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Highlights
• Parents with and without migration background differ in educational knowledge.
• Parents with migration background have less educational knowledge on average.
• Variations in educational knowledge by immigrant groups.
• Social and cultural resources are central to explaining knowledge differences.
• Acculturation strategies prove to be of little relevance.
Abstract
Although extant research persistently highlights the importance of information for educational decision-making, better understanding the existence of, and the underlying reasons for, informational differences between immigrant and non-immigrant parents is important. This study examines the differences in the level of information between immigrant and non-immigrant parents of third graders just before they make probably their most important educational decision in the German education system. We draw on approaches highlighting the importance of resources and parents’ acculturation to explain the informational differences between immigrant and non-immigrant parents. Employing linear regression and probability models on data from the National Educational Panel Study in Germany (N = 3961), we demonstrate that all immigrant groups, particularly those from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and northern Africa, are significantly less informed than parents without own immigration experience. This result is evident both in our overall test and in various domains of the test, which analyze different aspects of information relevant to parents’ educational decision-making. Furthermore, different endowments with social and cultural capital largely explain the informational differences between parents with and without an immigrant background. In contrast, different acculturation strategies are almost negligible in explaining the differences in the level of information. Our findings provide important insights for research on migration-related inequalities in educational decision-making and for developing interventions to improve migrant parents’ ability to make well-informed and thus intended educational decisions.
The aim of this paper is to take a fresh look at a discussion about the distinct existences argument that took place between David Armstrong and Frank Jackson more than 50 years ago. I will try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be successfully defended against Jackson’s objections (albeit at the price of certain concessions concerning Armstrong’s view on the meaning of psychological terms as well as his conception of universals). Focusing on two counterexamples that Jackson put forward against Hume’s principle (which is central to Armstrong’s argument), I will argue that they are either compatible with Hume’s principle, or imply a false claim. I will also look at several other considerations that go against Hume’s principle, such as, for example, Kripke’s origin essentialism and counterexamples from aposteriori necessity.
I will argue for a novel variant of the knowledge norm for practical reasoning. In Sect. 2, I will look at current variations of a knowledge norm for practical reasoning and I will provide reasons to doubt these proposals. In Sects. 3 and 4, I develop my own proposal according to which knowledge is the norm of apt practical reasoning. Section 5 considers objections. Finally, Sect. 6 concerns the normativity of my proposed knowledge norm and its significance.
A decorated pair of trousers excavated from a well-preserved tomb in the Tarim Basin proved to have a highly informative life history, teased out by the authors – with archaeological, historical and art historical dexterity. Probably created under Greek influence in a Bactrian palace, the textile started life in the third/second century BC as an ornamental wall hanging, showing a centaur blowing a war-trumpet and a nearly life-size warrior of the steppe with his spear. The palace was raided by nomads, one of whom worked a piece of the tapestry into a pair of trousers. They brought no great luck to the wearer who ended his days in a massacre by the Xiongnu, probably in the first century BC. The biography of this garment gives a vivid glimpse of the dynamic life of Central Asia at the end of the first millennium.
This essay presents contributions by Jürgen Habermas and Paulo Freire for the constitution of critical-reflexive subjects and the implications in the teaching-research-extension processes in the field of Organizational Studies. We show that intersubjectivity and dialogicity are conditions for the understanding between subjects and it is precisely through these conditions that the subjects are constituted, in a process that is dialogical, pedagogical and political. Freire and Habermas offer elements to deconstruct dominant instrumental logic and provide the basis for the reconstruction of unprecedented-viable possibilities of ways of organizing and managing. Therefore, this article highlights the importance of Organizational Studies to broaden the focus of teaching-research-extension possibilities and directs them to a communicative and dialogic engagement, beyond the borders of universities. This reconstruction indicates that researchers participate in different public arenas, debate and build public problems, processes of resistance, visibility, and dramatization of problematic issues. Observing the contributions of Freire and Habermas, Organizational Studies as a field cannot be limited to developing a critique, from a distant point of view: it is necessary to co-participate, co-act, co-operate and co-construct with its public.
This reading of Pride and Prejudice and Mansfield Park suggests that the semantic framework of the novels is provided by the contrast between two meanings of the word consequence, the archaic meaning of social or emotional importance and the common and garden meaning of effect of a cause. It also suggests that the narrative structure of the novels is that of a game of consequences, a game that was played at the time of Jane Austen.
