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SAFE Newsletter : 2015, Q2
(2015)
SAFE Newsletter : 2015, Q1
(2015)
SAFE Newsletter : 2015, Q3
(2015)
SAFE Newsletter : 2015, Q4
(2015)
This paper studies the life cycle consumption-investment-insurance problem of a family. The wage earner faces the risk of a health shock that significantly increases his probability of dying. The family can buy long-term life insurance that can only be revised at significant costs, which makes insurance decisions sticky. Furthermore, a revision is only possible as long as the insured person is healthy. A second important feature of our model is that the labor income of the wage earner is unspanned. We document that the combination of unspanned labor income and the stickiness of insurance decisions reduces the long-term insurance demand significantly. This is because an income shock induces the need to reduce the insurance coverage, since premia become less affordable. Since such a reduction is costly and families anticipate these potential costs, they buy less protection at all ages. In particular, young families stay away from long-term life insurance markets altogether. Our results are robust to adding short-term life insurance, annuities and health insurance.
We consider the continuous-time portfolio optimization problem of an investor with constant relative risk aversion who maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth. The risky asset follows a jump-diffusion model with a diffusion state variable. We propose an approximation method that replaces the jumps by a diffusion and solve the resulting problem analytically. Furthermore, we provide explicit bounds on the true optimal strategy and the relative wealth equivalent loss that do not rely on quantities known only in the true model. We apply our method to a calibrated affine model. Our findings are threefold: Jumps matter more, i.e. our approximation is less accurate, if (i) the expected jump size or (ii) the jump intensity is large. Fixing the average impact of jumps, we find that (iii) rare, but severe jumps matter more than frequent, but small jumps.
Based on a cognitive notion of neo-additive capacities reflecting likelihood insensitivity with respect to survival chances, we construct a Choquet Bayesian learning model over the life-cycle that generates a motivational notion of neo-additive survival beliefs expressing ambiguity attitudes. We embed these neo-additive survival beliefs as decision weights in a Choquet expected utility life-cycle consumption model and calibrate it with data on subjective survival beliefs from the Health and Retirement Study. Our quantitative analysis shows that agents with calibrated neo-additive survival beliefs (i) save less than originally planned, (ii) exhibit undersaving at younger ages, and (iii) hold larger amounts of assets in old age than their rational expectations counterparts who correctly assess their survival chances. Our neo-additive life-cycle model can therefore simultaneously accommodate three important empirical findings on household saving behavior.
This paper investigates systemic risk in the insurance industry. We first analyze the systemic contribution of the insurance industry vis-à-vis other industries by applying 3 measures, namely the linear Granger causality test, conditional value at risk and marginal expected shortfall, on 3 groups, namely banks, insurers and non-financial companies listed in Europe over the last 14 years. We then analyze the determinants of the systemic risk contribution within the insurance industry by using balance sheet level data in a broader sample. Our evidence suggests that i) the insurance industry shows a persistent systemic relevance over time and plays a subordinate role in causing systemic risk compared to banks, and that ii) within the industry, those insurers which engage more in non-insurance-related activities tend to pose more systemic risk. In addition, we are among the first to provide empirical evidence on the role of diversification as potential determinant of systemic risk in the insurance industry. Finally, we confirm that size is also a significant driver of systemic risk, whereas price-to-book ratio and leverage display counterintuitive results.
The European Central Bank (ECB) increased the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) for Greek banks from €50 billion in February 2015 to approximately €90 billion in June 2015. Its actions were accompanied by a discussion among academics, politicians and practitioners regarding the legitimacy of the ELA. Some have even accused the ECB of deliberately delaying the bankruptcy filing of already insolvent Greek banks.
We take the claim regarding insolvency delay as an opportunity to highlight the underlying economics of the ELA program and discuss its legitimacy in the current situation. We start by characterizing the complex interrelationship of the European Union, the ECB and the Greek banks through the lens of financial economics, with a particular focus on the political economy of a monetary union with incomplete fiscal union (or fiscal consolidation). Combining these two issues, we examine the decision of the ECB to continue the provision of ELA to Greek banks. Our conclusions, drawn from the analysis, do not support the claim that the ECB’s actions are consistent with a delayed filing for insolvency.
