such as the shareholders of the banking institution. These sections will at the same time explore whether there are institutional or regulatory provisions in place or market forces at work that adequately protect investors and the other constituencies in question. Concluding remarks follow (VI.).
This paper analyzes empirically the distribution of unemployment durations in West- Germany before and after the changes during the mid 1980s in the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits for elderly unemployed. The analysis is based on the comprehensive IAB employment subsample containing register panel data for about 500.000 individuals in West Germany. We analyze two proxies for unemployment since the data do not precisely measure unemployment in an economic sense. We provide a theoretical analysis of the link between the durations of nonemployment and of unemployment between jobs. Our empirical analysis finds significant changes in the distributions of nonemployment durations for older unemployed individuals. At the same time, the distribution of unemployment durations between jobs did not change in response to the reforms. Our findings are consistent with an interpretation that many firms and workers used the more bene cial laws as a part of early retirement packages but those workers who were still looking for a job did not reduce their search effort in response to the extension of the maximum entitlement periods. This interpretation is consistent with our theoretical model under plausible assumptions. JEL: C24, J64, J65
This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 160 non venture-backed, 79 venture-backed and 61 bridge financed companies going public at Germany´s Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2002. I examine whether these three types of issues differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This analysis provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VC-backed IPOs.
This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 108 non venture-backed, 58 venture-backed and 33 bridge financed companies going public at Germany s Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2000. I examine whether these three types of issues differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This study provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VCbacked IPOs.
The relations between Turkey and Germany have a long history that involves collaboration and partnership in many areas. After 1960s, this relationship gained a new dimension as hundreds of thousands of Turkish workers immigrated to Germany. This paper presents a brief history of the relations between the two countries, and the cultural and language-related problems experienced by Turkish people in Germany. More specifically, it focuses on the background and current state of the Turkish Language and Culture course taught to the Turkish youth in German schools. Problems regarding the implementation of this course are discussed with reference to official statistics. Finally, suggestions are offered to address the challenges faced to improve the Turkish Language and Culture course so that Turkish children can successfully learn their origin-language, and eventually achieve competence in both Turkish and German in their academic studies.
We first analyze legal provisions relating to corporate transparency in Germany. We show that despite the new securities trading law (WpHG) of 1995, the practical efficacy of disclosure regulation is very low. On the one hand, the formation of business groups involving less regulated legal forms as intermediate layers can substantially reduce transparency. On the other hand, the implementation of the law is not practical and not very effective. We illustrate these arguments using several examples of WpHG filings. To illustrate the importance of transparency, we show next that German capital markets are dominated by few large firms accounting for most of the market’s capitalization and trading volume. Moreover, the concentration of control is very high. First, 85% of all officially listed AGs have a dominant shareholder (controlling more than 25% of the voting rights). Second, few large blockholders control several deciding voting blocks in listed corporations, while the majority controls only one block.
Public employee pension systems throughout the developed world have traditionally been of the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) defined benefit (DB) variety, where pensioner payments are financed by taxes (contributions) levied on the working generation. But as the number of retirees rises relative to the working-age group, such systems have begun to face financial distress. This trend has been exacerbated in many countries, among them Germany, by high unemployment rates producing further deterioration of the contribution base. In the long run, public sector pension benefits will have to be cut or contributions increased, if the systems are to be maintained. An alternative path sometimes offered to ease the crunch of paying for public employee pensions is to move toward funding: here, plan assets are gradually built up, invested, and enhanced returns devoted to partly defray civil servants’ pension costs. In this study, we evaluate the impact of introducing partial prefunding, paired with a strategic investment policy for the German federal state of Hesse. The analysis assesses the impact of introducing a supplementary tax-sponsored pension fund whose contributions are invested in the capital market and used to relieve the state budget from (some) pension payments. Our model determines the expectation and the Conditional Value-at-Risk of economic pension costs using a stochastic simulation process for pension plan assets. This approach simultaneously determines the optimal contribution rate and asset allocation that controls the expected economic costs of providing the promised pensions, while at the same time controlling investment risk. Specifically, we offer answers to the following questions: 1. How can the plan be designed to control cash-flow shortfall risk, so as to mitigate the potential burden borne by future generations of taxpayers? 2. What is the optimal asset allocation for this fund as it is built up, to generate a maximum return while simultaneously restricting capital market and liability risk? 3. What are reasonable combinations of annual contribution rates and asset allocation to a state-managed pension fund, which will limit costs of providing promised public sector pensions? We anticipate that this research will interest several sorts of policymaker groups. First, focusing on the German case, the state and Federal governments should find it relevant, as these entities face considerable public sector pension liabilities. Second, our findings will also be of interest to other European countries, as most have substantial underfunded defined benefit plans for civil servants. In what follows, we first offer a brief description of the structure of civil servant pensions in Germany, focusing on their benefit formulas, their financing, and the resulting current as well as future plan obligations for taxpayers. Next, we turn to an analysis of the actuarial status of the Hesse civil servants’ pension plan and evaluate how much would have to be contributed to fund this plan in a nonstochastic context. Subsequently we evaluate the asset-liability and decision-making process from the viewpoint of the plan sponsor, to determine sensible plan asset allocation behavior. A final section summarizes findings and implications.