Day-to-day art criticism and art theory are qualitatively distinct. Whereas the best art criticism entails a closeness to its objects which is attuned to particularity, art theory inherently makes generalized claims, whether these claims are extrapolated from the process of art criticism or not. However, this article argues that these dynamics are effectively reversed if we consider the disparity between the criticism of so-called political art and attempts over the last century to elaborate theory which accounts for the political in art qua art. Art theory has located the political force of art precisely in the way that its particularity opposes or resists the status quo. Art criticism, on the other hand, tends to treat artwork as a text to be interpreted whose particularity may as well dissolve when translated into discourse. Drawing from the work of Theodor W. Adorno, this article argues that political art theory calls for art criticism more attuned to experience if it is to elucidate art’s critical valence.
I first encountered the work of Miriam Hansen as a graduate student in the mid-1990s when her book Babel and Babylon was the talk of the (at that time still fairly modest) film studies town – even though it was sitting somewhat uneasily on the fence. In fact, it was this position beyond the canonical that made the book so attractive in the first place. It did not fit into the raging debate of that time between psychosemiotics and neo-formalism, nor did it offer the (often too schematic and naive) way out within the cultural studies paradigm of empowering the individual or sub-culturally constituted groups.
The Methodological seminar was conducted by the scientific journal “Philosophy of Education” (Institute of Higher Education, National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine). The participants of the seminar were Prof. Panos Eliopoulos (University of Peloponnese, Greece), Lyudmyla Gorbunova, Mykhailo Boychenko, Olga Gomilko, Mariia Kultaieva, Volodymyr Kovtunets, Sergiy Kurbatov, Anna Laktionova, Tetiana Matusevych, Natalia Radionova, Iryna Stepanenko, Maya Trynyak and Viktor Zinchenko. On March 30, 2016, a methodological seminar was conducted at the Institute of Higher Education NAES of Ukraine. This seminar was devoted to the discussion of educational problems in the area of mass culture, and relative opportunities for the development of individuality. The report «Mass culture, education and the perspective of individuality» was made by Panos Eliopulos, professor of Peloponnese University, a member of journal’s «Філософія освіти. Philosophy of Education” editorial board. The scientists from the Institute of Higher Education, Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Skovoroda National Pedagogical University of Kharkiv participated in this event. Designated issues were observed primarily from the point of view of the Frankfurt School representatives, as well as representatives of modern critical philosophy of education and critical pedagogy. It was emphasized that T.Adorno’s ideas and ideas of other Frankfurt School members, which were developed in the middle of the last century, continue to be relevant in current socio-cultural contexts. The technical rationalism which became the rationalism of dominance in the context of technological civilization, could not provide the way toward the liberation of man and the development of his or her individuality. Market society with its instrumental rationality leads to homogenization and standardization of mass culture and as a result, we have a semi-education, leading to destruction of personality and social pathologies. The panelists agreed that semi-education reflects the crisis of ideals of education and training as far as a suspension of human emancipation process. Due to suspension of the creative process of a person formation, replacing it by the processes of stereotyping based on mimetic rationality, culture itself loses creative potential. The process of degradation of education and culture in the semi-education eventually leads to its destruction at theoretical level and the elaboration of the practice of anti-education. Only through returning of the individual and maintaining his or her social importance due to the tools of holistic education it is possible to overcome such stereotyping. For Frankfurt School members, and those who share their ideals, true education in its meta-theoretical sense becomes the important factor, contributing to the emancipation of society and individual. This idea is particularly important in the context of contemporary challenges and threats from instrumentalization of approaches to the process of transformation of the Ukrainian culture and education.
This article claims that the institution of the market is structurally exploitative. It allows for exploitation, it encouragesactors to engage in it and it even pressurizes them to do so. Within Marxism, this claim is well known, but can it bedefended without strongly relying on Marxist concepts and arguments? I will answer in the affirmative and identify theforces of market competition to be a fundamental source of exploitative pressures...
The main sources for the discussion of the category “relation” were Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics. Before their translation into Arabic in the 8th and 9th centuries, Christian theologians and in their footsteps Syriac scholars considered Aristotle’s works to be a useful tool in Christological discussions. This article analyzes the category of relation and its development in Arabic-Islamic philosophy in authors such as Kindī and his student Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī, Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ghazālī, Ibn Rušd, the Sufi Ibn ʿArabī and others.