Von Februar bis Juni 2015 hat die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) die Notfall-Liquiditätshilfen (emergency liquidity assistance, ELA) für griechische Banken von 50 auf etwa 90 Milliarden Euro ausgeweitet. Dies hat zu einer Diskussion unter Wissenschaftlern, Politikern und Praktikern geführt, ob diese Liquiditätshilfen rechtmäßig sind. Es wurde der Vorwurf erhoben, die EZB trage bewusst zu einer Konkursverschleppung der bereits insolventen griechischen Banken bei.
Wir nehmen diesen Vorwurf zum Anlass, die Grundsätze des ELA-Programms genauer zu betrachten und die Frage zu diskutieren, ob das Programm in der aktuellen Situation rechtmäßig war. Zunächst beschreiben wir hierfür aus finanzwirtschaftlicher Perspektive die komplexe Beziehung zwischen der Europäischen Union, der EZB und den griechischen Banken. Dabei gehen wir insbesondere auf die wirtschaftspolitischen Grundsätze einer Währungsunion mit einer unvollständigen Fiskalunion (oder Haushaltskonsolidierung) ein. Vor diesem Hintergrund analysieren wir dann die Entscheidung der EZB, weiterhin Liquiditätshilfen an griechische Banken bereitzustellen. Wir kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass das Vorgehen der EZB nicht als Konkursverschleppung zu bezeichnen ist.
Investors and insurance policyholders are often confronted with complex products and providers' opaque organisational structures. At the same time, the possibility that their claims will not be honoured often poses an existential risk. Financial regulation therefore aims at putting in place a financial services framework that will safeguard market processes whilst also protecting consumers. However, benefits of regulation are accompanied by certain risks, as can be exemplified with the case of insurance regulation.
Kapitalanleger wie Versicherungsnehmer werden oft konfrontiert mit komplexen Produkten und nicht durchschaubaren Unternehmensstrukturen der Anbieter. Gleichzeitig stellt die mögliche Nichterfüllung ihrer Ansprüche häufig ein existenzielles Risiko dar. Deshalb ist es Ziel der Finanzregulierung, Rahmenbedingungen im Finanzdienstleistungsbereich zu schaffen, die wirtschaftliche Abläufe gewährleisten und gleichzeitig den Konsumenten schützen. Dem Nutzen der Regulierung stehen aber auch Risiken gegenüber, die im diesem Artikel am Beispiel der Versicherungsregulierung dargelegt werden.
The paper discusses an additional reform proposal for enhancing Social Security solvency which reframes the existing debate in a different light. In our research, we focus on incentives to prolong working years and to delay benefits claiming as a way of sustaining Social Security. Specifically, we analyze how the offer of a budget-neutral, actuarially fair lump sum payment - instead of the current delayed retirement credit – would encourage people to delay claiming their OASI benefits and work longer. The results of our research will be useful for policymakers, namely in (1) measuring who would delay claiming benefits if offered a lump sum instead of higher annuity payments, (2) examining how long they would wait, and (3) how much longer, if at all, they would continue working in the interim.
IFRS 9 introduces new impairment rules responding to the G20 critique that IAS 39 results in the delayed and insufficient recognition of credit losses. In a case study of a Greek government bond for the period 2009 to 2011 when Greece’s credit rating declined sharply, this study highlights the discretion that preparers have when estimating impairments. IFRS 9 relies more on management expectations and will lead to earlier impairments. However, these appear still delayed and low if compared to the fair value losses.
European households face tremendous obstacles when intending to open a savings account outside their home country. The shortage of deposits has become a major reason for banks’ declining loan supply and ultimately is responsible for a substantial part of the investment weakness and GDP decline in affected European countries.
Policy makers have made important efforts to promote European deposit market integration and to stimulate cross border flows of savings within the European Union. But these efforts will only yield the intended benefits if a number of additional non-tariff trade barriers are removed. Currently, these barriers prevent households in surplus countries to transfer their savings to banks in deficit countries where their deposits are most urgently needed.
