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In an experimental setting in which investors can entrust their money to traders, we investigate how compensation schemes affect liquidity provision and asset prices. Investors face a trade-off between risk and return. At the benefit of a potentially higher return, they can entrust their money to a trader. However this investment is risky, as the trader might not be trustworthy. Alternatively, they can opt for a safe but low return. We study how subjects solve this trade-off when traders are either liable for losses or not, and when their bonuses are either capped or not. Limited liability introduces a conflict of interest because it makes traders value the asset more than investors. To limit losses, investors should thus restrict liquidity provision to force traders to trade at a lower price. By contrast, bonus caps make traders value the asset less than investors. This should encourage liquidity provision and decrease prices. In contrast to these predictions, we find that under limited liability investors contribute to asset price bubbles by increasing liquidity provision and that caps fail to tame bubbles. Overall, giving investors skin in the game fosters financial stability.
The standard view suggests that removing barriers to entry and improving judicial enforcement reduces informality and boosts investment and growth. However, a general equilibrium approach shows that this conclusion may hold to a lesser extent in countries with a constrained supply of funds because of, for example, a more concentrated banking sector or lower financial openness. When the formal sector grows larger in those countries, more entrepreneurs become creditworthy, but the higher pressure on the credit market limits further capital accumulation. We show empirical evidence consistent with these predictions.
Do markets correct individual behavioral biases? In an experimental asset market, we compare the outcomes of a standard market economy to those of a an island economy that removed market interactions. We observe asset price bubbles in the market economy while prices are stable in the island economy. We also find that subjects took more risk following larger losses, resulting in larger prices and consistent with a gambling for resurrection motive. This motive can translate into bubbles in the market economy because higher prices increase average losses and thus reinforce the desire to resurrect. By contrast, the absence of such a strategic complementarity in island economies can explain the more stable outcome. These results suggest that markets do not correct behavioral biases, rather the contrary.