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This study explores the implications of rising markups for optimal Mirrleesian income and profit taxation. Using a stylized model with two individuals, the main forces shaping welfare-optimal policies are analytically characterized. Although a higher profit tax has redistributive benefits, it adversely affects market competition, leading to a greater equilibrium cost-of-living. Rising markups directly contribute to a decline in optimal marginal taxes on labor income. The optimal policy response to higher markups includes increasingly relying on the profit tax to fund redistribution. Declining optimal marginal income taxes assists the redistributive function of the profit tax by contributing to the expansion of the profit tax base. This response alone considerably increases the equilibrium cost-of-living. Nevertheless, a majority of the individuals become better off with the optimal policy. If it is not possible to tax profits optimally, due, for example, to profit shifting, increasing redistribution via income taxes is not optimal; every individual is worse off relative to the scenario with optimal profit taxation.
Lisa Cronjäger untersucht entlang einer aus dem 19. Jahrhundert stammenden forstwissenschaftlichen Taxationskarte von Claës Wilhelm Gyldén, auf welche Weise Zukunft als kartografische Projektion entworfen wird. Das Ziel von Gyldén, den Holzertrag eines Waldes prognostisch zu regulieren, wird hierbei über diagrammatische und kalkulatorische Berechnungs- und Darstellungsverfahren erst möglich gemacht. Die Imagination einer genauen Planbarkeit von Ressourcennutzung, kartografische Genauigkeit und die Unterdrückung von (subalternen) Waldnutzungspraktiken bedingen sich in dieser Konstellation gegenseitig.