This Paper gives an overview of the German banking system and current challenges it is facing. It starts with an overview of the so-called ‘Three-Pillar-Banking-System’ and a detailed description of the current structure of the banking system in Germany. A brief comparison of the banking system in Germany with the ones in other European countries points out its uniqueness. The consequences of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and further challenges for the German banking system are discussed, as well as the the ongoing debate around the question whether the strong government involvement should be sustained.
The Liikanen Group proposes contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds as instruments to enhance financial stability in the banking industry. Especially life insurance companies could serve as CoCo bond holders as they are already the largest purchasers of bank bonds in Europe. The growing number of banks issuing CoCo bonds leads to a rising awareness of these hybrid securities among life insurers as they are increasingly looking for higher?yielding investments into bond?like asset classes during the current low interest rate period. Our contribution provides an insight for life insurance companies to understand the effects of holding CoCo bonds as implied by the Solvency II standards that will become effective by 2016.
The global financial crisis (as well as the European sovereign debt crisis) has led to a substantial redesign of rules and institutions – aiming in particular at underwriting financial stability. At the same time, the crisis generated a renewed interest in properly appraising systemic financial vulnerabilities. Employing most recent data and applying a variety of largely only recently developed methods we provide an assessment of indicators of financial stability within the Euro Area. Taking a “functional” approach, we analyze comprehensively all financial intermediary activities, regardless of the institutional roof – banks or non-bank (shadow) banks – under which they are conducted. Our results reveal a declining role of banks (and a commensurate increase in non-bank banking). These structural shifts (between institutions) are coincident with regulatory and supervisory reforms (implemented or firmly anticipated) as well as a non-standard monetary policy environment. They might, unintendedly, actually imply a rise in systemic risk. Overall, however, our analyses suggest that financial imbalances have been reduced over the course of recent years. Hence, the financial intermediation sector has become more resilient. Nonetheless, existing (equity) buffers would probably not suffice to face substantial volatility shocks.
There is a large, but yet growing debate about the need to complement the European monetary union with a stronger fiscal union. This paper reviews the potential trade-offs between effectiveness, moral hazard problems, and permanent redistribution. In particular, we contribute to the question of how member states may be willing to enter into a stronger fiscal union if the evolution of this union may imply large redistribution under incomplete contracting. We discuss clawback mechanisms that have been suggested in the literature, but conclude that clawbacks are undesirable, as they would essentially destroy the insurance value of a fiscal union. Instead, we propose that a clearly defined exit option as a guarantee against involuntary redistribution can make entry into a stronger fiscal union less risky and hence more attractive for member states.
Signaling cooperation
(2015)
We examine what an applicant’s vita signals to potential employers about her willingness to cooperate in teams. Intensive social engagement may credibly reveal that an applicant cares about the well-being of others and therefore is less likely to free-ride in teamwork situations. We find that contributions in a public goods game strongly increase in a subject’s degree of social engagement as indicated on her résumé (and rated by an independent third party). Engagement in other domains, such as student or sports associations, is not positively correlated with contributions. In a prediction experiment with human resource managers from various industries, we find that managers use résumé content effectively to predict relative differences in subjects’ willingness to cooperate. Thus, young professionals signal important behavioral characteristics to potential employers through the choice of their extracurricular activities.
We offer evidence of a new stylized feature of corporate financing decisions: the tendency of managers to rely more on debt financing when earnings prospects are poor. We term this 'leaning against the wind' and consider three possible explanations: market timing, precautionary financing, and 'making the numbers'. We find no evidence in favor of the first two hypotheses, and provisionally accept the 'making the numbers' hypothesis that managers who are under pressure because of unrealistically optimistic earnings expectations by analysts and deteriorating real opportunities, will rely more heavily on debt financing to boost earnings per share and return on equity.
