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I propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which the leverage of borrowers as well as banks and housing finance play a crucial role in the model dynamics. The model is used to evaluate the relative effectiveness of a policy to inject capital into banks versus a policy to relieve households of mortgage debt. In normal times, when the economy is near the steady state and policy rates are set according to a Taylor-type rule, capital injections to banks are more effective in stimulating the economy in the long-run. However, in the middle of a housing debt crisis, when households are highly leveraged, the short-run output effects of the debt relief are more substantial. When the zero lower bound (ZLB) is additionally considered, the debt relief policy can be much more powerful in boosting the economy both in the short-run and in the longrun. Moreover, the output effects of the debt relief become increasingly larger, the longer the ZLB is binding.
This paper studies the long-run effects of credit market disruptions on real firm outcomes and how these effects depend on nominal wage rigidities at the firm level. I trace out the long-run investment and growth trajectories of firms which are more adversely affected by a transitory shock to aggregate credit supply. Affected firms exhibit a temporary investment gap for two years following the shock, resulting in a persistent accumulated growth gap. I show that affected firms with a higher degree of wage rigidity exhibit a steeper drop in investment and grow more slowly than affected firms with more flexible wages.
New provisioning rules introduced by IFRS 9 are expected to reduce the procyclicality of provisioning. Heterogeneity among banks in the procyclicality of provisioning may not only reflect the formal accounting rules, but also variation in discretionary provisioning policies. This paper presents empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of provisioning procyclicality among significant banks that are directly supervised by the ECB. In particular, this paper finds that provisioning is relatively procyclical at banks that have i) high loans-to-assets ratios, ii) high shares of non-interest income in total operating income, iii) low capitalization rates, and iv) low total assets. Supervisory guidance provided to banks on how to implement IFRS 9 has mostly been of a qualitative nature, and may prove inadequate to prevent an undesirably wide future variation in provisioning among EU banks.
This paper was provided at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament and commissioned and drafted under the responsibility of the Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) of the European Parliament. It was originally published on the European Parliament’s webpage.
This paper analyzes the bail-in tool under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory private sector involvement (PSI). From this analysis, the key features for an effective bail-in tool can be derived.
These insights serve as the background to make the case that the European resolution framework is likely ineffective in establishing adequate market discipline through risk-reflecting prices for bank capital. The main reason for this lies in the avoidable embeddedness of the BRRD’s bail-in tool in the much broader resolution process, which entails ample discretion of the authorities also in forcing private sector involvement. Moreover, the idea that nearly all positions on the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet should be subjected to bail-in is misguided. Instead, a concentration of PSI in instruments that fall under the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is preferable.
Finally, this paper synthesized the prior analysis by putting forward an alternative regulatory approach that seeks to disentangle private sector involvement as a precondition for effective bank-resolution as much as possible form the resolution process as such.
The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remedy the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) that emanate from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficiently sized minimum of high-quality, easy to bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI’s operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects.
The main problem, echoing the general concerns voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt, at best, only insufficiently. Quite importantly, given the character of typical MREL instruments as non-runnable long-term debt, even if investors are able to gauge the relevant risk of PSI in a bank’s failure correctly at the time of purchase, subsequent adjustment of MREL-prescriptions by competent or resolution authorities potentially change the risk profile of the pertinent instruments. Therefore, original pricing decisions may prove inadequate and so may market discipline that follows from them.
The pending European legislation aims at an implementation of the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by very detailed and case specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning. What gets lost in this approach, however, is the key policy objective of enhanced market discipline through predictable PSI: it is hardly conceivable that the pricing of MREL-instruments reflects an accurate risk-assessment of investors because of the many discretionary choices a multitude of agencies are supposed to make and revisit in the administration of the new regime. To prove this conclusion, this chapter looks in more detail at the regulatory objectives of the BRRD’s prescriptions for MREL and their implementation in the prospectively amended European supervisory and resolution framework.
Crowdfunding is a buzzword that signifies a sub-set in the new forms of finance facilitated by advances in information technology usually categorized as fintech. Concerns for financial stability, investor and consumer protection, or the prevention of money laundering or funding of terrorism hinge incrementally on including the new techniques to initiate financing relationships adequately in the regulatory framework.
This paper analyzes the German regulation of crowdinvesting and finds that it does not fully live up to the regulatory challenges posed by this novel form of digitized matching of supply and demand on capital markets. It should better reflect the key importance of crowdinvesting platforms, which may become critical providers of market infrastructure in the not too distant future. Moreover, platforms can play an important role in investor protection that cannot be performed by traditional disclosure regimes geared towards more seasoned issuers. Against this background, the creation of an exemption from the traditional prospectus regime seems to be a plausible policy choice. However, it needs to be complemented by an adequate regulatory stimulation of platforms’ role as gatekeepers.