Sublimity, negativity, and architecture. An essay on negative architecture through Kant to Adorno
(2015)
Architecture defines and consumes people. It exposes them to a multitude of varieties of different aesthetic engagements. Architecture becomes a lived experience. However, this lived experience is always caught in the inner workings of the social and more specifically within cultural ideology. In modern capitalism, culture pervades every aspect of our lives. It shows its presence everywhere from our own homes to the public streets. Culture is everywhere, and architecture is a tool used for both the benefit and detriment of the “culture industry”. Kant speaks of the sublime as a profound moment of reason realizing its ability to overcome its own limits. In this experience is it possible to be completely ravaged and descend into hades and melancholy? Is there a beauty in this descent? More specifically, can architecture become banal or pedestrian, uplifting or depressing? According to Theodor Adorno, our subjectivity is defined by the constant dialectical struggle between freedom and unfreedom (among other things). It is realizing our freedom in the face of our unfreedom that makes us truly able to attain some form of resistance. The sublime experience can be transformed into a spirit of revelation and beautifully allow us to in a way resist the one-dimensional tendencies of modern capitalism. Architecture, which is immersed in our societal being and contributes to many of our own subjective unfreedoms, comes to define our lives as inhabited space. When does architecture produce a sublime experience? Can architecture’s authentic “aura” stand out amongst the reproduced city and produce a sublime feeling that can be a form of resistance against the culture industry? Does Grand Central Terminal provide the key to an architecturally sublime experience? Using dialectical experience and examining the sublime feeling (in a critique of the Kantian sublime) as the key to breaking through the culture industry’s banal architectural hold on our subjectivity, this essay will examine the experience of the sublime as a key to unfolding resistance in the face of the banality of modern architecture in the city and opening our minds to the Great Refusal through the exploration of Grand Central Terminal.
This essay reflects on the convergence between Jürgen Habermas’ work and the theoretical framework put forward by the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, arguing in favor of the characteristics of the Frankfurt school in Habermas and pointing out research possibilities in the field of Organizational Studies (OS). We discuss the essential theoretical aspects of the work by Horkheimer (1975) “Traditional and Critical Theory,” and produce a critique on the use of generational chronology as the main criterion for understanding the intellectual movement of the Frankfurt School. The methodology is based on the critique of the interpretation using the philosophical hermeneutics (RICOEUR, 1990) and observes the propositional nature of an interpretation offered in theoretical essays (MENEGUETTI, 2011). To support the provocative proposition of this work, we establish a dialogue with authors such as Bottomore (2001), Freitag (2004), Nobre (2004), and Melo (2013)) discussing a non-generational characterization of the Frankfurt School’s members and the proximity of Habermas in relation to the pioneer works on the Critical Theory. We believe that (i) the re-reading of the emancipatory purpose (HABERMAS, 2002); (ii) the deconstruction of the impartiality of the scientific knowledge (HABERMAS, 1987); (iii) and the incorporation of the philosophy of language into the Frankfurtian social criticism (HABERMAS, 2012) are important contributions of Habermas to the Frankfurt’s critical theory. As for a proposal for the field of organizational studies, this esseay concludes that recognizing Habermas as a Critical Theory scholar of the Frankfurt School may constitute a new research agenda for the field. The contribution of this essay lies in helping researchers in the field of Organizational Studies to understand Habermas’ work differently and not as a non-critical or utopian production. In this perspective, it is clear that Habermas’ intellectual production is politically engaged in contemporary social problems, which is a dimension neglected by the researchers of the field of Organizational Studies in Brazil.
The purpose of the text is to present an interpretation of Theodor Adorno’s critical reading of authors considered revisionists of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, particularly Karen Horney. We discuss critically Adorno’s favorable positioning to the Freudian conception of the individual psychic nucleus in contrast to the hasty sociologization of psychoanalysis practiced by the revisionism of Karen Horney. In the final part we try to show how the Adornian perspective ends up by making, in his own way, the same mistake of a hasty sociologization of psychoanalysis he imputed to the revisionists and advocates an theoretical emphasis on the sociological realm that seems also problematic.
This essay argues for the philosophical standing of Walter Benjamin’s early work and posits a deeper continuity between this early work as a philosopher and the subsequent development of his work as a writer. When these fragments are read in proper relation to each other, they reveal for the first time many of the key innovations of Benjamin as a philosopher, as well as his points of influence on Horkheimer and Adorno. His early ‘Program’ critiques the Enlightenment conception of experience as a means for gaining empirical knowledge, and announces the need for a new concept of experience. Benjamin follows through on this program with a method of philosophical enquiry that is by turns fragmentary and constellational, developing a series of provisional notions of experience, which form a constellation with one another: perception, mimesis, language as a medium of experience, observation and memory.
This article is an inquiry into the concept of metaphysical experience through a joint discussion of two authors and philosophers with different approaches that nevertheless converge in the reclamation of the concept and rely both on the experience of death as an example. In both cases, the authors are guided by the central problem of how not to relinquish metaphysical experience to unscrutinized immediacy or a powerful conversion which enjoins subjection, putting it in contact with aesthetics and ethics at once. Theodor Adorno situates metaphysical experience as a problem of philosophy of history and devotes attention to the contemporary possibility of experiences that evoke transcendence. The transformations he identifies in the concept also lead him to propose art as a domain where metaphysical experience is alive. The implicit personal investment Adorno makes is much more clear in Lacoue-Labarthe who, in a dialogue with Maurice Blanchot, shows the experience as deeply bound up with literature and its links to subjectivity. The article argues that the main difference between the two approaches is modal and temporal from the side of the object, aside from the different modes of interrogation recognized with the labels deconstruction and critical theory.