We build a novel leading indicator (LI) for the EU industrial production (IP). Differently from previous studies, the technique developed in this paper is able to produce an ex-ante LI that is immune to “overlapping information drawbacks”. In addition, the set of variables composing the LI relies on a dynamic and systematic criterion. This ensures that the choice of the variables is not driven by subjective views. Our LI anticipates swings (including the 2007-2008 crisis) in the EU industrial production – on average – by 2 to 3 months. The predictive power improves if the indicator is revised every five or ten years. In a forward-looking framework, via a general-to-specific procedure, we also show that our LI represents the most informative variable in approaching expectations on the EU IP growth.
The interbank market is important for the efficient functioning of the financial system, transmission of monetary policy and therefore ultimately the real economy. In particular, it facilitates banks' liquidity management. This paper aims at extending the literature which views interbank markets as mutual liquidity insurance mechanism by taking into account persistence of liquidity shocks. Following a theory of long-term interbank funding a financial system which is modeled as a micro-founded agent based complex network interacting with a real economic sector is developed. The model features interbank funding as an over-the-counter phenomenon and realistically replicates financial system phenomena of network formation, monetary policy transmission and endogenous money creation. The framework is used to carry out an optimal policy analysis in which the policymaker maximizes real activity via choosing the optimal interest rate in a trade-off between loan supply and financial fragility. It is shown that the interbank market renders the financial system more efficient relative to a setting without mutual insurance against persistent liquidity shocks and therefore plays a crucial role for welfare.
This paper undertakes a quantitative investigation of the effects of anticipated inflation on the distribution of household wealth and welfare. Consumer Finance Data on household financial wealth suggests that about a third of the US population holds all its financial assets in transaction accounts. The remaining two-third of the US population holds most of their financial assets outside transaction accounts. To account for this evidence, I introduce a portfolio choice in a standard incomplete markets model with heterogeneous agents. I calibrate the model economy to SCF 2010 US data and use this environment to study the distributive effects of changes in anticipated inflation. An increase in anticipated inflation leads households to reshuffle their portfolio towards real assets. This crowding-in of supply for real assets lowers equilibrium interest rates and thereby redistributes wealth from creditors to borrowers. Because borrowers have a higher marginal utility, this redistribution improves aggregate welfare. First, this paper shows that inflation acts not only a regressive consumption tax as in Erosa and Ventura (2002), but also as a progressive tax. Second, this paper shows that the welfare cost of inflation are even lower than the estimates computed by Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009). Finally, this paper offers insights into why deflationary environments should be avoided.
We study the life cycle of portfolio allocation following for 15 years a large random sample of Norwegian households using error-free data on all components of households’ investments drawn from the Tax Registry. Both, participation in the stock market and the portfolio share in stocks, have important life cycle patterns. Participation is limited at all ages but follows a hump-shaped profile which peaks around retirement; the share invested in stocks among the participants is high and flat for the young but investors start reducing it as retirement comes into sight. Our data suggest a double adjustment as people age: a rebalancing of the portfolio away from stocks as they approach retirement, and stock market exit after retirement. Existing calibrated life cycle models can account for the first behavior but not the second. We show that incorporating in these models a reasonable per period participation cost can generate limited participation among the young but not enough exit from the stock market among the elderly. Adding also a small probability of a large loss when investing in stocks, produces a joint pattern of participation and of the risky asset share that resembles the one observed in the data. A structural estimation of the relevant parameters that target simultaneously the portfolio, participation and asset accumulation age profiles of the model reveals that the parameter combination that fits the data best is one with a relatively large risk aversion, small participation cost and a yearly large loss probability in line with the frequency of stock market crashes in Norway.
n this paper we analyze an economy with two heterogeneous investors who both exhibit misspecified filtering models for the unobservable expected growth rate of the aggregated dividend. A key result of our analysis with respect to long-run investor survival is that there are degrees of model misspecification on the part of one investor for which there is no compensation by the other investor's deficiency. The main finding with respect to the asset pricing properties of our model is that the two dimensions of asset pricing and survival are basically independent. In scenarios when the investors are more similar with respect to their expected consumption shares, return volatilities can nevertheless be higher than in cases when they are very different.