The Judgement of the EGC in the Case T-122/15 – Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbank v European Central Bank is the first statement of the European judiciary on the sub-stantive law of the Banking Union. Beyond its specific holding, the decision is of great importance, because it hints at the methodological approach the EGC will take in interpreting prudential banking regulation in the appeals against supervisory measures that fall in its jurisdiction under TFEU, arts. 256(1) subpara 1 and 263(4). Specifically, the case pertained to the scope of direct ECB oversight of significant banks in the euro area and the reassignment of this competence to national competent authorities (NCAs) in individual circumstances (Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation, art. 6(4) subpara 2; SSM Framework Regulation, arts. 70, 71).
This paper analyses the bail-in tool under the BRRD and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory PSI. From this analysis the key features for an effective bail-in tool can be derived. These insights serve as the background to make the case that the European resolution framework is likely ineffective in establishing adequate market discipline through risk-reflecting prices for bank capital. The main reason for this lies in the avoidable embeddedness of the BRRD’s bail-in tool in the much broader resolution process which entails ample discretion of the authorities also in forcing private sector involvement. Finally, this paper synthesized the prior analysis by putting forward an alternative regulatory approach that seeks to disentangle private sector involvement as a precondition for effective bank-resolution as much as possible form the resolution process as such.
The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remedy the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) that emanate from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficiently sized minimum of high-quality, easy to bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI’s operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects.
The main problem, echoing the general concerns voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt, at best, only insufficiently. Quite importantly, given the character of typical MREL instruments as non-runnable long-term debt, even if investors are able to gauge the relevant risk of PSI in a bank’s failure correctly at the time of purchase, subsequent adjustment of MREL-prescriptions by competent or resolution authorities potentially change the risk profile of the pertinent instruments. Therefore, original pricing decisions may prove inadequate and so may market discipline that follows from them.
The pending European legislation aims at an implementation of the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by very detailed and case specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning. What gets lost in this approach, however, is the key policy objective of enhanced market discipline through predictable PSI: it is hardly conceivable that the pricing of MREL-instruments reflects an accurate risk-assessment of investors because of the many discretionary choices a multitude of agencies are supposed to make and revisit in the administration of the new regime. To prove this conclusion, this chapter looks in more detail at the regulatory objectives of the BRRD’s prescriptions for MREL and their implementation in the prospectively amended European supervisory and resolution framework.
During the 1970s, industrial countries, including the US and continental Europa, experienced a combination of slow productivity growth and high unemplyoment. Subsequent research has shown that the standard model of unemployment actually gives counterfactual predictions. Motivated by the observation that the 1970s were also characterized by high and rising inflation, Tesfaselassie and Wolters examine the effect of growth on unemployment in the presence of nominal price rigidity.
The authors demonstrate that the effect of growth on unemployment may be positive or negative. Faster growth leads to lower unemployment if the rate of inflation is high enough. There is a threshold level of inflation below which faster growth leads to higher unemployment and above which faster growth leads to lower unemployment. The threshold level in turn depends on labor market characteristics, such as hiring efficiency, the job destruction rate, workers' relative bargaining power and the opportunity cost of work.
Helmut Siekmann erläutert in seinem Beitrag die Einstandspflicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Deutsche Bundesbank und die Europäische Zentralbank. Dabei kommt er zu dem Schluss, dass weder eine „Haftung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für Verluste der EZB noch eine Verpflichtung zur Auffüllung von aufgezehrtem Eigenkapital“ besteht.
Dieser Beitrag ist zuerst erschienen in: Festschrift für Theodor Baums zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, S. 1145-1179, Helmut Siekmann, Andreas Cahn, Tim Florstedt, Katja Langenbucher, Julia Redenius-Hövermann, Tobias Tröger, Ulrich Segna, Hrsg., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2017
The German savings and cooperative banks of the 19th century were precursors of modern microfinance. They provided access to financial services for the majority of the German population, which was formerly excluded from bank funding. Furthermore, they did this at low costs for themselves and affordable prices for their clients. By creating networks of financially viable and stable financial institutions covering the entire country, they contributed significantly to building a sound and “inclusive” financial infrastructure in Germany. A look back at the history of German savings and cooperative banks and combining these experiences with the lessons learned from modern microfinance can guide current policy and be valuable for present and future models of microfinance business.
To broaden the scope of monetary policy, cash abolishment is often suggested as a means of breaking through the zero lower bound. However, practically nothing is said about the welfare costs of such a proposal. Rösl, Seitz and Tödter argue that the welfare costs of bypassing the zero lower bound can be analyzed analytically and empirically by assuming negative interest rates on cash holdings. They gauge the welfare effects of abolishing cash, both, for the euro area and for Germany.
Their findings suggest that the welfare losses of negative interest rates incurred by money holders are large, notably if implemented in the current low interest rate environment. Imposing a negative interest rate of 3 percentage points on cash holdings and reducing the interest on all assets included in M3 creates a deadweight loss of € 62bn for the euro area and of €18bn for Germany. Therefore, the authors argue that cash abolishment or negative interest rates on cash to break through the zero lower bound at any price can hardly be a meaningful policy goal.