This chapter analyzes the role of financial accounting in the German financial system. It starts from the common perception that German accounting is rather "uninformative". This characterization is appropriate from the perspective of an arm´s length or outside investor and when confined to the financial statements per se. But it is no longer accurate when a broader perspective is adopted. The German accounting system exhibits several arrangements that privately communicate information to insiders, notably the supervisory board. Due to these features, the key financing and contracting parties seem reasonably well informed. The same cannot be said about outside investors relying primarily on public disclosure. A descriptive analysis of the main elements of the Germany system and a survey of extant empirical accounting research generally support these arguments.
For the German observer the idea of a Company repurchasing its own shares seems to resemble the picture of a snake eating its own tail. It appears to be highly unnatura1 and one wonders how the tail tan possibly be eatable for the snake. Not in the United States. Although repurchases have once been subject to the most stubbornly fought conflict in US Company law only some modest disclosure requirements and safeguards against overt market manipulation exist today. Large repurchases are an almost everyday event and there is an increasing tendency. The aggregate value of shares repurchased by NYSE listed companies has increased from $ 1 .l billion in 1975 to $ 6.3 billion in 1982 to $ 37.1 billion in 1985*. Few examples may illustrate this practice further: Within three years Ford Motor Corp. repurchased 30 million shares for $ 1.2 billion. In 1985 Phillips Petroleum Corp. was faced with two hostile bids and took several defensive Steps, one of which was to tender for 20 million of its own shares at a total tost of $ 1 billion. And by the end of 1988 Exxon Corp. retired 28 percent of its shares that had once been outstanding at an aggregate tost of $ 14.5 billion. The Situation in Germany is completely different. As it will be shown under German law repurchases are severely restricted and do appreciable amount at all. not take place at an In contrast to German law the United Kingdom does not prohibit repurchases but requires companies to comply with such complex rules that US companies would regard simply as limiting their economic freedom. Therefore UK companies very seldom repurchase their own shares, too. This Paper deals with repurchases by quoted companies, in particular the UK public Company and the more or less German equivalent, the Aktiengesellschaft (AG). It seeks to ascertain the reasons why companies might want to engage in those activities. Moreover, it tries to analyse the Problems which may arise from repurchases and the safeguards which the UK and German legal Systems provide for these Problems.This Paper deals with repurchases by quoted companies, in particular the UK public Company and the more or less German equivalent, the Aktiengesellschaft (AG). It seeks to ascertain the reasons why companies might want to engage in those activities. Moreover, it tries to analyse the Problems which may arise from repurchases and the safeguards which the UK and German legal Systems provide for these Problems.
We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.
The previous proposal for a company law directive on takeovers in 1990 was rejected in Germany almost unanimously for several different reasons. The new "slimmed down" draft proposal, in the light of the subsidiarity principle, takes the different approaches to investorprotection in the various member states better into account. Notably, the most controversial principle of the previous draft, viz. the mandatory bid rule as the only means of investorprotection in case of a change of control, has been given up. Therefore a much higher degree of acceptance seems likely. The Bundesrat (upper house) and the industry associations have already expressed their consent; the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) will deal with the proposal shortly. The technique of a "frame directive" leaves ample leeway for the member states. That will shift the discussion back to the national level and there will lead to the question as to how to make use of this leeway (cf. II, III, below) rather than to a debate about principles as in the past. It seems likely that criticism will confine itself to more technical questions (cf. IV, below).