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This contribution draws on two recent publications in which the macroeconomic model data base (www.macromodelbase.com) is employed for model comparisons. The comparative approach is used to base policy analysis on a systematic evaluation of the different implications that a certain economic policy can have when submitted to different modeling approaches. In this manner, policy recommendations are more robust to modeling uncertainty. By extending the comparative approach to forecasting, the authors investigate the accuracy of different forecasting models and obtain more reliable mean forecasts.
In 2011 wurde der Preis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der schwedischen Reichsbank im Gedenken an Alfred Nobel an die US-Ökonomen Thomas J. Sargent von der New York University und Chistopher A. Sims von Princeton University verliehen. Gerade deutsche Zeitungskommentare kritisierten die Forscher vielfach für die Verwendung „unrealistischer“ Annahmen wie Nutzenmaximierung und rationale Erwartungen. Diese Kritik verkennt den maßgeblichen Beitrag von Sargent und Sims zur Entwicklung der modernen Makroökonomik. Ihre empirischen Methoden sind heute Standardwerkzeuge der akademischen Forschung und werden auch von Ökonomen in Zentralbanken, Finanzministerien und internationalen Organisationen eingesetzt. Sie haben grundlegende neue Erkenntnisse ermöglicht, zum Beispiel über die Wirkungsweise der Geld- und Fiskalpolitik.
Schlechte Erfahrungen
(2012)
Eine Transaktionssteuer auf Finanzgeschäfte würde weniger Geld einbringen, als viele ihrer Anhänger hoffen - und sie birgt gravierende ökonomische und juristische Risiken. Die Bundesregierung sollte sich der Belastungen durch eine Finanztransaktionssteuer bewusst sein – und sie nicht ohne Beteiligung der weltweit führenden Finanzplätze einführen. Eine internationale Einigung auf strengere Eigenkapitalvorschriften für Banken muss Vorrang haben.
In its decision of December 13, 2011, the Constitutional Court of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia ruled that a State Court of Auditors is granted by the constitution a broad scope of powers not only to control the immediate state administration but also entities outside the direct state administration, as far as they exercise financial responsibility for the state. This ruling may have serious implications for the capital guarantees extended by EU Member States to the newly established institutions on the European level, as for instance the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
After initial temporary measures in support of Greece prooved insufficient to end the sovereign debt crisis, extensive countermeasures have ensued. The heads of state of the euro group have agreed to permanent support mechanims over the course of the past two years. In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) has become involved in the assistance program. The article provides an overview of the various support mechanisms installed and cautions against the connected legal problems.
Der Beitrag diskutiert den unlängst veröffentlichten Referentenentwurf eines Finanzstabilitätsgesetzes, der vorsieht, dass die Bundesbank ab 2013 ein Mandat zur makroprudenziellen Überwachung bekommt. Die Entscheidungen über die Vorschläge, die sich vor allem an die Bundesregierung oder an die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Bafin) richten dürften, wird ein neuer Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität beim Bundesfinanzministerium treffen. Der Autor befasst sich mit der Zusammensetzung dieses Ausschusses und mit den Instrumenten, die für die Umsetzung der Empfehlungen des Ausschusses zur Verfügung stehen.
We introduce a new measure of systemic risk, the change in the conditional joint probability of default, which assesses the effects of the interdependence in the financial system on the general default risk of sovereign debtors. We apply our measure to examine the fragility of the European financial system during the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. Our analysis documents an increase in systemic risk contributions in the euro area during the post-Lehman global recession and especially after the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. We also find a considerable potential for cascade effects from small to large euro area sovereigns. When we investigate the effect of sovereign default on the European Union banking system, we find that bigger banks, banks with riskier activities, with poor asset quality, and funding and liquidity constraints tend to be more vulnerable to a sovereign default. Surprisingly, an increase in leverage does not seem to influence systemic vulnerability.
We outline a procedure for consistent estimation of marginal and joint default risk in the euro area financial system. We interpret the latter risk as the intrinsic financial system fragility and derive several systemic fragility indicators for euro area banks and sovereigns, based on CDS prices. Our analysis documents that although the fragility of the euro area banking system had started to deteriorate before Lehman Brothers' file for bankruptcy, investors did not expect the crisis to affect euro area sovereigns' solvency until September 2008. Since then, and especially after November 2009, joint sovereign default risk has outpaced the rise of systemic risk within the banking system.
The idea of appointing a non-national as Central Bank Governor remains surprisingly controversial. Nevertheless, given the skills required by the Governor in order to manage what no doubt are increasingly complex institutions, considering non-nationals makes good sense for at least two reasons. First, increasing the pool of candidates to include those with broader skills and backgrounds makes it easier to find a suitable person for the job. Second, non-nationals are less likely to be beholden to domestic pressure groups and could help better insulate the central bank from political pressures.