Refine
Year of publication
- 2008 (137) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (137) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (137) (remove)
Keywords
- USA (7)
- Deutschland (6)
- Bank (5)
- Geldpolitik (5)
- Lambda-Kalkül (5)
- Operationale Semantik (5)
- Programmiersprache (5)
- Haushalt (4)
- Liquidität (4)
- Aging (3)
Institute
The reaction of consumer spending and debt to tax rebates – evidence from consumer credit data
(2008)
We use a new panel dataset of credit card accounts to analyze how consumer responded to the 2001 Federal income tax rebates. We estimate the monthly response of credit card payments, spending, and debt, exploiting the unique, randomized timing of the rebate disbursement. We find that, on average, consumers initially saved some of the rebate, by increasing their credit card payments and thereby paying down debt. But soon afterwards their spending increased, counter to the canonical Permanent-Income model. Spending rose most for consumers who were initially most likely to be liquidity constrained, whereas debt declined most (so saving rose most) for unconstrained consumers. More generally, the results suggest that there can be important dynamics in consumers’ response to “lumpy” increases in income like tax rebates, working in part through balance sheet (liquidity) mechanisms.
After the pioneering German “Aktiengesetz” of 1965 and the Brazilian “Lei das Sociedades Anónimas” of 1976, Portugal has become the third country in the world to enact a specific regulation on groups of companies. The Code of Commercial Companies (“Código das Sociedades Comerciais”, abbreviately hereinafter CSC), enacted in 1986, contains a unitary set of rules regulating the relationships between companies, in general, and the groups of companies, in particular (arts. 481° to 508°-E CSC). With this set of rules, the Portuguese legislator has dealt with one of the major topics of modern Company Law. While this branch of law is traditionally conceived as the law of the individual company, modern economic reality is characterized by the massive emergence of large-scale enterprise networks, where parts of a whole business are allocated and insulated in several legally independent companies submitted to an unified economic direction. As Tom HADDEN put it: “Company lawyers still write and talk as if the single independent company, with its shareholders, directors and employees, was the norm. In reality, the individual company ceased to be the most significant form of organization in the 1920s and 1930s. The commercial world is now dominated both nationally and internationally by complex groups of companies”. This trend, which is now observable in any of the largest economies in the world, holds also true for small markets such as Portugal. Although Portuguese economy is still dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, the organizational structure of the group has always been extremely common. During the 70s, it was estimated that the seven largest groups of companies owned about 50% of the equity capital of all domestic enterprises and were alone responsible for 3/4 of the internal national product. Such a trend has continued and even highlighted in the next decades, surviving to different political and economic scenarios: during the 80s, due to the process of state nationalization of these groups, an enormous public group with more than one thousand controlled companies has been created (“IPE - Instituto de Participações do Estado”); and during the 90s until today, thanks to the reprivatisation movement and the opening of our national market, we assisted to the re-emergence of some large private groups, composed of several hundred subsidiaries each, some of which are listed in foreign stock exchange markets (e.g., in the banking sector, “BCP – Banco Comercial Português”, in the industrial area, “SONAE”, and in the media and communication area, “Portugal-Telecom”).
Ensuring financial stability : financial structure and the impact of monetary policy on asset prices
(2008)
This paper studies the responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 1986-2006. We estimate VARs for individual economies and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries on the basis of the characteristics of their financial systems. The results suggest that using monetary policy to offset asset price movements in order to guard against financial instability may have large effects on economic activity. Furthermore, while financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset prices, its importance appears limited. Keywords: asset prices, monetary policy, panel VAR. JEL Number: C23, E52
We study the responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 1986-2006, using single-country VARs and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries depending on their financial systems. The effect of monetary policy on property prices is about three times as large as its impact on GDP. Using monetary policy to guard against financial instability by offsetting asset-price movements thus has sizable effects on economic activity. While the financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset prices, its importance appears limited.