I analyze the real effects of the quality of the judicial enforcement by showing that an increase in the average duration of civil proceedings reduces firms' employment. I exploit a reorganization of court districts in Italy as an exogenous shock to court productivity and, using an instrumental variable approach, estimate an elasticity of employment to average trial length between -0.24 and -0.29. These results are very different from OLS estimates which do not control for endogeneity, and suggest that stronger law enforcement eases financing constraints. The effects are more pronounced in highly levered and more financially dependent firms, and appear to affect mainly firms in less financially developed areas. Revenues respond more slowly than employment to the reform, and wages fall as the judiciary improves. There is no evidence of effects on capital structure and profitability. These results offer a more complete picture of the interplay between legal institutions and real economic outcomes.
Seit 2006 haben die Bundesländer das Recht, den Steuersatz der Grunderwerbsteuer selbst zu bestimmen. Von diesem Recht wurde in den meisten Bundesländern – mit Ausnahme von Bayern und Sachsen – ausgiebig Gebrauch gemacht. Mit dieser Entwicklung sind verschiedene negative Begleiterscheinungen der Steuer weiter in den Vordergrund gerückt. Ausweichreaktionen und Preiseffekte auf dem Immobilienmarkt führten dazu, dass aus jedem Prozent, um das der Steuersatz erhöht wurde, schätzungsweise nur rund 0,6 Prozent zusätzliche Steuereinahmen resultierten, während ohne Ausweichreaktionen und Preiseffekte eine Einnahmenerhöhung um ein Prozent zu erwarten gewesen wäre. Hinter diesem unterproportionalen Aufkommenseffekt sind verschiedene Mechanismen zu vermuten, wie etwa die Umgehung durch den Kauf des Grundvermögens als Teil einer Kapitalgesellschaft.
In Anbetracht der gestiegenen Steuersätze wurde im letzten Bundestagswahlkampf aus CDU sowie FDP der Ruf laut nach einem Freibetrag für Immobilienkäufer, die erworbenes Wohneigentum selbst nutzen möchten. Die Kinderzahl soll den Freibetrag je nach Vorschlag erhöhen.
Der Beitrag diskutiert kritisch die Forderung nach einer Familienkomponente der Grunderwerbssteuer und zeigt darüber hinaus mögliche Alternativen zur Einschränkung der Steuergestaltungen durch Share Deals auf.
We document that natural disasters significantly weaken the stability of banks with business activities in affected regions, as reflected in lower z-scores, higher probabilities of default, higher non-performing assets ratios, higher foreclosure ratios, lower returns on assets and lower bank equity ratios. The effects are economically relevant and suggest that insurance payments and public aid programs do not sufficiently protect bank borrowers against financial difficulties. We also find that the adverse effects on bank stability dissolve after some years if no further disasters occur in the meantime.
People who delay claiming Social Security receive higher lifelong benefits upon retirement. We survey individuals on their willingness to delay claiming later, if they could receive a lump sum in lieu of a higher annuity payment. Using a moment-matching approach, we calibrate a lifecycle model tracking observed claiming patterns under current rules and predict optimal claiming outcomes under the lump sum approach. Our model correctly predicts that early claimers under current rules would delay claiming most when offered actuarially fair lump sums, and for lump sums worth 87% as much, claiming ages would still be higher than at present.
Given rising life expectations around the world, it seems that old-age pension benefits will need to be cut and pension contributions boosted in many nations. Yet our research on old-age system reforms does not require raising mandatory retirement ages or contributions. Instead, we offer ways to enhance incentives for people to work longer and delay retirement. There are good reasons to incentivize older people to work longer and delay retirement. These include rising longevity, the shrinking workforce, and emerging evidence indicating that working longer can be associated with better mental and physical health for many people. Nevertheless, old age Social Security systems in many nations find that people tend to claim benefits early, usually leading to reduced benefits.In the United States, for instance, a majority of Americans claim their Social Security benefits at the earlier feasible age, namely 62, even though their monthly benefits would be 75% higher if they waited until age 70. To test whether this is the result of people underweighting the economic value of higher lifetime benefit streams, we examine whether people would claim later and work longer if they were rewarded with a lump sum instead of a higher lifetime benefit stream for deferring. Two arguments have been offered to explain early claiming. One is that workers claim early to avoid potentially “forfeiting” their deferred benefits should they die too soon (Brown et al., 2016). A second explanation is that many people underweight the economic value of lifetime benefit streams (Brown et al., 2017). This latter rationale motivates the present study.
This paper presents new evidence on the expectation formation process of firms from a survey of the German manufacturing sector. It focuses on the expectation about their future business conditions, which enters the widely followed economic sentiment index and which is an important determinant of their employment and investment decisions. We find that firms extrapolate their experience too much and make predictable forecasting errors. Moreover, firms do not seem to anticipate the upcoming reversals of business cycle peaks and troughs which causes suboptimal adjustment of investment and employment and affects their inventories and profits. However, the impact on expectation errors decreases with the size and the age of the firm as firms learn to reduce their extrapolation bias over time.
