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This paper considers a trading game in which sequentially arriving liquidity traders either opt for a market order or for a limit order. One class of traders is considered to have an extended trading horizon, implying their impatience is linked to their trading orientation. More specifically, sellers are considered to have a trading horizon of two periods, whereas buyers only have a single-period trading scope (the extended buyer-horizon case is completely symmetric). Clearly, as the life span of their submitted limit orders is longer, this setting implies sellers are granted a natural advantage in supplying liquidity. This benefit is hampered, however, by the direct competition arising between consecutively arriving sellers. Closed-form characterizations for the order submission strategies are obtained when solving for the equilibrium of this dynamic game. These allow to examine how these forces affect traders´ order placement decisions. Further, the analysis yields insight into the dynamic process of price formation and into the market clearing process of a non-intermediated, order driven market.