Recently, the Bank of Japan outlined a “two perspectives” approach to the conduct of monetary policy that focuses on risks to price stability over different time horizons. Interpreting this as pertaining to different frequency bands, we use band spectrum regression to study the determination of inflation in Japan. We find that inflation is related to money growth and real output growth at low frequencies and the output gap at higher frequencies. Moreover, this relationship reflects Granger causality from money growth and the output gap to inflation in the relevant frequency bands. Keywords: spectral regression, frequency domain, Phillips curve, quantity theory. JEL Numbers: C22, E3, E5
Im Normalfall, in dem Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat den Jahresabschluß feststellen (vgl. § 172 AktG), können sie einen Teil des Jahresüberschusses, höchstens jedoch die Hälfte, in „andere Gewinnrücklagen“1 einstellen (§ 58 Abs. 2 S. 1 AktG). Die Satzung kann Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat zur Einstellung eines größeren oder kleineren Teils des Jahresüberschusses ermächtigen; allerdings darf die Verwaltung aufgrund einer solchen Satzungsbestimmung keine Beträge in andere Gewinnrücklagen einstellen, wenn die anderen Gewinnrücklagen die Hälfte des Grundkapitals übersteigen oder soweit sie nach der Einstellung die Hälfte übersteigen würden (§ 58 Abs. 2 S. 2, 3 AktG). Nach § 58 Abs. 3 AktG kann die Hauptversammlung sodann in ihrem Beschluß über die Verwendung des Bilanzgewinns (vgl. § 174 AktG) weitere Beträge in Gewinnrücklagen einstellen oder als Gewinn vortragen. Im Folgenden werden nach einer Sichtung wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Erwägungen zu Thesaurierung und Ausschüttung (unten II.) die Pflichten und die Kontrolle der Entscheidungen über die Gewinnverwendung von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat einerseits (unten III.) und der Hauptversammlung andererseits (unten IV.) erörtert. V. faßt die Ergebnisse zusammen. Die besonderen Rechtsfragen, die sich bei Rücklagenbildung in abhängigen Gesellschaften ergeben, werden nicht behandelt.
In meinem Vortrag habe ich mich mit den eher technischen Bestimmungen des Referentenentwurfs des Schuldverschreibungsgesetzes zu den Anforderungen an die Beschlüsse der Gläubigerversammlung und vor allem mit ihrer gerichtlichen Kontrolle zu befassen. Diese technischen Fragen lassen sich freilich nicht ganz von den Fragen trennen, die Gegenstand der Referate zu den Befugnissen der Gläubigerversammlung und zu den Anleihebedingungen sind. Ich werde mir also gewisse Grenzüberschreitungen insbesondere auf die Gebiete der zu diesen Themen speziell vorgesehenen Referate zuschulden kommen lassen und bitte hierfür schon jetzt um Nachsicht. Mit Anmerkungen versehene Fassung eines Vortrags auf dem Seminar des Deutschen Aktieninstituts „Die Novellierung des Schuldverschreibungsrechts“ am 16. 9. 2008. Die Vortragsform ist beibehalten.
Am 27. und 28. September des vergangenen Jahres hat auf Initiative von Prof. Paul Krüger Andersen, Dänemark,1 und des Verfassers in Aarhus/Dänemark das erste Treffen der Arbeitsgruppe stattgefunden, die sich zum Ziel gesetzt hat, einen „European Model Company Law Act“ (EMCLA) zu entwickeln. Dieses Projekt soll im Folgenden vorgestellt werden. Es zielt weder auf eine zwingende Harmonisierung der nationalen Gesellschaftsrechte noch auf die Schaffung einer weiteren europäischen Gesellschaftsform ab. Ziel ist vielmehr, Modellregeln für eine Kapitalgesellschaft, zunächst die Aktiengesellschaft, zu entwerfen, die von den nationalen Gesetzgebern ganz oder zum Teil übernommen werden können. Damit tritt das Vorhaben als Alternative und Ergänzung neben die vorhandenen Instrumente der Gesellschaftsrechtsangleichung in der Europäischen Union. Darauf ist im Folgenden zunächst einzugehen (II.). Ein weiterer Abschnitt weist auf die US-amerikanischen Erfahrungen mit solchen einheitlichen „Modellgesetzen“ im Bereich des Gesellschaftsrechts hin (III.). Der letzte Teil spricht dann ausgewählte Einzelprobleme an, die sich bei der Entwicklung eines EMCLA ergeben, stellt die Arbeitsgruppe vor und erläutert ihren vorläufigen Arbeitsplan (IV.).
Sur initiative du Professeur Paul Krüger Andersen, Danemark, et de l’auteur du présent article1, les 27 et 28 septembre 2007 a eu lieu au Danemark la première réunion d’une commission qui s’est fixé comme objectif la conception d’un European Model Company Law Act (EMCLA). Le projet sera décrit dans ce qui suit. Il ne vise ni l’harmonisation impérative des droits des sociétés nationaux ni la création d’une forme supplémentaire de société européenne. Le but est d’élaborer des normes modèles pour les sociétés de capitaux, dans un premier temps pour la société anonyme, qui pourraient être reprises tout ou en partie par les législateurs nationaux. Le projet doit donc être conçu comme une alternative ou un complément aux instruments existants d’harmonisation légale au niveau communautaire (II.). Il convient par la suite de décrire l’expérience américaine avec de telles « lois modèles » en matière de droit des sociétés (III.). Enfin une ébauche des problèmes spécifiques auxquels se heurtera le EMCLA sera faite tandis que seront exposés la composition et le plan de travail de la commission (IV.).