We analyze older individuals’ debt and financial vulnerability using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the National Financial Capability Study (NFCS). Specifically, in the HRS we examine three different cohorts (individuals age 56–61) in 1992, 2004, and 2010 to evaluate cross-cohort changes in debt over time. We also use two waves of the NFCS (2012 and 2015) to gain additional insights into debt management and older individuals’ capacity to shield themselves against shocks. We show that recent cohorts have taken on more debt and face more financial insecurity, mostly due to having purchased more expensive homes with smaller down payments.
This study provides a graphic overview on core legislation in the area of economic and financial services. The presentation essentially covers the areas within the responsibility of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON); hence it starts with core ECON areas but also displays neighbouring areas of other Committees' competences which are closely connected to and impacting on ECON's work. It shows legislation in force, proposals and other relevant provisions on banking, securities markets and investment firms, market infrastructure, insurance and occupational pensions, payment services, consumer protection in financial services, the European System of Financial Supervision, European Monetary Union, euro bills and coins and statistics, competition, taxation, commerce and company law, accounting and auditing. Moreover, it notes selected provisions that might become relevant in the upcoming Article 50 TEU negotiations.
We develop a state-space model to decompose bid and ask quotes of CDS into two components, fair default premium and liquidity premium. This approach gives a better estimate of the default premium than mid quotes, and it allows to disentangle and compare the liquidity premium earned by the protection buyer and the protection seller. In contrast to other studies, our model is structurally much simpler, while it also allows for correlation between liquidity and default premia, as supported by empirical evidence. The model is implemented and applied to a large data set of 118 CDS for a period ranging from 2004 to 2010. The model-generated output variables are analyzed in a difference-in-difference framework to determine how the default premium, as well as the liquidity premium of protection buyers and sellers, evolved during different periods of the financial crisis and to which extent they differ for financial institutions compared to non-financials.
We investigate the effect of overreaction in the fine art market. Using a unique sample of auction prices of modern prints, we define an overvalued (undervalued) print as a print that was bought for a price above (below) its high (low) auction pricing estimate. Based on the overreaction hypothesis, we predict that overvalued (undervalued) prints generate a negative (positive) excess return at a subsequent sale. Our empirical findings confirm our expectations. We report that prints that were bought for a price 10 percent above (below) its high (low) pricing estimate generate a positive (negative) excess return of 12 percent (17 percent) after controlling for the general price movement on the prints market. The price correction for overvalued (undervalued) prints is more pronounced during recessions (expansions).
This paper sets the background for the Special Issue of the Journal of Empirical Finance on the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. It identifies the channel through which risks in the financial industry leaked into the public sector. It discusses the role of the bank rescues in igniting the sovereign debt crisis and reviews approaches to detect early warning signals to anticipate the buildup of crises. It concludes with a discussion of potential implications of sovereign distress for financial markets.
This paper applies the theory of structured finance to the regulation of asset backed securities. We find the current regulation in Europe (Article 405 of the CRR) and the US (Section D of Dodd-Frank Act) to be severely flawed with respect to its key intention: the imposition of a strict loss retention requirement. While nominal retention is always 5%, the true level of loss retention varies across available retention options between zero loss retention and full loss retention at the extreme ends. Based on a standard model of structured finance transactions, we propose a new risk retention metric RM measuring the level of an issuer’s skin-in-the-game. The new metric could help to achieve a better implementation of CRR/CRD-IV and DFA, by making disclosure of the RM-number compulsory for all ABS transactions. There are also implications for the operation of rating agencies. On a general level, the RM metric will be instrumental in achieving simplicity and transparency in securitizations (STS).
This paper studies a consumption-portfolio problem where money enters the agent's utility function. We solve the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and provide closed-form solutions for the optimal consumption and portfolio strategy both in an infinite- and finite-horizon setting. For the infinite-horizon problem, the optimal stock demand is one particular root of a polynomial. In the finite-horizon case, the optimal stock demand is given by the inverse of the solution to an ordinary differential equation that can be solved explicitly. We also prove verification results showing that the solution to the Bellman equation is indeed the value function of the problem. From an economic point of view, we find that in the finite-horizon case the optimal stock demand is typically decreasing in age, which is in line with rules of thumb given by financial advisers and also with recent empirical evidence.
After the Lehman-Brothers collapse, the stock index has exceeded its pre-Lehman-Brothers peak by 36% in real terms. Seemingly, markets have been demanding more stocks instead of bonds. Yet, instead of observing higher bond rates, paradoxically, bond rates have been persistently negative after the Lehman-Brothers collapse. To explain this paradox, we suggest that, in the post-Lehman-Brothers period, investors changed their perceptions on disasters, thinking that disasters occur once every 30 years on average, instead of disasters occurring once every 60 years. In our asset-pricing calibration exercise, this rise in perceived market fragility alone can explain the drop in both bond rates and price-dividend ratios observed after the Lehman-Brothers collapse, which indicates that markets mostly demanded bonds instead of stocks.