This essay focuses on the relationship between solipsism and aesthetic subjectivity, as outlined in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. As he mentions, according to dialectical materialism, solipsism gained actuality within (radical) modernism as general “standpoint”, realized in atomistic society through “reified division of labor”. This also applies to artistic production. At the same time, solipsism constitutes a long standing philosophical hypothesis, which concerns the truth value of perception, thus imitating the “subjective point of reference in art”. Therefore, Adorno’s brief statements on the relationship between epistemological solipsism and immanent artistic subjectivity designate different phenomena under the same heading; these concern sociological, cognitive and existential aspects of artistic creation and aesthetic experience, sedimented in the artwork’s content. However, he often undertakes abrupt conceptual transitions within them. In this essay, I mainly focus on the cognitive aspect, especially on the relationship between solipsism and art’s “subjective point of reference”. For this purpose, I reconstruct Adorno’s relevant ideas on the role of subjectivity within art and relate them to his elaborated analysis of the process of aesthetic experience. Finally, I scrutinize the value of this non-apodictic truth and its relationship to particular aspects of “truth-content” and to Adorno’s redemption of the artwork’s fragile ontological status, its semblance character.
The necessity of over-interpretation: Adorno, the essay, and the gesture of aesthetic experience
(2013)
This article is a discussion of Theodor W. Adorno’s comment, in the beginning of ‘The Essay as Form’, that interpretations of essays are over-interpretations. I argue that this statement is programmatic, and should be understood in the light of Adorno’s essayistic ideal of configuration, his notion of truth, and his idea of the enigmatic character of art. In order to reveal how this over-interpreting appears in practice, I turn to Adorno’s essay on Kafka. According to Adorno, the reader of Kafka is caught in an aporia: Kafka’s work cannot be interpreted, yet every single sentence calls for interpretation. This paradox is related to the gestures and images in Kafka’s work: like Walter Benjamin, Adorno means that they contain sedimented, forgotten experiences. Instead of interpreting these images, Adorno visualizes the experiences indirectly by presenting images of his own. His own essay becomes gestural.
‘Being with oneself in the other’ is a well-known formula that Hegel uses to characterize the basic relation of subjective freedom. This phrase points to the fact that subjects can only come to themselves if they remain capable of going beyond themselves. This motif also plays a significant role in Hegel’s philosophy of art. The article further develops this motif by exploring the extent to which this polarity of selfhood and otherhood is also characteristic of states of aesthetic freedom. It does not offer an exegesis of Hegel’s writings, but attempts to remain as close as possible to the spirit of Hegel’s philosophy – with some help from Kant and Adorno. The argument begins with some key terms on the general state of subjective freedom in order to distinguish it from the particular role of aesthetic freedom and then, finally, drawing again on Hegel, works out the sense in which aesthetic freedom represents an important variant of freedom.
Theodor W. Adorno’s criticism of human beings’ domination of nature is a familiar topic to Adorno scholars. Its connection to the central relationship between art and nature in his aesthetics has, however, been less analysed. In the following paper, I claim that Adorno’s discussion of art’s truth content (Wahrheitsgehalt) is to be understood as art’s ability to give voice to nature (both human and non-human) since it has been subjugated by the growth of civilization. I focus on repressed non-human nature and examine Adorno’s interpretation of Eduard Mörike’s poem ‘Mausfallen-Sprüchlein’ (Mousetrap rhyme). By giving voice to the repressed animal, Mörike’s poem manages to point towards the possibility of a changed relationship between mice and men, between nature and humanity, which is necessary in order to achieve reconciliation amongst humans as well.
To imitate all that is hidden. The place of mimesis in Adorno’s theory of musical performance
(2017)
The article examines the use of the concept of mimesis in Adorno’s notes towards a theory of musical performance. In trying to idiosyncratically define the latter as “reproduction”, Adorno relied on a framework elaborating on concepts introduced by Arnold Schoenberg, Hugo Riemann and Walter Benjamin – a framework that the article discusses insofar as it deals with the problem of mimesis. Specific attention is devoted to the relation between Benjamin’s essays on language and translation and Adorno’s theory of notation, that soon became the crucial aspect of his theory of reproduction. Given the shortcomings of Adorno’s theory, which in the end did not achieve its goals, the article proposes to capitalize on his terminology while at the same time rethinking his framework in the light of recent musicological paradigms for the study of musical performance. On the whole, the article shows that it was Adorno’s philosophical assumptions – in particular the theses of music’s non-intentionality and of its non-similarity to language – that prevented him from convincingly theorizing musical performance, and suggests an alternative framework for future research.