On 27 and 28 September 2007, a commission formed on the initiative of the authors held its first meeting in Aarhus, Denmark to deliberate on its goal of drafting a "European Model Company Law Act" (EMCLA). This project, outlined in the following pages, aims neither to force a mandatory harmonization of national company law nor to create a further, European corporate form. The goal is rather to draft model rules for a corporation that national legislatures would be free to adopt in whole or in part. Thus, the project is thought as an alternative and supplement to the existing EU instruments for the convergence of company law. The present EU instruments, their prerequisites and limits will be discussed in more detail in Part II, below. Part III will examine the US experience with such "model acts" in the area of company law. Part IV will then conclude by discussing several topics concerning the content of an EMCLA, introducing the members of the EMCLA Working Group, and explaining the Group's preliminary working plan.
Research with Keynesian-style models has emphasized the importance of the output gap for policies aimed at controlling inflation while declaring monetary aggregates largely irrelevant. Critics, however, have argued that these models need to be modified to account for observed money growth and inflation trends, and that monetary trends may serve as a useful cross-check for monetary policy. We identify an important source of monetary trends in form of persistent central bank misperceptions regarding potential output. Simulations with historical output gap estimates indicate that such misperceptions may induce persistent errors in monetary policy and sustained trends in money growth and inflation. If interest rate prescriptions derived from Keynesian-style models are augmented with a cross-check against money-based estimates of trend inflation, inflation control is improved substantially.
This paper discusses the effect of capital regulation on the risk taking behavior of commercial banks. We first theoretically show that capital regulation works differently in different market structures of banking sectors. In lowly concentrated markets, capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking behavior because banks' franchise values are low and banks have incentives to pursue risky strategies in order to increase their franchise values. If franchise values are high, on the other hand, the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking is ambiguous as banks lack those incentives. We then test the model predictions on a cross-country sample including 421 commercial banks from 61 countries. We find that capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking only in markets with a low degree of concentration. The results remain robust after accounting for financial sector development, legal system effciency, and for other country and bank-specific characteristics. Keywords: Banks, market structure, risk shifting, franchise value, capital regulation
Previous evidence suggests that less liquid stocks entail higher average returns. Using NYSE data, we present evidence that both the sensitivity of returns to liquidity and liquidity premia have significantly declined over the past four decades to levels that we cannot statistically distinguish from zero. Furthermore, the profitability of trading strategies based on buying illiquid stocks and selling illiquid stocks has declined over the past four decades, rendering such strategies virtually unprofitable. Our results are robust to several conventional liquidity measures related to volume. When using liquidity measure that is not related to volume, we find just weak evidence of a liquidity premium even in the early periods of our sample. The gradual introduction and proliferation of index funds and exchange traded funds is a possible explanation for these results.
We document significant and robust empirical relationships in cross-country panel data between government size or social expenditure on the one hand, and trade and financial development indicators on the other. Across countries, deeper economic integration is associated with more intense government redistribution, but more developed financial markets weaken that relationship. Over time, controlling for country-specific effects, public social expenditure appears to be eroded by globalization trends where financial market development can more easily substitute for it.
In this paper, we investigate how bank mergers affect bank revenues and present empirical evidence that mergers among banks have a substantial and persistent negative impact on merging banks’ revenues. We refer to merger related negative effects on banks’ revenues as dissynergies and suggest that they are a result of organizational diseconomies, the loss of customers and the temporary distraction of management from day-to-day operations by effecting the merger. For our analyses we draw on a proprietary data set with detailed financials of all 457 regional savings banks in Germany, which have been involved in 212 mergers between 1994 and 2006. We find that the negative impact of a merger on net operating revenues amounts to 3% of pro-forma consolidated banks’ operating profits and persists not only for the year of the merger but for up to four years post-merger. Only thereafter mergers exhibit a significantly superior performance compared to their respective pre-merger performance or the performance of their non-merging peers. The magnitude and persistence of merger related revenue dissynergies highlight their economic relevance. Previous research on post-merger performance mainly focuses on the effects from mergers on banks’ (cost) efficiency and profitability but fails to provide clear and consistent results. We are the first, to our knowledge, to examine the post-merger performance of banks’ net operating revenues and to empirically verify significant negative implications of mergers for banks’ net operating revenues. We propose that our finding of negative merger related effects on banks’ operating revenues is the reason why previous research fails to show merger related gains.