The paper provides an overview and an economic analysis of the development of the corporate governance of German banks since the 1950s, highlighting peculiarities – as seen from the meanwhile prevailing standard model perspective – of the German case. These peculiarities refer to the specific German notion and legal-institutional regime of corporate governance in general as well as to the specific three-pillar structure of the German banking system.
The most striking changes in the corporate governance of German banks during the past 50 years occurred in the case of the large shareholder-owned banks. For them, capital markets have become an important element of corporate governance, and their former orientation towards the interests of a broadly defined set of stakeholders has largely been replaced by a one-sided concentration on shareholders’ interests. In contrast, the corporate governance regimes of the smaller local public savings banks and the local cooperative banks have remained virtually unchanged. They acknowledge a broader horizon of stakeholder interests and put an emphasis on monitoring.
The Great Financial Crisis, beginning in 2007, has led to a considerable reassessment in the academic and political debate on bank governance. On an international level, it has revived the older notion that, in view of their high leverage and their innate complexity, banks are “special” and bank corporate governance also – and needs to be seen in this light, not least because research indicates that banks with a strong and one-sided shareholder orientation – and thus with what appears to be the best corporate governance according to the standard model – have suffered most in the crisis. In the German case, the crisis has shown that the smaller local banks have survived the crisis much better than large private and public banks, whose funding strongly depends on wholesale markets. This may point to certain advantages of their governance and ownership regimes. But the differences in the performance during the crisis years may also, or even more so, be a consequence of the business models of large vs small banks than of their different governance regimes.
This paper examines the relationship between oil movements and systemic risk of financial institution in major petroleum-based economies. We estimate ΔCoVaR for those institutions and observe the presence of elevated increases in its levels corresponding to the subprime and global financial crises. The results provide evidence in favor of risk measurement improvements by accounting for oil returns in the risk functions. The spread between the standard CoVaR and the CoVaR that includes oil absorbs in a time range longer than the duration of the oil shock. This indicates that the drop in the oil price has a longer effect on risk and requires more time to be discounted by the financial institutions. To support the analysis, we consider also the other major market-based systemic risk measures.
The growth and popularity of defined contribution pensions, along with the government’s increasing attention to retirement plan costs and investment choices provided, make it important to understand how people select their retirement plan investments. This paper shows how employees in a large firm altered their fund allocations when the employer streamlined its pension fund menu and deleted nearly half of the offered funds. Using administrative data, we examine the changes in plan participant investment choices that resulted from the streamlining and how these changes might affect participants’ eventual retirement wellbeing. We show that streamlined participants’ new allocations exhibited significantly lower within-fund turnover rates and expense ratios, and we estimate this could lead to aggregate savings for these participants over a 20-year period of $20.2M, or in excess of $9,400 per participant. Moreover, after the reform, streamlined participants’ portfolios held significantly less equity and exhibited significantly lower risks by way of reduced exposures to most systematic risk factors, compared to their non-streamlined counterparts.
This Chapter explores how an environment of persistent low returns influences saving, investing, and retirement behaviors, as compared to what in the past had been thought of as more “normal” financial conditions. Our calibrated lifecycle dynamic model with realistic tax, minimum distribution, and Social Security benefit rules produces results that agree with observed saving, work, and claiming age behavior of U.S. households. In particular, our model generates a large peak at the earliest claiming age at 62, as in the data. Also in line with the evidence, our baseline results show a smaller second peak at the (system-defined) Full Retirement Age of 66. In the context of a zero-return environment, we show that workers will optimally devote more of their savings to non-retirement accounts and less to 401(k) accounts, since the relative appeal of investing in taxable versus tax-qualified retirement accounts is lower in a low return setting. Finally, we show that people claim Social Security benefits later in a low interest rate environment.
This paper aims to analyze the effects of financial constraints and the financial crisis on the financing and investment policies of newly founded firms. Thereby, the analysis adds important new insights on a crucial segment of the economy. We make use of a large and comprehensive data set of French firms founded in the years 2004-2006, i.e. well before the financial crisis. Our panel data analysis shows that the global financial crisis imposed a shock (mostly demand-driven) on the financing as well as on the investments of these firms. Moreover, we find that financially constrained firms use less external debt financing and invest smaller amounts. They also rely on less trade credit. With regard to bank financing, newly founded firms which are more financially constrained accumulate less bank debt and repay initial bank debt slower than their non-financially constraint counterparts. Finally, we find that financially constrained firms are affected to a smaller degree by the financial crisis than their less financially constrained counterparts.