In my paper, I intend firmly to criticize Taubes' interpretation of Benjamin's Theology as a modern form of Gnosticism (Benjamin as a modern Marcionit). In a positive way, I sustain rather the thesis that Benjamin's Messianism is in close connection with his conception of reason (“the sharpened axe of reason”) and, in particularly, with the paradoxical unity of Mysticism and Enlightenment, which, according to the famous definition of Adorno, distinguishes his thought. As a radically anti-magical and anti-mythical conception of the historical time, Benjamin's Messianism has to be considered as an original synthesis between motifs of the mystical tradition of the Jewish Kabbalah and motifs belonging to the rationalist tradition of the Jewish philosophy. Moving from Cohen's standpoint of a continuity between Maimonides and Kant, I consider therefore the affinity between his messianic conception of history and that of Benjamin. Both, Benjamin and Cohen, share, together with the reference to the a priori of the idea of justice, the reference to the Kantian connection between rationality and hope. Hence originates the non-eschatological Messianism of both. Motives of difference between Cohen and Benjamin’s messianic idea are to be found, conversely, in their different way to consider the idea of "the infinite task" and of its infinite fulfillment in the context of the historical time. Unlike the fundamentally ethical interpretation that Cohen gives of this relationship, Benjamin understands it ontologically in a monadological sense. This explains the constitutive relationship that exists, in Benjamin's philosophy, between Origin, Fragment and Revelation. In the light of this connection, Benjamin's messianic understanding of the historical time exceeds the Scholemian alternative between a restorative and a utopian conception of Messianism. Consequently, the Krausian motto “Ursprung ist das Ziel” (“The Origin is the Goal”) displays its truth in the idea of the messianic fragment or spark.
Hamlet or Europe and the end of modern Trauerspiel. On some shakespearians motifs in Walter Benjamin
(2019)
Hamlet’s character sets, under different shapes and extents, the benchmark against which a large part of the European philosophy of the very long «short twentieth-century» behind us has had to measure. In the name of Hamlet as the most enigmatic among Shakespeare’s creatures, even Europe, its spirit and destiny, is identified, according to the well-known claim by Paul Valery.
Common trait to a big part of these interpretations – from the juvenile works of Pavel Florenskij and Lev S. Vygotskij (respectively written in 1905 and 1915) to Carl Schmitt’s Hamlet oder Ekuba. Der Einbruch der Zeit in das Spiel (1956) – is offered by the detection, in Hamlet’s figure, of the contradiction inherent to an epochal transition: the time of an unresolved passage between two ages that only knows the endless pain of an “interim”. My paper concerns the possibility to interpret Hamlet’s time as the time of an “interim” in light of Benjamin’s claims about Shakespeare’s drama contained in his book on the German Trauerspiel.
While Florenskij interprets Hamlet’s time as tragic and the figure of Hamlet as a tragic one, in my essay - moving from some observations on the " Hamlet Problem " by the young Franz Rosenzweig - I consider the original Benjaminian thesis about the character and the drama of Hamlet as the end of the modern Trauerspiel. Starting from a statement by Theodor Adorno in the famed Hornberger Brief to Benjamin of August 2, 1935, I outline, therefore, how Benjamin characterizes the figure of Hamlet. This, from his early writings on the relationship between tragedy and Trauerspiel up to the great book on the Origin of the German Trauerspiel.
In the frame of Benjamin’s interpretation, exactly by virtue of its distance from the thesis on the duality of tragedy (evoked by Florenskij’s interpretation as well as other ones), the Shakespearian theatrum of consciousness, paradigmatically represented in the figure of Hamlet and in the intimately dialectic character of his drama, is accounted for as necessary correlate of the Cartesian’s theatrum of consciousness. From a theoretical point of view, the Benjaminian characterization of Hamlet's figure reveals, therefore, something of the nature of modern consciousness and of consciousness in general in relation to the problem of truth and its representation. Hence the end of modern Trauerspiel coincides with the original incompleteness of its time. Consequently, I also claim Hamlet's dramatic figure to represent the aporetic characters of modern politics. This contrasts the thesis of Carl Schmitt who (in direct controversy with Benjamin) speaks, instead, of the Shakespearean drama as an expression of a pre-modern barbaric time.