In this paper, we examine the impact of mergers among German savings banks on the extent to which these savings banks engage in small business lending. The ongoing consolidation in the banking industry has sparked concerns about the continuous availability of credit to small businesses which has been further fueled by empirical studies that partly confirm a reduction in small business lending in the aftermath of mergers. However, using a proprietary data set of German savings banks we find strong evidence that in Germany merging savings banks do not significantly change the extent to which they lend to small businesses compared to prior to the merger or compared to the contemporaneous lending by non-merging banks. We investigate the merger related effects on small business lending in Germany from a bank-level perspective. Furthermore, we estimate small business lending and its continuous adjustment process simultaneously using recent General Method of Moments (GMM) techniques for panel data as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Heiner Boehncke beschreibt in seinem kurzen Aufsatz die Entwicklung des Kulturprojekts >Literaturland Hessen<, das mittlerweile zum Begriff geworden ist und über Hessen hinaus für gelungene Kultur-Kooperation steht. Heute handelt es sich bei dem Projekt >Literaturland Hessen< um eine Kooperation des Hessischen Rundfunks mit dem Hessischen Ministerium für Wissenschaft und Kultur, dem ADAC Hessen/Thüringen, dem Hessischen Literaturrat und der Kulturstiftung der Sparkassen Hessen/Thüringen.
The market reaction to legal shocks and their antidotes : lessons from the sovereign debt market
(2008)
This Article examines the market reaction to a series of legal events concerning the judicial interpretation of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments. More generally, the Article provides insights into the reactions of investors (predominantly financial institutions), issuers (sovereigns), and those who draft bond covenants (lawyers), to unanticipated changes in the judicial interpretation of certain covenant terms.
Der Verkauf von Immobiliendarlehen sorgt nach wie vor für Aufregung. Die Kreditwirtschaft sieht sich mit vehementen öffentlichen Vorwürfen konfrontiert, die den Kredithandel beeinträchtigen. Die Kreditinstitute werden indes nicht müde in ihren Beteuerungen, ordnungsgemäß bediente Kredite nicht an Finanzinvestoren zu veräußern und dabei hinzunehmen, dass ihre Kreditnehmer ihrer Wohnimmobilie verlustig gehen. Die praktische Bedeutung des Kredithandels ist gerade in Deutschland immens. Exemplarisch genannt sei als eine der größten bisherigen Transaktionen der Ende 2007 erfolgte Erwerb eines 53.000 Immobiliarkredite umfassenden Portfolios im Volumen von ca. 4,3 Mrd. Euro durch die ING Diba von der Hypo Real Estate. Unter der Überschrift "Verbesserte Transparenz bei Verkäufen von Kreditforderungen" hat die Bundesregierung um die letzte Jahreswende ein Maßnahmenpaket vorgelegt, mit dem auf Missbrauchsfälle beim Verkauf von Krediten reagiert werden soll. Inzwischen ist die Diskussion fortgeschritten, weitere Reformvorschläge sind in der Welt. Dabei sind die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen von Kreditverkäufen de lege lata auch nach einer einschlägigen BGH-Entscheidung vom 27. Februar 2007 noch immer nicht abschließend geklärt. Bevor in nachfolgendem Beitrag die aktuellen Reformansätze vorgestellt und einer kurzen Bewertung unterzogen werden, seien daher die derzeitige Praxis und Rechtslage untersucht.
Purim and parodies
(2008)
We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using a large sample of firm-level data. Our estimates show that information sharing is associated with improved availability and lower cost of credit to firms. This correlation is stronger for opaque firms than transparent ones and stronger in countries with weak legal environments than in those with strong legal environments. In cross-sectional estimates, we control for variation in country-level aggregate variables that may affect credit, by examining the differential impact of information sharing across firm types. In panel estimates, we also control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as for changes in macroeconomic variables and the legal environment.