Effective market discipline incentivizes financial institutions to limit their risk-taking behavior, making it a key element for financial regulation. However, without adequate incentives to monitor and control the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions market discipline erodes. As a consequence, bailing out financial institutions, as happened unprecedentedly during the recent financial crisis, may impose indirect costs to financial stability if bailout expectations of investors change. Analyzing US data covering the period between 2004 and 2014, Hett und Schmidt (2017) find that market participants adjusted their bailout expectations in response to government interventions, undermining market discipline mechanisms. Given these findings, policymakers need to take into account the potential effects on market discipline when deciding about public support to troubled financial institutions in the future. Considering the parallelism of events and public responses during the financial crisis as well as the recent developments of Italian banks, these results not only concern the US, but also have important implications for European financial markets and policy makers.
We theoretically and empirically study large-scale portfolio allocation problems when transaction costs are taken into account in the optimization problem. We show that transaction costs act on the one hand as a turnover penalization and on the other hand as a regularization, which shrinks the covariance matrix. As an empirical framework, we propose a flexible econometric setting for portfolio optimization under transaction costs, which incorporates parameter uncertainty and combines predictive distributions of individual models using optimal prediction pooling. We consider predictive distributions resulting from highfrequency based covariance matrix estimates, daily stochastic volatility factor models and regularized rolling window covariance estimates, among others. Using data capturing several hundred Nasdaq stocks over more than 10 years, we illustrate that transaction cost regularization (even to small extent) is crucial in order to produce allocations with positive Sharpe ratios. We moreover show that performance differences between individual models decline when transaction costs are considered. Nevertheless, it turns out that adaptive mixtures based on high-frequency and low-frequency information yield the highest performance. Portfolio bootstrap reveals that naive 1=N-allocations and global minimum variance allocations (with and without short sales constraints) are significantly outperformed in terms of Sharpe ratios and utility gains.
We show an ambivalent role of high-frequency traders (HFTs) in the Eurex Bund Futures market around high-impact macroeconomic announcements and extreme events. Around macroeconomic announcements, HFTs serve as market makers, post competitive spreads, and earn most of their profits through liquidity supply. Right before the announcement, however, HFTs significantly widen spreads and cause a rapid but short-lived drying-out of liquidity. In turbulent periods, such as after the U.K. Brexit announcement, HFTs shift their focus from market making activities to aggressive (but not necessarily profitable) directional strategies. Then, HFT activity becomes dominant and market quality can degrade.
Exploiting NASDAQ order book data and difference-in-differences methodology, we identify the distinct effects of trading pause mechanisms introduced on U.S. stock exchanges after May 2010. We show that the mere existence of such a regulation constitutes a safeguard which makes market participants behave differently in anticipation of a pause. Pauses tend to break local price trends, make liquidity suppliers revise positions, and enhance price discovery. In contrast, pauses do not have a “cool off” effect on markets, but rather accelerate volatility and bid-ask spreads. This implies a regulatory trade-off between the protective role of trading pauses and their adverse effects on market quality.
The publication of the Liikanen Group's final report in October 2012 was surrounded by high expectations regarding the implementation of the reform plans through the proposed measures that reacted to the financial and sovereign debt crises. The recommendations mainly focused on introducing a mild version of banking separation and the creation of the preconditions for bail-in measures. In this article, we present an overview of the regulatory reforms, to which the financial sector has been subject over the past years in accordance with the concepts laid out in the Liikanen Report. It becomes clear from our assessment that more specific steps have yet to be taken before the agenda is accomplished. In particular, bail-in rules must be implemented more consistently. Beyond the question of the required minimum, the authors develop the notion of a maximum amount of liabilities subject to bail-in. The combination of both components leads to a three-layer structure of bank capital: a bail-in tranche, a deposit-insured bailout tranche, and an intermediate run-endangered mezzanine tranche. The size and treatment of the latter must be put to a political debate that weighs the costs and benefits of a further increase in financial stability beyond that achieved through loss-bearing of the bail-in tranche.
According to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), introduced as a lesson from the recent financial crisis, the losses a failing bank incurred should generally be borne by its investors. Before a minimum bail-in has occurred, government money can only be injected in emergency cas-es to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy and to preserve financial stability. This policy letter argues that in case of the Italian Bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), which the Italian gov-ernment currently plans to bail out, a resolution would most likely not cause such a systemic event. A bailout contrary to the existing rules will lead to a mispricing of bank capital and retard the re-structuring of the European banking sector, the authors write. They appeal to the European Central Bank, the Systemic Risk Board and the EU Commission to follow the rules as the test-case MPS will have a direct impact on the credibility of the new BRRD regime and the responsible institutions.