We analyze the macroeconomic implications of increasing the top marginal income tax rate using a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents and a fiscal structure resembling the actual U.S. tax system. The wealth and income distributions generated by our model replicate the empirical ones. In two policy experiments, we increase the statutory top marginal tax rate from 35 to 70 percent and redistribute the additional tax revenue among households, either by decreasing all other marginal tax rates or by paying out a lump-sum transfer to all households. We find that increasing the top marginal tax rate decreases inequality in both wealth and income but also leads to a contraction of the aggregate economy. This is primarily driven by the negative effects that the tax change has on top income earners. The aggregate gain in welfare is sizable in both experiments mainly due to a higher degree of distributional equality.
There is a growing debate about complementing the European Monetary Union by a more comprehensive fiscal union. Against this background, this paper emphasizes that there is a trade-off in designing a system of fiscal transfers ("fiscal capacity") in a union between members of different size. A system cannot guarantee symmetric treatment of members and simultaneously ensure a balanced budget. We compute hypothetical transfers for the Eurozone members from 2001 to 2012 to illustrate this trade-off. Interestingly, a symmetric system that treats shocks in small and large countries symmetrically would have produced large budgetary surpluses in 2009, the worst year of the financial crisis.
In Absatz 3 des Artikel 136 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der EU (AEUV) wurde für die Verwendung von ESM Geldern festgelegt, dass diese nur dann zur Gewährung von Finanzhilfen verwendet werden dürfen, wenn „... dies unabdingbar ist, um die Stabilität des Euro-Währungsgebiets insgesamt zu wahren." Im vorliegenden Artikel argumentiert Alfons Weichenrieder, dass die nach dem griechischen Referendum entstandene Situation, die Stabilität des “Euro-Währungsgebiets insgesamt" nicht bedroht, so dass die Vergabe von neuen Krediten, zumal diese voraussichtlich unter weichen und im Zweifel nicht durchsetzbaren Auflagen vergeben würden, ein offensichtlicher Verstoß gegen die Grundlagen des ESM wäre.
In this statement the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) is advocating a conditional relief of Greek’s government debt based on Greece meeting certain targets for structural economic reforms in areas such as its labor market and pensions sector.The authors argue that the position of the European institutions that debt relief for Greece cannot be part of an agreement is based on the illusion that Greece will be able to service its sovereign debt and reduce its debt overhang after implementing a set of fiscal and structural reforms. However, the Greek economy would need to grow at an unrealistig level to achieve debt sustainability soley on the basis of reforms.The authors therefore view a substantial debt relief as inevitable and argue that three questions must be resolved urgently, in order to structure debt relief adequately: First, which groups must accept losses associated with debt relief. Second, how much debt relief should be offered. Third, under what conditions should relief be offered.
In light of the failed negotiations with Greece, Jan Krahnen argues that an effective reform agenda for Greece can only be designed by the elected government. Fundamental reforms will take time to take full effect and euro area member states will, in the meantime, have to offer Greece a basic level of economic security.
Krahnen demands that policy makers and the professional public involved view the Greek crisis as an opportunity to take the next necessary steps to formulate a reform agenda for the European Monetary Union. A community of supranational and non-party researchers and intellectuals could take the initiative and in a structured process develop a trustworthy and realistic concept that drafts the next big step towards a political union of Europe, including elements of a fiscal union.
Mit Blick auf die gescheiterten Verhandlungen mit Griechenland, argumentiert Jan Krahnen im vorliegenden Policy Beitrag, dass eine zielführende Reformagenda nur von der gewählten Regierung Griechenlands formuliert werden kann. Die Euro-Staaten müssten Griechenland für die Zeitdauer einer Restrukturierungszeit eine Grundsicherung zusagen. Die EU-Staaten fordert Krahnen dazu auf, aus der Griechenlandkrise die notwendigen Konsequenzen zu ziehen. Auch die Eurozone brauche eine effektive Reformagenda. Die Verschuldungsdynamik innerhalb der Währungsunion, deren Auswüchse am Beispiel Griechenlands besonders deutlich werden, könne bei fehlendem guten Willen nur durch eine politische Union und eine in sie eingebettete Fiskalunion aufgelöst werden. Krahnen argumentiert, dass ein Weiterverhandeln über Restrukturierungsauflagen aus der derzeitigen verfahrenen Situation nicht herausführen wird. Entscheidend sei, ein mehr oder weniger umfassendes Paket zu schnüren, das Elemente eines teilweisen internationalen Haftungsverbunds mit Elementen eines partiellen nationalen Souveränitätsverzichts verbindet.