Die politische Steuerung des Krankenhaussektors hat sich in den vergangenen anderthalb Jahrzehnten nachhaltig verändert. Das Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz von 1992 markiert einen gesundheitspolitischen Paradigmenwechsel, mit dem verstärkt wettbewerbliche Steuerungsinstrumente in das Gesundheitswesen eingeführt wurden. Auch im stationären Sektor ersetzen bzw. ergänzen wettbewerbliche Instrumente korporatistische Arrangements. Die Gegenüberstellung der politischen Steuerung des Krankenhaussektors vor 1992 mit der Situation nach der Gesundheitsreform 2007 verdeutlicht, dass auf den Feldern Leistungserbringung, Vergütung und Qualitätssicherung sukzessive ein neues Steuerungsmodell entstanden ist. Dieses zeichnet sich durch eine gewachsene Komplexität, eine Zunahme von Steuerungsaktivitäten und eine Neujustierung des Verhältnisses staatlicher bzw. korporatistischer Steuerung einerseits und wettbewerblicher Steuerung andererseits aus. Dort, wo es um allokative Entscheidungen geht, werden korporatistische Elemente durch wettbewerbliche ersetzt. Auf anderen Regulierungsfelder bleibt der Korporatismus dagegen erhalten. Der Staat als „architect of political order“ (Anderson) hat diese Transformation herbeigeführt, sieht sich allerdings zunehmend mit dem Widerspruch zwischen einer bedarfsorientierten Krankenhausplanung und Investitionsfinanzierung auf Landesebene und einer Leistungsverteilung über den Wettbewerb konfrontiert.
Das MoMiG hat einerseits die bilanzgestützte aktien- und GmbH-rechtliche Vermögensbindung gelockert, andererseits aber in Gestalt des Verbots von Zahlungen an Aktionäre, die zur Zahlungsunfähigkeit der Gesellschaft führen müssen, einen gesetzlichen Liquiditätsschutz eingeführt. Der Beitrag lotet Voraussetzungen und Grenzen dieses Zahlungsverbots aus. Zusammenfassung Der Liquiditätsschutz durch das Zahlungsverbot nach § 92 Abs. 2 S. 3 AktG ergänzt die auf die Erhaltung des bilanziellen Vermögens gerichtete Vermögensbindung durch § 57 AktG. Anders als die Vermögensbindung gilt das Zahlungsverbot unabhängig davon, ob der Zahlungsempfänger eine gleichwertige Gegenleistung erbringt. Wegen der andersartigen Schutzrichtung des Zahlungsverbots bleibt seine Geltung unberührt durch Lockerungen der Vermögensbindung im Vertragskonzern und im faktischen Konzern. Anders als der weite Wortlaut der Vorschrift nahe legt, gilt das Zahlungsverbot des § 92 Abs. 2 S. 3 AktG nicht für jede Zahlung an einen Gläubiger, der zugleich Aktien der zahlenden AG besitzt. Seine Anwendung setzt vielmehr voraus, dass die Zahlung oder das ihr zugrunde liegende Geschäft gerade auf der Aktionärseigenschaft des Empfängers beruht oder sich dies jedenfalls nicht ausschließen lässt, oder dass die Zahlung auf einen Anspruch erfolgt, der nach § 39 Abs. 1 Nr. 5, Abs. 5 InsO in der Insolvenz der Gesellschaft nur nachrangig zu befriedigen wäre.
Wertpapierleihgeschäfte gehören heute zum Standardrepertoire bei der Durchführung von Kapitalmarkttransaktionen. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, welche Möglichkeiten solche Geschäfte im Hinblick auf eigene Aktien bieten und welche Grenzen §§ 71 ff. AktG ihrem Einsatz bei eigenen Aktien ziehen.
Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2007), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available. We show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for banks ex ante are a crucial requirement for sensible lender of last resort policy. In addition, we analyse the impact of equity requirements and narrow banking, in the sense that banks are required to hold sufficient liquid funds so as to pay out in all contingencies. We show that such a policy is strictly inferior to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender of last resort policy.
Based on a unique dataset of legislative changes in industrial countries, we identify events that strengthen the competition control of mergers and acquisitions, analyze their impact on banks and non-financial firms and explain the different reactions observed with specific regulatory characteristics of the banking sector. Covering nineteen countries for the period 1987 to 2004, we find that more competition-oriented merger control increases the stock prices of banks and decreases the stock prices of non-financial firms. Bank targets become more profitable and larger, while those of non-financial firms remain mostly unaffected. A major determinant of the positive bank returns is the degree of opaqueness that characterizes the institutional setup for supervisory bank merger reviews. The legal design of the supervisory control of bank mergers may therefore have important implications for real activity.
We estimate the degree of 'stickiness' in aggregate consumption growth (sometimes interpreted as reflecting consumption habits) for thirteen advanced economies. We find that, after controlling for measurement error, consumption growth has a high degree of autocorrelation, with a stickiness parameter of about 0.7 on average across countries. The sticky-consumption-growth model outperforms the random walk model of Hall (1978), and typically fits the data better than the popular Campbell and Mankiw (1989) model. In several countries, the sticky-consumption-growth and Campbell-Mankiw models work about equally well.