Coming (great) events cast their (long) shadow before. As the financial crisis gave birth to the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), the imminent Brexit now serves as an impulse to rather extensively reorganize it. Pursuant to the preferences of the Commission—as revealed in its draft for a regulation amending the regulations founding the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA)—the supervision (and regulation) of the financial sectors should be further centralized and integrated and additional powers should be given to the ESAs. To a large degree these alterations are intended to adjust the competences of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to better meet its new objectives under the Capital Markets Union (“CMU”). In view that an equivalent to the CMU or the Banking Union—in the sense of a European Insurance Union—is not yet on the horizon for the insurance sector (or the occupational pensions sector), one could prima vista take the view that insurance supervision and regulation is once again taken captive by the necessity of regulatory reforms stemming from other financial sectors. However, even if that is partially the case, the outcome of the intended reforms might still be advantageous for the insurance sector and an important step in the right direction. Therefore, it needs to be intensively discussed.
At this stage, some of the most prominent envisioned changes to the structure, tasks and powers of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and their necessity, usefulness or counter-productivity still have to be examined.
Empirical evidence suggests that investments in research and development (R&D) by older and larger firms are more spread out internationally than R&D investments by younger and smaller firms. In this paper, I explore the quantitative implications of this type of heterogeneity by assuming that incumbents, i.e. current monopolists engaging in incremental innovation, have a higher degree of internationalization in their R&D technologies than entrants, i.e. new firms engaging in radical innovation, in a two-country endogenous growth general equilibrium model. In particular, this assumption allows the model to break the perfect correlation between incumbents’ and entrants’ innovation probabilities and to match the empirical counterpart exactly.
We introduce an innovative approach to measure bank integration, based on the corporate culture of multinational banking conglomerates. The new measure, the Power Index, assesses the prevalence of a language of power and authority in the financial reports of global banks. We employ a two-step approach: as a first step, we investigate whether parent-bank or parent-country characteristics are more important for bank integration. In a second step, we analyze whether bank integration affects the transmission of shocks across borders. We find that the level of integration of global banks is determined by parent-bank-specific factors, as well as by the social centralization in the parent’s country: ethnically diverse and linguistically homogenous countries nurture decentralized corporate structures. Political and economic factors, such as corruption, political rights and economic development also affect bank integration. Furthermore, we find that organizational integration affects the transmission of exogenous shocks from parent banks to their subsidiaries: the more centralized a global bank is, the lower the lending of its subsidiaries after a solvency shock. Wholesale shocks do not appear to be transmitted through this channel. Also, past experience with solvency shocks reduces the integration between parents and subsidiaries.
We investigate how solvency and wholesale funding shocks to 84 OECD parent banks affect the lending of 375 foreign subsidiaries. We find that parent solvency shocks are more important than wholesale funding shocks for subsidiary lending. Furthermore, we find that parent undercapitalization does not affect the transmission of shocks, while wholesale shocks transmit to foreign subsidiaries of parents that rely primarily on wholesale funding. We also find that transmission is affected by the strategic role of the subsidiary for the parent and follows a locational, rather than an organizational pecking order. Surprisingly, liquidity regulation exacerbates the transmission of adverse wholesale shocks. We further document that parent banks tend to use their own capital and liquidity buffers first, before transmitting. Finally, we show that solvency shocks have higher impact on large subsidiary banks with low growth opportunities in mature markets.
On average young people \undersave" whereas old people \oversave" with respect to the rational expectations model of life-cycle consumption and savings. According to numerous studies on subjective survival beliefs, young people also \underestimate" whereas old people \overestimate" their objective survival chances on average. We take a structural behavioral economics approach to jointly address both empirical phenomena by embedding subjective survival beliefs that are consistent with these biases into a rank-dependent utility (RDU) model over life-cycle consumption. The resulting consumption behavior is dynamically inconsistent. Considering both naive and sophisticated RDU agents we show that within this framework underestimation of young age and overestimation of old age survival probabilities may (but need not) give rise to the joint occurrence of undersaving and oversaving. In contrast to this RDU model, the familiar quasi-hyperbolic discounting (QHD), which is nested as a special case, cannot generate oversaving.
The long-run consumption risk model provides a theoretically appealing explanation for prominent asset pricing puzzles, but its intricate structure presents a challenge for econometric analysis. This paper proposes a two-step indirect inference approach that disentangles the estimation of the model's macroeconomic dynamics and the investor's preference parameters. A Monte Carlo study explores the feasibility and efficiency of the estimation strategy. We apply the method to recent U.S. data and provide a critical re-assessment of the long-run risk model's ability to reconcile the real economy and financial markets. This two-step indirect inference approach is potentially useful for the econometric analysis of other prominent consumption-based asset pricing models that are equally difficult to estimate.
A counterparty credit limit (CCL) is a limit imposed by a financial institution to cap its maximum possible exposure to a specified counterparty. Although CCLs are designed to help institutions mitigate counterparty risk by selective diversification of their exposures, their implementation restricts the liquidity that institutions can access in an otherwise centralized pool. We address the question of how this mechanism impacts trade prices and volatility, both empirically and via a new model of trading with CCLs. We find empirically that CCLs cause little impact on trade. However, our model highlights that in extreme situations, CCLs could serve to destabilize prices and thereby influence systemic risk.
We compare the cost effectiveness of two pronatalist policies:
(a) child allowances; and
(b) daycare subsidies.