In the nineties, Habermas redirected his political writings to the post-national constellation (global and European) and the possibilities of a society politically integrated through transnational democracy (or post-national democracy). This thematic reorientation took place on two fronts. The first one is the global transnational democracy, which includes the impacts of the economic globalization on national democracies, as well the proposal for a political Constitution for a pluralistic world society, based on a constitutionalization of international law. The second one is the European transnational democracy, which includes the redefinition of the political profile of European welfare state for an economic liberal profile, as well the paradox of democratic technocracy operated by European institutions and the proposal to overcome the decoupled technocratic policy model. This paper will address only this last topic, describing the reasons of the democratic deficit and the consequent delay of European political Union. Despite numerous reforms, the technocratic policies have not eliminated the discrepancy between centralization and democratization, and mistakenly indicate another direction further reinforcing the problem of European undemocratic institutions. In contrast, Habermas argues that the democratic deficit could only be overcome replacing the technocratic approach by a deeper democratization of European institutions.
It is difficult to think of another area of literary discourse in which a critic has brought such a profound influence to bear, as Theodor W. Adorno has, in the area of literature concerning the Shoah. It is also difficult to think of another area of literary discourse in which a critic’s pronouncements have been misinterpreted so often and to such a degree as have Adorno’s reflections concerning the status of art after the Shoah. Reference here is of course being made to Adorno’s (supposed) ‘dictum’ concerning the barbarity of poetry after Auschwitz. The principle aims of this paper are to restore his reflections to their argumentative context and to restore the dialectical tension conferred on them in the original text. I will examine what I have termed the “after-Auschwitz” aporia, so evident in Adorno’s reflections on post-Shoah art and yet overlooked all too frequently in the research literature. Defined as an irresolvable impasse as a result of equally plausible yet inconsistent premises the term “aporia” succinctly captures the essence of Adorno’s deliberations on post-Shoah art: the imperative to represent the egregious crimes and the impossibility of doing so. I will demonstrate that Adorno’s pronouncements were never meant as silence-inducing taboos, but rather as concrete theoretical reflections upon the moral status of art in the aftermath of the Shoah and as warnings of the moral peril involved in the artistic rendering of mass extermination.
Rezension zu: David SHERMAN. Sartre and Adorno - The Dialectics of Subjectivity. Albany: SUNY Press, 2007, xii + 328 pp., €64.59, ISBN 978-0-7914-7115-9.
The starting point of Demirovic's text is Adorno's idea that concepts as forms of thinking are constellations of power. Differently from many interpretations of Adorno as resigned, Demirovic shows that this assumption enables Adorno to give his own theory the character of interventions in the ideological consensus of everyday life with regard to emancipation.
This article is an attempt to re-read the magnum opus of Adorno's philosophy, namely Aesthetic Theory, using an interpretative key offered by Agata Bielik-Robson's book entitled Jewish Cryptotheologies of Late Modernity: Philosophical Marranos. This interpretative key, called by the Author The Marrano Strategy implemented to Adorno's late philosophy allows us to investigate the common points of Adorno's theory of art criticism and modern Jewish thought. Therefore the main question of this text concerns the characteristics of Jewishness and messianicity (Scholem, Derrida) in Adorno's Aesthetic Theory. The thesis that I am attempting to justify is as follows: the implementation of Marrano strategy to the modern art criticism redefines and reverses the relationship between the particular element and the universal domain. Consequently, this dialectical 'appreciation' of the particular establishes a common conceptual field for critical thinking and traditional, religious motifs.
This article deals with the analysis of Frankfurtrt's theorists, especially Adorno, Marcuse, Walter Benjamin and Horkheimer, and their relevance in relation to education. Motivation, faced with a world in which extreme-right values and religious fundamentalisms are promoted, such a scenario motivates us to question the role that education plays in combating extremism and intolerance. Scope of relevance. This article is directly related to the philosophy of education. Justification and relevance. This topic is justified because it deals with teleological aspects of the function of education. In the sense of questioning the teleological character of education based on philosophical concepts that seek the autonomy of the subject instead of just the human being to what is settled. As a methodology, it resorts to bibliographical studies and critical reflections on education and its political character in the construction of an emancipated social conscience of values that legitimize oppression. Results and discussion. A study on Critical Theory of Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin, Habermas and Marcuse was conducted as contributions to the construction of an education that, in addition to seeking inclusion, also seeks to be a political instrument to combat prejudice, which is nowadays alive again with the rise of religious fundamentalisms, xenophobia and the rise of extreme-right political ideas. Conclusion. It is concluded that the school has the political purpose to educate for a world of solidarity and respect for differences.
This paper reconstructs the argument of Axel Honneth's recent book Das Recht der Freiheit as a theory of the institutionalization of freedom in modern society. In particular, it looks at Honneth's argument for the realization of freedom in law and morality that is proposed as a contemporary re-interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Then I discuss Honneth's argument for the reality of freedom in the ethical spheres of civil society, in particular in the family, the market and in democracy. Finally, the paper proposes some critical remarks to Honneth's theory.