We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors. Thus, investors’ average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price information can implement the fraction of insiders that maximizes investors’ average welfare. This market features a high price to curb excessive acquisition of ticker information. We also show that informational efficiency is greater when the dissemination of ticker information is broader and more timely.
Inhalt: 1. Gesellschaftsrecht als neues Rechtgebiet für die Rechtsordnungen der GUS: 1 2. Besonderheiten der AG in den Staaten der GUS 4 3. Ausgewählte Probleme des Aktienrechts 6 a. Corporate Governance 6 b. Haftung der Organe 7 c. Aktionärsrechte, vor allem Auskunftsrechte 9 d. Große Geschäfte – krupnie sdelki 10 e. Verträge mit Interessiertheit 12 4. Reform des Aktienrechts 13 a. Entscheidung der interparlamentarischen Versammlung 13 b. Grundlagen des neuen Konzeptes zu einem Modell-Aktiengesetz 14 c. Vorschläge des Konzeptes zu oben erwähnten Problemen 17 Zusammenfassung 19 Zusammenfassung: Allein die kurze Schilderung der Entwicklung des Gesellschaftsrechts in den GUS-Staaten zeigt die Notwendigkeit der Reformen auf diesem Gebiet. Wichtig ist, dass die Länder, die traditionell zur kontinental-europäischen Rechtsfamilie gehören, im Rahmen dieser Familie bleiben. Die kritiklose und bedingungslose Übernahme der Institute der Common-Law-Tradition hat für zahlreiche Irritationen und Verwirrungen gesorgt. Die Korrektur dieser Missentwicklungen kann als große Herausforderung der Reform des Aktienrechts der Staaten der GUS bezeichnet werden.
We explore the pattern of elderly homeownership using microeconomic surveys of 15 OECD countries, merging 60 national household surveys on about 300,000 individuals. In all countries the survey is repeated over time, permitting construction of an international dataset of repeated cross-sectional data. We find that ownership rates decline considerably after age 60 in all countries. However, a large part of the decline depends on cohort effects. Adjusting for them, we find that ownership rates start falling after age 70 and reach a percentage point per year decline after age 75. We find that differences across country ownership trajectories are correlated with indicators measuring the degree of market regulations.
We investigate, using the 2002 US Health and Retirement Study, the factors influencing individuals’ insecurity and expectations about terrorism, and study the effects these last have on households’ portfolio choices and spending patterns. We find that females, the religiously devout, those equipped with a better memory, the less educated, and those living close to where the events of September 2001 took place worry a lot about their safety. In addition, fear of terrorism discourages households from investing in stocks, mostly through the high levels of insecurity felt by females. Insecurity due to terrorism also makes single men less likely to own a business. Finally, we find evidence of expenditure shifting away from recreational activities that can potentially leave one exposed to a terrorist attack and towards goods that might help one cope with the consequences of terrorism materially (increased use of car and spending on the house) or psychologically (spending on personal care products by females in couples).
This paper documents and studies sources of international differences in participation and holdings in stocks, private businesses, and homes among households aged 50+ in the US, England, and eleven continental European countries, using new internationally comparable, household-level data. With greater integration of asset and labor markets and policies, households of given characteristics should be holding more similar portfolios for old age. We decompose observed differences across the Atlantic, within the US, and within Europe into those arising from differences: a) in the distribution of characteristics and b) in the influence of given characteristics. We find that US households are generally more likely to own these assets than their European counterparts. However, European asset owners tend to hold smaller real, PPP-adjusted amounts in stocks and larger in private businesses and primary residence than US owners at comparable points in the distribution of holdings, even controlling for differences in configuration of characteristics. Differences in characteristics often play minimal or no role. Differences in market conditions are much more pronounced among European countries than among US regions, suggesting significant potential for further integration.
We study the relation between cognitive abilities and stockholding using the recent Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which has detailed data on wealth and portfolio composition of individuals aged 50+ in 11 European countries and three indicators of cognitive abilities: mathematical, verbal fluency, and recall skills. We find that the propensity to invest in stocks is strongly associated with cognitive abilities, for both direct stock market participation and indirect participation through mutual funds and retirement accounts. Since the decision to invest in less information-intensive assets (such as bonds) is less strongly related to cognitive abilities, we conclude that the association between cognitive abilities and stockholding is driven by information constraints, rather than by features of preferences or psychological traits.