Negative Zinsen auf Einlagen – juristische Hindernisse und ihre wettbewerbspolitischen Auswirkungen
(2015)
Im anhaltenden Niedrigzinsumfeld tun Banken sich schwer damit, die ihnen zur Verfügung gestellte Liquidität einer renditeträchtigen Nachfrage zuzuführen. Darüberhinaus müssen sie auf Liquiditätsüberschüsse, die im Rahmen der Einlagenfazilität des Eurosystems über Nacht bei den nationalen Zentralbanken der Eurozone deponiert werden, Strafzinsen entrichtet. Vor diesem Hintergrund könnten Banken durch negative Einlagenzinsen das Anliegen verfolgen, die Nachfrage nach Aufbewahrung von (Sicht)Einlagen zu verringern. Einer solchen Strategie stehen aber aus juristischer Sicht Hindernisse entgegen, soweit der beschriebene Paradigmenwechsel auch im Rahmen existierender Kundenbeziehungen einseitig vorgenommen werden soll. Die rechtlichen Hürden sind weder Ausdruck einer realitätsfernen Haarspalterei, noch eines verbraucherschützenden Furors. Vielmehr ermöglichen sie privaten und gewerblichen Bankkunden, im Zeitpunkt der angestrebten Zinsanpassung bewusst über die Verwendung ihrer liquiden Mittel zu entscheiden.
When markets are incomplete, social security can partially insure against idiosyncratic and aggregate risks. We incorporate both risks into an analytically tractable model with two overlapping generations. We derive the equilibrium dynamics in closed form and show that joint presence of both risks leads to over-proportional risk exposure for households. This implies that the whole benefit from insurance through social security is greater than the sum of the benefits from insurance against each of the two risks in isolation. We measure this through interaction effects which appear even though the two risks are orthogonal by construction. While the interactions unambiguously increase the welfare benefits from insurance, they can in- or decrease the welfare costs from crowding out of capital formation. The net effect depends on the relative strengths of the opposing forces.
We investigate the relationship between anchoring and the emergence of bubbles in experimental asset markets. We show that setting a visual anchor at the fundamental value (FV) in the first period only is sufficient to eliminate or to significantly reduce bubbles in laboratory asset markets. If no FV-anchor is set, bubble-crash patterns emerge. Our results indicate that bubbles in laboratory environments are primarily sparked in the first period. If prices are initiated around the FV, they stay close to the FV over the entire trading horizon. Our insights can be related to initial public offerings and the interaction between prices set on pre-opening markets and subsequent intra-day price dynamics.
The pressure on tax haven countries to engage in tax information exchange shows first effects on capital markets. Empirical research suggests that investors do react to information exchange and partially withdraw from previous secrecy jurisdictions that open up to information exchange. While some of the economic literature emphasizes possible positive effects of tax havens, the present paper argues that proponents of positive effects may have started from questionable premises, in particular when it comes to the effects that tax havens have for emerging markets like China and India.
n this paper we compute the optimal tax and education policy transition in an economy where progressive taxes provide social insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, but distort the education decision of households. Optimally chosen tertiary education subsidies mitigate these distortions. We highlight the importance of two different channels through which academic talent is transmitted across generations (persistence of innate ability vs. the impact of parental education) for the optimal design of these policies and model different forms of labor as imperfect substitutes, thereby generating general equilibrium feedback effects from policies to relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that subsidizing higher education has important redistributive benefits, by shrinking the college wage premium in general equilibrium. We also argue that a full characterization of the transition path is crucial for policy evaluation. We find that optimal education policies are always characterized by generous tuition subsidies, but the optimal degree of income tax progressivity depends crucially on whether transitional costs of policies are explicitly taken into account and how strongly the college premium responds to policy changes in general equilibrium.
