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The paper analyses the contagion channels of the European financial system through the stochastic block model (SBM). The model groups homogeneous connectivity patterns among the financial institutions and describes the shock transmission mechanisms of the financial networks in a compact way. We analyse the global financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis and show that the network exhibits a strong community structure with two main blocks acting as shock spreader and receiver, respectively. Moreover, we provide evidence of the prominent role played by insurances in the spread of systemic risk in both crises. Finally, we demonstrate that policy interventions focused on institutions with inter-community linkages (community bridges) are more effective than the ones based on the classical connectedness measures and represents consequently, a better early warning indicator in predicting future financial losses.
Understanding the shift from micro to macro-prudential thinking: a discursive network analysis
(2016)
While some economists argued for macro-prudential regulation pre-crisis, the macro-prudential approach and its emphasis on endogenously created systemic risk have only gained prominence post-crisis. Employing discourse and network analysis on samples of the most cited scholarly works on banking regulation as well as on systemic risk (60 sources each) from 1985 to 2014, we analyze the shift from micro to macro-prudential thinking in the shift to the post crisis period. Our analysis demonstrates that the predominance of formalism, particularly, partial equilibrium analysis along with the exclusion of historical and practitioners’ styles of reasoning from banking regulatory studies impeded economists from engaging seriously with the endogenous sources of systemic risk prior to the crisis. Post-crisis, these topics became important in this discourse, but the epistemological failures of banking regulatory studies pre-crisis were not sufficiently recognized. Recent attempts to conceptualize and price systemic risk as a negative externality point to the persistence of formalism and equilibrium thinking, with its attending dangers of incremental innovation due to epistemological barriers constrains theoretical progress, by excluding observed phenomena, which cannot yet be accommodated in mathematical models.
This paper investigates systemic risk in the insurance industry. We first analyze the systemic contribution of the insurance industry vis-à-vis other industries by applying 3 measures, namely the linear Granger causality test, conditional value at risk and marginal expected shortfall, on 3 groups, namely banks, insurers and non-financial companies listed in Europe over the last 14 years. We then analyze the determinants of the systemic risk contribution within the insurance industry by using balance sheet level data in a broader sample. Our evidence suggests that i) the insurance industry shows a persistent systemic relevance over time and plays a subordinate role in causing systemic risk compared to banks, and that ii) within the industry, those insurers which engage more in non-insurance-related activities tend to pose more systemic risk. In addition, we are among the first to provide empirical evidence on the role of diversification as potential determinant of systemic risk in the insurance industry. Finally, we confirm that size is also a significant driver of systemic risk, whereas price-to-book ratio and leverage display counterintuitive results.