Reform of the securities class action is once again the subject of national debate. The impetus for this debate is the reports of three different groups – The Committee on Capital Market Regulation, The Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets In the 21st Century, and McKinsey & Company. Each of the reports focuses on a single theme: how the contemporary regulatory culture places U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage to foreign markets. While multiple regulatory forces are targeted by each report’s call for reform, each of the reports singles out securities class actions as one of the prime villains that place U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage. The reports’ recommendations range from insignificant changes to drastic curtailments of private class actions. Surprisingly, these current-day cries echo calls for reform heeded by Congress in the not too distant past. Major reform of the securities class action occurred with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.5 Among the PSLRA’s contributions is the introduction of procedures by which the court chooses from among competing petitioners a lead plaintiff for the class. The statute commands that the petitioner with the largest financial loss suffered as a consequence of the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation is presumed to be the most adequate plaintiff. Thus, the lead plaintiff provision supplants the traditional “first to file” rule for selecting the suit’s plaintiff with a mechanism that seeks to harness to the plaintiff’s economic self interest to the suits’ prosecution. Also, by eliminating the race to be the first to file, the lead plaintiff provision seeks to avoid “hair trigger” filings by overly eager plaintiffs’ counsel which Congress believed too frequently gave rise to incomplete and insubstantially pled causes of action. The PSLRA also introduced for securities class actions a heightened pleading requirement8 as well as a bar to the plaintiff obtaining any discovery prior to the district court disposing of the defendants’ motions to dismiss. By introducing the requirement that allegations involving fraud must be plead not only with particularity, but also that the pled facts must establish a “strong inference” of fraud, the PSLRA cast aside, albeit only for securities actions, the much lower notice pleading requirement that has been a fixture of American civil procedure for decades. Substantive changes to the law were also introduced by the PSLRA. With few exceptions, joint and several liability was replaced by proportionate liability so that a particular defendant’s liability is capped by that defendant’s relative degree of fault. Similarly, contribution rights among co-violators are also based on proportionate fault of each defendant. Three years after the PSLRA, Congress returned to the topic again by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act;13 this provision was prompted by aggressive efforts of plaintiff lawyers to bypass the limitations, most notably the bar to discovery and higher pleading requirement, of the PSLRA by bringing suit in state court. Post-SLUSA, securities fraud class actions are exclusively the domain of the federal court. In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums – small relative to the “provable losses” suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendantcompany, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears heavily on the debate over “strike suits.” Part I of this paper sets forth the contemporary debate surrounding the need for further reforms of securities class actions. In this section, we set forth the insights advanced in three prominent reports focused on the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. In Part II we first provide descriptive statistics of our extensive data set, and thenuse multivariate regression analysis to explore the underlying relationships. In Part III, we closely examine small settlements for clues to whether they reflect evidence of strike suits. We conclude in Part IV with a set of policy recommendations based on our analysis of the data. Our goals in this paper are more modest than the Committee Report, the Chamber Report and the McKinsey Report, each of which called for wide-ranging reforms: we focus on how the PSLRA changed securities fraud settlements so as to determine whether the reforms it introduced accomplished at least some of the Act’s important goals. If the PSLRA was successful, and we think it was, then one must be somewhat skeptical of the need for further cutbacks in private securities class action so soon after the Act was passed.
This paper explores the role of trade integration—or openness—for monetary policy transmission in a medium-scale New Keynesian model. Allowing for strategic complementarities in price-setting, we highlight a new dimension of the exchange rate channel by which monetary policy directly impacts domestic inflation. Although the strength of this effect increases with economic openness, it also requires that import prices respond to exchange rate changes. In this case domestic producers find it optimal to adjust their prices to exchange rate changes which alter the domestic currency price of their foreign competitors. We pin down key parameters of the model by matching impulse responses obtained from a vector autoregression on U.S. time series relative to an aggregate of industrialized countries. While we find evidence for strong complementarities, exchange rate pass-through is limited. Openness has therefore little bearing on monetary transmission in the estimated model.
The popular Nelson-Siegel (1987) yield curve is routinely fit to cross sections of intra-country bond yields, and Diebold and Li (2006) have recently proposed a dynamized version. In this paper we extend Diebold-Li to a global context, modeling a potentially large set of country yield curves in a framework that allows for both global and country-specific factors. In an empirical analysis of term structures of government bond yields for the Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S., we find that global yield factors do indeed exist and are economically important, generally explaining significant fractions of country yield curve dynamics, with interesting differences across countries.
We argue for incorporating the financial economics of market microstructure into the financial econometrics of asset return volatility estimation. In particular, we use market microstructure theory to derive the cross-correlation function between latent returns and market microstructure noise, which feature prominently in the recent volatility literature. The cross-correlation at zero displacement is typically negative, and cross-correlations at nonzero displacements are positive and decay geometrically. If market makers are sufficiently risk averse, however, the cross-correlation pattern is inverted. Our results are useful for assessing the validity of the frequently-assumed independence of latent price and microstructure noise, for explaining observed cross-correlation patterns, for predicting as-yet undiscovered patterns, and for making informed conjectures as to improved volatility estimation methods.