This paper analyzes two contemporary, „third-generation“ perspectives within critical theory - Nancy Fraser’s and Axel Honneth’s - with the aim of examining the degree to which the two authors succeed in grounding the normative criteria of social critique in the perspectives of ’ordinary’ social actors, as opposed to speculative social theory. To that end, the author focuses on the influential debate between Fraser and Honneth Redistribution or Recognition? which concerns the appropriate normative foundations of a „post-metaphysical“ critical theory, and attempts to reconstruct the fundamental 29 disagreements between Fraser and Honneth over the meaning and tasks of critical theory. The author concludes that both critical theorists ultimately secure the normative foundations of critique through substantive theorizations of the social, which frame the two authors’ „reconstructions“ of the normativity of everyday social action, but argues that post-metaphysical critical theory does not have to abandon comprehensive social theory in order to be epistmologically „non-authoritarian“.
Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in Marcuse's critical theory. This can be partly ascribed to Marcuse's interdisciplinary approach to humanities and social sciences. Many of Marcuse's ideas and concepts are tacitly present in contemporary social and ecological movements. Contemporary literature on Marcuse is positively inclined to his theory while the critique of Marcuse dates back to the '70s, and remains largely unimpaired. This fact poses significant challenges to the revival of Marcuse's critical theory. This study sets out to report on current interest in Marcuse's critical theory trying to correct "past injustices" by responding to negative criticism. The main flaw of such criticism - as we see it - is in failing to perceive interdisciplinary character of Marcuse's critical theory. Marcuse's renaissance cannot be complete without, to use dialectical term, sublating the history of negative criticism.
Objective: to systematize the strengths and challenges of Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition, and to reflect on these as support for research in health care. Method: this is a reflection article which considers the potential of incorporating the category of recognition in the Honnethian proposition for research, understanding, exercising of practice and management of health care. Results: the process of recognition promotes the exploration and understanding of relations of power and respect, above all in terms of conflict which are ascribed to these. As a result, it indicates support for diagnoses and structuring nuclei for overcoming oppressive and unequal practices, with consequences for dealing with situations of insecurity, weaknesses in self-esteem and vulnerabilities in the interactions between the subjects, which are configured as contemporary challenges. Conclusion: in the scientific exploration of care, management and public policies in health, this theoretical framework can assist in the visibility of the context and in its critical knots, in order to promote autonomy and human dignity, which are relevant for the interpersonal relations in the processes of care, with fruitful contributions to the qualification of the health care.
From reciprocal recognition to a society that is properly 'social' : on Axel Honneth's recent work
(2017)
This paper addresses Axel Honneth's recent endeavors to defend his theory of justice, broadly described in Freedom's right (2011) as an analysis of society. The paper begins by exposing Honneth's model as a theory of institutional intersubjectivity rather than a theory of the struggle for recognition. This model, however, was subject to criticism due to its supposed acceptance of the capitalistic market economy as a social order. In order to defend it from such objections, Honneth (2016) exposes the normative core of socialist ideals as a version of social freedom. Finally, he presents a distinction between two forms of political intervention: an internal and an external struggle for recognition – and asserts the advantages of the former.
The subject matter of this article is Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition as it has been exposed in his more recent book, Das Recht der Freiheit. Throughout the paper his attempts to describe injustices within modern capitalist societies using the notions of pathologies and anomie will be analyzed and criticized, especially from the viewpoint of their inability to deal with processes and contexts of disrecognition (Aberkennung). With help of this category, Honneth’s diagnosis regarding the moral progress in modern societies, as well as his notion of second order disorders, as injustices will be confronted and, hopefully, complemented.
While liberal, redistributive views seek to correct and compensate for past injustices, by resorting to compensatory, procedural arguments for corrective justice, the recognition-based, communitarian arguments tend to promote by means of social movements and struggles for recognition a society free from prejudice and disrespect. In developing democratic societies such as Brazil, Axel Honneth’s contribution to the ongoing debates on Affirmative Action has been evoked, confirming that the dialectics of recognition does not merely seek a theoretical solution to the structural and economic inequalities that constitute some of their worst social pathologies, but allows for practices of self-respect and subjectivation that defy all technologies of social control, as pointed out in Foucault’s critique of power. The phenomenological deficit of critical theory consists thus in recasting the critique of power with a view to unveiling lifeworldly practices that resist systemic domination.