We pay special attention to estimating how intended fertility (fertility before children are born) responds to these policies. We use two evaluation tools:
(i) a dynamic model on fertility, labor supply, outsourced childcare time, parental time, asset accumulation and consumption; and
(ii) randomized vignette-survey policy experiments.
We implement both tools in the United States and Germany, finding consistent evidence that daycare subsidies are more cost effective. Nevertheless, the required public expenditure to increase fertility to the replacement level might be viewed as prohibitively high.
This paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability in the Banking Union. There is no uniform global model regarding the relationship between monetary policy-making on the one hand, and prudential supervision on the other. Before the crisis, EU Member States followed different approaches, some of them uniting monetary and supervisory functions in one institution, others assigning them to different, neatly separated institutions. The financial crisis has underlined that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other, especially in case of systemic events. Even in normal times, monetary and supervisory decisions might conflict with each other. After the crisis, some jurisdictions have moved towards a more holistic approach under which monetary policy takes supervisory considerations into account, while supervisory decisions pay due regard to monetary policy.
The Banking Union puts prudential supervision in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), the institution responsible for monetary policy. Nevertheless, at its establishment there was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation in the discharge of its different functions. This raises the question whether the ECB may pursue a holistic approach to monetary policy and supervisory decision-making, respectively. On the basis of a purposive reading of the monetary policy mandate and the SSM Regulation, the paper answers this question in the affirmative. Effective monetary policy (or supervision) requires financial stability (or smooth monetary policy transmission). Moreover, without a holistic approach, the SSM Regulation is more likely to provoke the adoption of mutually defeating decisions by the Governing Board. The reputation of the ECB would suffer considerably under such a situation – in a field where reputation is of paramount importance for effective policy.
As any meticulous separation between monetary and supervisory functions turns out to be infeasible, the paper explores the reasons. Parting from Katharina Pistor’s legal theory of finance, which puts the emphasis on exogenous factors to explain the (non)enforcement of legal rules, the paper suggests a legal instability theorem which focuses on endogenous reasons, such as law’s indeterminacy, contextuality, and responsiveness to democratic deliberation. This raises the question whether the holistic approach would be democratically legitimate under the current framework of the ESCB. The idea of technocratic legitimacy that exempts the ECB from representative structures is effectively called into question by the legal instability theorem. This does not imply that the independence of the ECB should be given up, as there are no viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem. Rather, any solution might benefit from recognizing the ECB in its mixed technocratic and political shape as a centerpiece of European integration and improving.
On 15 August 2017, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) referred the case against the European Central Bank’s policy of Quantitative Easing (QE) to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The author argues that this event differs in several aspects from the OMT case in 2015 – in content as well as in form. The BVerfG recognizes that it is a legitimate goal of the ECB’s monetary policy to bring inflation up close to 2%, and that the instrument employed for QE is one of monetary policy. However, it doubts whether the sheer volume of QE would not distort the character of the program as one of monetary policy. The ECJ will now have to clarify the extent to which the ECJ’s findings in its OMT judgment are relevant for QE as well as the standard of review applicable to monetary policy. The author raises the questions of whether the principle of democracy under German constitutional law can actually provide the standard by which the ECB is to be measured, and how tight judicial review could be exercised over the ECB without encroaching upon its autonomy in monetary policy matters – and thus upon the very essence of central bank independence.
Low probability events are overweighted in the pricing of out-of the-money index puts and single stock calls. We find that this behavioral bias is strongly time-varying, linked to equity market sentiment, and higher moments of the risk-neutral density. An implied volatility (IV) sentiment measure that is jointly derived from index and single stock options explains investors' overweight of tail events the best. Our findings also suggest that IV-sentiment predicts equity markets reversals better than overweight of small probabilities itself. When employed in a trading strategy, IV-sentiment delivers economically significant results, which are more consistent than the ones produced by the market sentiment factor. The joint use of information from the single stock and index option markets seems to explain the forecasting power of IV-sentiment. Out-of-sample tests on reversal prediction show that our IV-sentiment measure adds value over and above traditional factors in the equity risk premium literature, especially as an equity-buying signal. This reversals prediction seems to improve time-series and cross-sectional momentum strategies.
We test two hypotheses, based on sexual selection theory, about gender differences in costly social interactions. Differential selectivity states that women invest less than men in interactions with new individuals. Differential opportunism states that women’s investment in social interactions is less responsive to information about the interaction’s payoffs. The hypotheses imply that women’s social networks are more stable and path dependent and composed of a greater proportion of strong relative to weak links. During their introductory week, we let new university students play an experimental trust game, first with one anonymous partner, then with the same and a new partner. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that women invest less than men in new partners and that their investments are only half as responsive to information about the likely returns to the investment. Moreover, subsequent formation of students’ real social networks is consistent with the experimental results: being randomly assigned to the same introductory group has a much larger positive effect on women’s likelihood of reporting a subsequent friendship.