Measuring financial asset return and volatilty spillovers, with application to global equity markets
(2008)
We provide a simple and intuitive measure of interdependence of asset returns and/or volatilities. In particular, we formulate and examine precise and separate measures of return spillovers and volatility spillovers. Our framework facilitates study of both non-crisis and crisis episodes, including trends and bursts in spillovers, and both turn out to be empirically important. In particular, in an analysis of nineteen global equity markets from the early 1990s to the present, we find striking evidence of divergent behavior in the dynamics of return spillovers vs. volatility spillovers: Return spillovers display a gently increasing trend but no bursts, whereas volatility spillovers display no trend but clear bursts.
This paper identifies some common errors that occur in comparative law, offers some guidelines to help avoid such errors, and provides a framework for entering into studies of the company laws of three major jurisdictions. The first section illustrates why a conscious approach to comparative company law is useful. Part I discusses some of the problems that can arise in comparative law and offers a few points of caution that can be useful for practical, theoretical and legislative comparative law. Part II discusses some relatively famous examples of comparative analysis gone astray in order to demonstrate the utility of heeding the outlined points of caution. The second section offers a framework for approaching comparative company law. Part III provides an example of using functional definition to demarcate the topic "company law", offering an "effects" test to determine whether a given provision of law should be considered as functionally part of the rules that govern the core characteristics of companies. It does this by presenting the relevant company law statutes and related topical laws of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, using Delaware as a proxy for the 50 states. On the basis of this definition, Part IV analyzes the system of legal functions that comprises "company law" in the United States and the European Union. It selects as the predominant factor for consideration the jurisdictions, sub-jurisdictions and rule-making entities that have legislative or rule-making competence in the relevant territorial unit, analyzes the extent of their power, presents the type of law (rules) they enact (issue), and discusses the concrete manner in which the laws and rules of the jurisdictions and sub-jurisdictions can legally interact. Part V looks at the way these jurisdictions do interact on the temporal axis of history, that is, their actual influence on each other, which in the relevant jurisdictions currently takes the form of regulatory competition and legislative harmonization. The method of the approach outlined in this paper borrows much from system theory. The analysis attempts to be detailed without losing track of the overall jurisdictional framework in the countries studied.
How do fiscal and technology shocks affect real exchange rates? : New evidence for the United States
(2008)
Using vector autoregressions on U.S. time series relative to an aggregate of industrialized countries, this paper provides new evidence on the dynamic effects of government spending and technology shocks on the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. To achieve identification, we derive robust restrictions on the sign of several impulse responses from a two-country general equilibrium model. We find that both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade – whose responses are left unrestricted – depreciate in response to expansionary government spending shocks and appreciate in response to positive technology shocks.
We find and describe four futures markets where the bid-ask spread is bid down to the fixed price tick size practically all the time, and which match counterparties using a pro-rata rule. These four markets´ offered depths at the quotes on average exceed mean market order size by two orders of magnitude, and their order cancellation rates (the probability of any given offered lot being cancelled) are significantly over 96 per cent. We develop a simple theoretical model to ex- plain these facts, where strategic complementarities in the choice of limit order size cause traders to risk overtrading by submitting over-sized limit orders, most of which they expect to cancel.
The future of securitization
(2008)
Securitization is a financial innovation that experiences a boom-bust cycle, as many other innovations before. This paper analyzes possible reasons for the breakdown of primary and secondary securitization markets, and argues that misaligned incentives along the value chain are the primary cause of the problems. The illiquidity of asset and interbank markets, in this view, is a market failure derived from ill-designed mechanisms of coordinating financial intermediaries and investors. Thus, illiquidity is closely related to the design of the financial chains. Our policy conclusions emphasize crisis prevention rather than crisis management, and the objective is to restore a “comprehensive incentive alignment”. The toe-hold for strengthening regulation is surprisingly small. First, we emphasize the importance of equity piece retention for the long-term quality of the underlying asset pool. As a consequence, equity piece allocation needs to be publicly known, alleviating market pricing. Second, on a micro level, accountability of managers can be improved by compensation packages aiming at long term incentives, and penalizing policies with destabilizing effects on financial markets. Third, on a macro level, increased transparency relating to effective risk transfer, risk-related management compensation, and credible measurement of rating performance stabilizes the valuation of financial assets and, hence, improves the solvency of financial intermediaries. Fourth, financial intermediaries, whose risk is opaque, may be subjected to higher capital requirements.