This paper looks into the specific influence that the European banking union will have on (future) bank client relationships. It shows that the intended regulatory influence on market conditions in principle serves as a powerful governance tool to achieve financial stability objectives.
From this vantage, it analyzes macro-prudential instruments with a particular view to mortgage lending markets – the latter have been critical in the emergence of many modern financial crises. In gauging the impact of the new European supervisory framework, it finds that the ECB will lack influence on key macro-prudential tools to push through more rigid supervisory policies vis-à-vis forbearing national authorities.
Furthermore, this paper points out that the current design of the European bail-in tool supplies resolution authorities with undue discretion. This feature which also afflicts the SRM imperils the key policy objective to re-instill market discipline on banks’ debt financing operations. The latter is also called into question because the nested regulatory technique that aims at preventing bail-outs unintendedly opens additional maneuvering space for political decision makers.
In an experimental setting in which investors can entrust their money to traders, we investigate how compensation schemes affect liquidity provision and asset prices. Investors face a trade-off between risk and return. At the benefit of a potentially higher return, they can entrust their money to a trader. However this investment is risky, as the trader might not be trustworthy. Alternatively, they can opt for a safe but low return. We study how subjects solve this trade-off when traders are either liable for losses or not, and when their bonuses are either capped or not. Limited liability introduces a conflict of interest because it makes traders value the asset more than investors. To limit losses, investors should thus restrict liquidity provision to force traders to trade at a lower price. By contrast, bonus caps make traders value the asset less than investors. This should encourage liquidity provision and decrease prices. In contrast to these predictions, we find that under limited liability investors contribute to asset price bubbles by increasing liquidity provision and that caps fail to tame bubbles. Overall, giving investors skin in the game fosters financial stability.
Since August 2009, German legislation allows for voluntary Say on Pay Votes (SoPV) during Annual General Meetings (AGMs). We examine 1,169 AGMs of all German listed firms with more than 10,000 agenda items over the period 2010-2013 to identify (1) determinants and approval rates of voluntary SoPVs, (2) the effect of voluntary SoPVs on AGM participation, and (3) the effect of SoP on executive compensation. Our data reveals that in the first four years of the voluntary say on pay regime every second firm in our sample has opted for having a SoPV. The propensity for a SoPV increases with firm size, abnormal executive compensation and free float of shares. Indeed, smaller firms with concentrated ownership do not only have a lower propensity for a SoPV, but also show a higher propensity to opt for only limited disclosure of executive compensation. Approval rates of SoPVs are lower than the approval rate for the average AGM agenda item and this effect is stronger in (i) widely held firms as well as in (ii) firms with abnormal executive compensation. Additionally, SoPVs actually can increase AGM participation; however, this result is particularly evident for widely held firms. Finally, we find stronger pay for performance elements within total executive compensation, particularly when the effect of executive compensation is lagged over the years following the vote. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that firms use voluntary SoPV to gain legitimation for executive remuneration policies in firms with low ownership concentration. This is enforced, where (small) shareholders consider executive compensation a part of the agency problem of listed firms, and where (small) shareholders consider SoPVs as a possibility to actively influence corporate decisions, with these decisions leading to a higher degree of alignment between executive management boards and shareholders.
The standard view suggests that removing barriers to entry and improving judicial enforcement reduces informality and boosts investment and growth. However, a general equilibrium approach shows that this conclusion may hold to a lesser extent in countries with a constrained supply of funds because of, for example, a more concentrated banking sector or lower financial openness. When the formal sector grows larger in those countries, more entrepreneurs become creditworthy, but the higher pressure on the credit market limits further capital accumulation. We show empirical evidence consistent with these predictions.
n the EU there are longstanding and ongoing pressures towards a tax that is levied on the EU level to substitute for national contributions. We discuss conditions under which such a transition can make sense, starting from what we call a "decentralization theorem of taxation" that is analogous to Oates (1972) famous result that in the absence of spill-over effects and economies of scale decentralized public good provision weakly dominates central provision. We then drop assumptions that turn out to be unnecessary for this results. While spill-over effects of taxation may call for central rules for taxation, as long as spill-over effects do not depend on the intra-regional distribution of the tax burden, decentralized taxation plus tax coordination is found superior to a union-wide tax.