Axel Honneth associates his reading of Hegel with Winnicott's maturational development theory, in order to defend theses on intersubjectivity and recognition. That connection between philosophy and psychoanalysis is a target of criticism from two Hegelians: Joel Whitebook, a reader of Freud, and Judith Butler, a critical reader of Freud and Lacan. At the core of the controversy is Honneth's rejection of the work of the negative that is performed by Freud's death drive. We intend on following in the wake of that debate, and thus investigate the reasons and consequences for social criticism of Honneth's rejection of Freud's death drive.
This article corrects the following: Hope in political philosophy,
Claudia Blöser Jakob Huber Darrel Moellendorf. Volume 15Issue 5Philosophy Compass First Published online: April 17, 2020.
It has come to the author's attention that the reference citation of ‘Meirav, 2009’ on page 2 of his published article entitled, ‘Hope in political philosophy’ does not provide bibliographical details regarding the article and does not include it in its list of works cited.
Here is the bibliographical information: Meirav, A. (2009). The nature of hope. Ratio, 22, 216–233.
Hope in political philosophy
(2020)
The language of hope is a ubiquitous part of political life, but its value is increasingly contested. While there is an emerging debate about hope in political philosophy, an assessment of the prevalent scepticism about its role in political practice is still outstanding. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of historical and recent treatments of hope in political philosophy and to indicate lines of further research. We argue that even though political philosophy can draw on recent analyses of hope in analytic philosophy, there are distinct challenges for an account of hope in political contexts. Examples such as racial injustice or climate change show the need for a systematic normative account that is sensitive to the unavoidability of hope in politics as much as its characteristic dangers.
This article aims to shed light on some core challenges of liberating social criticism. Its centerpiece is an intuitively attractive account of the nature and difficulty of critical social thought that nevertheless goes missing in many philosophical conversations about critique. This omission at bottom reflects the fact that the account presupposes a philosophically contentious conception of rationality. Yet the relevant conception of rationality does in fact inform influential philosophical treatments of social criticism, including, very prominently, a left Hegelian strand of thinking within contemporary Critical Theory. Moreover, it is possible to mount a defense of the conception by reconstructing, if with various qualifications and additions, an argument from classic—i.e., mid twentieth-century—Anglo-American philosophy of the social sciences, in particular, the argument that forms the backbone of Peter Winch’s The Idea of a Social Science. Winch draws his guiding insights from the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, and one of the payoffs of considering Winch’s Wittgenstein-inspired work against the backdrop of Hegel-inspired work in Critical Theory is to contest the artificial professional strictures that are sometimes taken to speak against reaching across the so-called ‘Continental Divide’ in philosophy. The larger payoff is advancing, by means of this philosophically ecumenical approach, the enterprise of liberating social thought.
The following article attempts to clarify the ambivalent relationship that Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse developed with the vitalist and phenomenological tendencies that permeated philosophy and the social sciences during the Weimar Republic. More precisely, it traces how both thinkers, in spite of acknowledging the “truth moment” contained in the criticism that the philosophical exponents of both movements (Husserl, Bergson, Dilthey) developed of 19th century positivism, also recognized in its shallow popularization the advancement of a dangerous philosophical irrationalism, suspicious of science and Enlightenment values, that would soon become an accomplice to the rise of fascism.
According to the theory of language of the young Benjamin, the primary task of language isn't the communication of contents, but to express itself as a "spiritual essence" in which also men take part. That conception according to which language would be a medium to signification of something outside it leads to a necessary decrease of its original strength and is thus denominated by Benjamin bürgerlich. The names of human language are remainders of an archaic state, in which things weren't yet mute and had their own language. Benjamin suggests also that all the arts remind the original language of things, as they make objects "speak" in form of sounds, colors, shapes etc. That relationship between arts as reminders of the "language of things" and the possible reconciliation of mankind with itself and with nature has been developed by Theodor Adorno in several of his writings, specially in the Aesthetic Theory, where the artwork is ultimately conceived as a construct pervaded by "language" in the widest meaning - not in the "bourgeois" sense.
This paper intends to present some considerations on a possible epistemology of noise as a response to theory of recognition and its bases on theory of communicative action. The principal movement will be to recover some aspects of Marcuse’s and Foucault’s perspective on the disturbances narratives in social sphere. The interest for them becomes stronger from Habermas’ perspective on their “performative contradicions”. Both of them would appeal to social aspects that escapes from critical normativities. Foucault’s structures of power as well as Marcuse’s psychoanalytical drives would represent aspects of the same Habermasian problem: the absence of auto-critical rationality. However, we can question: what would offer to the two authors the limits of communicative action?
The papers here collected are divided in an English and an Italian section, to facilitate the reader who is confident, or prefers, only one of these languages. In both sections, Critical Theory is addressed in a twofold way: as regards its origins in the so-called School of Frankfurt and as concerns its further and contemporary developments, from an interdisciplinary perspective.