Do markets correct individual behavioral biases? In an experimental asset market, we compare the outcomes of a standard market economy to those of a an island economy that removed market interactions. We observe asset price bubbles in the market economy while prices are stable in the island economy. We also find that subjects took more risk following larger losses, resulting in larger prices and consistent with a gambling for resurrection motive. This motive can translate into bubbles in the market economy because higher prices increase average losses and thus reinforce the desire to resurrect. By contrast, the absence of such a strategic complementarity in island economies can explain the more stable outcome. These results suggest that markets do not correct behavioral biases, rather the contrary.
This paper analyzes sovereign risk shift-contagion, i.e. positive and significant changes in the propagation mechanisms, using bond yield spreads for the major eurozone countries. By emphasizing the use of two econometric approaches based on quantile regressions (standard quantile regression and Bayesian quantile regression with heteroskedasticity) we find that the propagation of shocks in euro's bond yield spreads shows almost no presence of shift-contagion. All the increases in correlation we have witnessed over the last years come from larger shocks propagated with higher intensity across Europe.
Research on interbank networks and systemic importance is starting to recognise that the web of exposures linking banks balance sheets is more complex than the single-layer-of-exposure paradigm. We use data on exposures between large European banks broken down by both maturity and instrument type to characterise the main features of the multiplex structure of the network of large European banks. This multiplex network presents positive correlated multiplexity and a high similarity between layers, stemming both from standard similarity analyses as well as a core-periphery analyses of the different layers. We propose measures of systemic importance that fit the case in which banks are connected through an arbitrary number of layers (be it by instrument, maturity or a combination of both). Such measures allow for a decomposition of the global systemic importance index for any bank into the contributions of each of the sub-networks, providing a useful tool for banking regulators and supervisors. We use the dataset of exposures between large European banks to illustrate the proposed measures.
Although banks are at the center of systemic risk, there are other institutions that contribute to it. With the publication of the leveraged lending guideline in March 2013, the U.S. regulators show that they are especially worried about the private equity firms with their high-risk deals. Given these risks and the interconnectedness of the banks through the LBO loan syndicates, I shed light on the impact of a bank’s LBO loan exposure on its systemic risk. By using 3,538 observations between 2000 and 2013 from 165 global banks, I show that banks with higher LBO exposure also have a higher level of systemic risk. Other loan purposes do not show this positive relationship. The main drivers influencing this relationship positively are the bank’s interconnectedness to other LBO financing banks and its size. Lending experience with a specific PE sponsor, experience with leading LBO syndicates or a bank’s credit rating, however, lead to a lower impact of the LBO loan exposure on systemic risk.
In the mid-1990s, institutional investors entered the syndicated loan market and started to serve borrowers as lead arrangers. Why are non-banks able to compete for this role against banks? How do the composition of syndicates and loan pricing differ among lead arrangers? By using a dataset of 12,847 leveraged loans between 1997 and 2012, I aim to answer these questions. Non-banks benefit from looser regulatory requirements, have industry expertise which helps them in the screening and monitoring of borrowers and focus on firms that ask for loans only instead of additional cross-selling of other services. I can show that non-banks specialize on more opaque and less experienced borrowers, are more likely than banks to choose participants that help to reduce potentially higher information asymmetries and earn 105 basis points more than banks.
This paper analyzes the influence Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) have on the operating performance of the LBO target companies’ direct competitors. A unique and hand-collected data set on LBOs in the United States in the period 1985-2009 allows us to analyze the effects different restructuring activities as part of the LBO have on the competitors’ revenues. These restructuring activities include changes to leverage, governance, or operating business, as well as M&A activities of the LBO target company. We find that although LBOs itself have a negative influence on competitors’ revenue growth, some restructuring mechanisms might actually benefit competing companies.